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Unpacking Entrepreneurial Ecosystem Health: An 
Entrepreneurial Process Approach 
Xianwei Shi 
ABSTRACT 
What makes an entrepreneurial region stand out among the crowds? On the one hand, regional 
entrepreneurship literature highlights the impacts of regional context and structures on regional 
entrepreneurship, but fails to reveal the reciprocity between them, i.e., how regional 
entrepreneurship could in turn benefit regional context in order to sustain the new venture 
creation activities over time. On the other hand, although entrepreneurial ecosystem literature 
provides a new perspective to understand regional entrepreneurship in context by shedding 
light on the structures and building blocks of an entrepreneurial ecosystem, relatively less is 
known about what dimensions and factors contribute to the performance and competitiveness 
that signify the ecosystem’s ability to continuously create new ventures in the region. Hence, 
this research asks: how do we unpack the health of an entrepreneurial ecosystem? 
Following an inductive approach, a qualitative study on two exemplary entrepreneurial 
ecosystems – Silicon Valley, US, and Shenzhen, China – was conducted. For each ecosystem, 
its evolution over time was revealed first, highlighting critical events and start-ups in different 
lifecycle stages of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Then the entrepreneurial processes of key 
start-ups – Fairchild-Intel, Apple, Google and Tesla in Silicon Valley and Huawei, Tencent and 
DJI in Shenzhen – as well as their interactions with the ecosystems were analysed. The primary 
data is mainly from semi-structured interviews with informants pertinent to different players 
in the ecosystems, as well as employees who are familiar with the entrepreneurial processes of 
the key companies identified. Primary data was complemented and triangulated with secondary 
data mainly from academic papers, archives, online articles from reliable sources, books and 
monographs, as well as biographies of key companies and their founders, etc. 
 
 III 
The findings show that entrepreneurial ecosystem health consists of six dimensions: ecosystem 
resources (supply-side, intermediary, and demand-side resources), entrepreneurial process 
(resource acquisition in opportunity and organisational creation stages, resource exploitation 
in organisational creation and technology set-up stages, resource feedback in market exchange 
and exit stages), ecosystem performance (regional economic impact and regional 
entrepreneurship performance), ecosystem robustness (resource replenishment and recycling), 
ecosystem adaptation (resource diversification and exit), and enabling conditions for resource 
dynamisms (three sets of conditions for resource replenishment and recycling, for resource 
diversification, as well as for resource exit, respectively). This dissertation also sheds light on 
how resource acquisition, exploitation and feedback in individual entrepreneurial processes 
contribute to the resource dynamisms in entrepreneurial ecosystems. With these health 
dimensions and resource dynamisms, an integrated process model revealing how a healthy 
entrepreneurial ecosystem continuously creates new ventures is provided. It is argued that, 
from the entrepreneurial process perspective, the health of an entrepreneurial ecosystem 
divulges its current performance in relation to new venture creation and the expectation of 
whether its ability to continuously create new ventures will be sustained or even grow. 
This dissertation seeks to contribute to entrepreneurial ecosystem literature with the 
conceptualisation of entrepreneurial ecosystem health. The resource dynamisms bridge the gap 
between individual entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial ecosystems and shed light on how 
resource-accessing behaviours in individual entrepreneurial processes contribute to the 
ecosystem-level resource dynamisms. The integrative process model contributes to the regional 
entrepreneurship literature by elaborating on the feedback impacts of regional entrepreneurship 
on regional resources. Finally, a resource-based view of entrepreneurial ecosystems is provided, 
which addresses the necessity of facilitating sufficient resource dynamisms within and outside 
of the ecosystems in pursuit of ecosystem health. This dissertation has implications for 
governments to guide their policy initiatives by informing them of the health of their regional 
entrepreneurial ecosystems in order to maximise the economic return and societal utilities. It 
also has implications for individual entrepreneurs in terms of their location choices and how to 
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1.1 Research background 
As entrepreneurship and new venture creation have become important sources of economic 
growth and essential lubricants for regional development in recent years (Benneworth, 2004), 
discussions around entrepreneurship and regional development have become popular among 
academics, policymakers and industry practitioners. In developed economies such as the 
United States, regions like Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1996) and the Greater Boston Area (Best, 
2014) have grown to the poplars of global entrepreneurship and innovation since WWII. In 
Europe, Cambridge, UK (Garnsey, Lorenzoni, and Ferriani, 2008), also known as ‘Silicon Fen’, 
has gained considerable attentions in terms of research and technology enabled 
entrepreneurship. The successful stories of these entrepreneurial regions make one wonder why 
and how they have gained their triumph, and whether their success could be replicated 
elsewhere. Indeed, interests among policy makers and industry practitioners have burgeoned 
over the past twenty years in terms of monitoring regional entrepreneurship
1
 and promoting 
regional development. For example, many developing countries have issued policies to foster 
new venture creation activities
2
, such as the Chinese government’s ‘Mass Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship’
3
 in order to boost regional economic growth. Over the past few years, 
prominent regions like Beijing, Shenzhen, Hangzhou and Shanghai have become the central 
locus of new venture creation activities in China: impactful start-ups including Tencent, 
Alibaba, and Baidu have changed lives of normal Chinese people dramatically. 
However, a fundamental question that challenges policy makers and industry practitioners is 
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that why some regions stand out in terms of new venture creation among the many regions 
within and outside their own countries. Specifically, what are the key factors that contribute to 
their success and what could be the underlying mechanisms for their sustained performance of 
new venture creation over the years? Answers to these questions bear enormous implications 
for regional and national governments to issue appropriate policies for promoting regional 
entrepreneurship and economic development. 
On the academic side, extant research suggests that munificent regional structures and contexts 
precipitates regional entrepreneurship (Müller, 2016). These regional structures and contexts 
could include different resources required by entrepreneurs to fulfil their entrepreneurial 
journeys, such as financial, knowledge, and human capitals, infrastructures, local value chains 
and research institutes etc. Indeed, scholars have come to realise that entrepreneurs do not 
create their ventures in a vacuum (Van De Ven, 1993). Rather, new venture creation activities 
are deeply embedded within and enabled by the regional socio-economic systems, and new 
venture creation activities could in turn alter the existing regional structures. A system 
perspective is therefore needed to understand the reciprocity between entrepreneurship and 
regional development. Early efforts in outlining such reciprocity include the infrastructure of 
entrepreneurship (Van De Ven, 1993) and entrepreneurship systems (Spilling, 1996).  
The concept of entrepreneurial ecosystem, which emerged with a strong policy flavour 
(Isenberg, 2011), describes the regional communities consisting of multiple interdependent and 
co-evolving actors involved in the new venture creation processes (Autio et al., 2018; Cohen, 
2006; Mack and Mayer, 2015; Spigel, 2017). Such a regional entrepreneurial ecosystem 
consists of various domains that facilitate new venture creation and also evolves over time 
(Isenberg, 2011; Mack and Mayer, 2015). Over the past few years, the ecosystem construct has 
become a new lens to examine regional entrepreneurship (Brown and Mason, 2017). Despite 
the flourish of regional entrepreneurship literature, significant gaps remain in the emerging 
entrepreneurial ecosystem literature, and these gaps provide opportunities to further explore 
the reciprocity between entrepreneurship and regional development, as well as the 
heterogeneities in regional entrepreneurship.  
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Firstly, research has been surprisingly scarce on the performance or competitiveness of an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. Although numerous literature on business ecosystems and clusters 
has raised the importance of maintaining a healthy ecosystem/cluster for all players involved 
(Iansiti and Levien, 2004a; Porter, 2000), the critical dimensions for the ecosystem to sustain 
new venture creation continuously over time still remain ambiguous. Differing from previous 
literature on performance and determinants of regional entrepreneurships (Davidsson, 1991), 
this dissertation is not looking for traditional performance indicators for the health of 
entrepreneurial ecosystems, as doing so will undermine the novelty of the concept.  
Secondly, although some research has focused on ecosystem lifecycle (Mack and Mayer, 2015), 
ecosystem process (Spigel and Harrison, 2018), and ecosystem structural models (Autio et al., 
2018), more insights on how entrepreneurial ecosystems evolve, and especially how 
ecosystems co-evolve with actors as well as the resultant implications, can be offered via 
further empirical research (Acs et al., 2017).  
Thirdly, the reciprocity of entrepreneurial ecosystems and ecosystem actors is not fully 
understood. Although extant literature has demonstrated how regional resources precipitate 
regional entrepreneurship, relatively less is known about whether and how regional 
entrepreneurship, in turn, benefits regional resources and contexts (Müller, 2016).  
Finally, extant research has shed less light on how individual entrepreneurs are relevant in 
entrepreneurial ecosystems. As entrepreneurs’ activities may well change the ecosystem 
(Thompson, Purdy, and Ventresca, 2018) collectively, examining the health of entrepreneurial 
ecosystems from an entrepreneurial process perspective may offer opportunities to reveal the 
underlying mechanisms. 
1.2 Research question and objectives 




How do we unpack the concept of entrepreneurial ecosystem health from 
an entrepreneurial process perspective? 
To answer the overarching research question, this dissertation is aimed at: 
Ø Identifying the key dimensions that constitute entrepreneurial ecosystem health 
Ø Identifying the resource dynamisms underlying the entrepreneurial ecosystems and their 
linkages to micro entrepreneurial processes 
Ø Understanding how a healthy entrepreneurial ecosystem durably facilitates new venture 
creation over time 
1.3 Dissertation structure 
As is shown in Figure 1-1, this dissertation is structured as follows:  
Chapter 2 introduces key interdisciplinary linkages and antecedents for entrepreneurial 
ecosystems, and regional entrepreneurship literature, as well as the related concepts of ‘health’ 
in various domains. Research gaps and research questions are identified at the end of the 
literature review.  
In Chapter 3, research design employing a multiple embedded case design is adopted, with two 
levels of unit of analysis being ecosystem-level and entrepreneurial firm-level. Silicon Valley 
and Shenzhen have been selected as the case regions and their respective entrepreneurial firms 
in different time frames have also been identified. Primary data including site visits and 
interviews with key informants in both regions, and secondary data including books, websites 
and biographies etc. were used in the analysis. It also introduces how this dissertation has 
combined process data analysis, inductive coding and cross-case analysis. 
In Chapter 4, the evolution of Shenzhen and Silicon Valley entrepreneurial ecosystems is 




Chapter 5 identifies six dimensions: ecosystem resources, entrepreneurial process, ecosystem 
performance, ecosystem robustness, ecosystem adaptation, and enabling conditions for 
resource dynamisms, answering to the first sub research question ‘what are the dimensions for 
entrepreneurial ecosystem health’ 
Chapter 6 serves to answer the second sub research question ‘How do individual 
entrepreneurial activities contribute to collective entrepreneurial ecosystem health’, by 
identifying the underlying relationships between individual level resource accessing 
behaviours and the ecosystem level resource dynamisms.  
Chapter 7 integrates findings from Chapter 5 and 6, and explicates a process model to answer 
the third sub research question ‘How does a healthy entrepreneurial ecosystem facilitate new 
venture creation’. The process model presents a closed loop that details how a healthy 
entrepreneurial ecosystem could durably facilitate new venture creation even upon external 
disruption. A formal definition of entrepreneurial ecosystem health taking a dynamic and 
process perspective is proposed.  
Chapter 8 discusses how this dissertation contributes to entrepreneurial ecosystem literature 
and regional entrepreneurship literature. Practical implications for entrepreneurs and 
policymakers, as well as research limitations and future research opportunities are provided.  
Chapter 9 presents a concise summary for the dissertation regarding research background, 




Figure 1–1 Dissertation structure 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the literature on the geographical focus of entrepreneurship and the emerging 
domain of entrepreneurial ecosystems is first introduced. Then the interdisciplinary linkages 
and antecedents to entrepreneurial ecosystems are revealed, followed by a discussion of the 
use of ‘health’ in various domains. This chapter is concluded by highlighting research gaps 
identified from the literature review and the research question of this dissertation. 
2.2 Geographies of entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurs do not create new ventures in a vacuum. Traditional cognitive-based 
entrepreneurship literature has revealed some of the intrinsic entrepreneurial traits in 
identifying opportunities and creating new ventures, but the influences of external 
environments on their entrepreneurial processes (Gartner, 1990; Mason and Harvey, 2013) are 
not well explained and delineated. As a result, scholars have come to realise that there is a need 
to promote the geographical dimensions of entrepreneurship, highlighting the antecedents and 
outcomes of entrepreneurship in relation to regional factors and contexts (Müller, 2016).  
2.2.1 Entrepreneurship and regional development 
It has been well explained in regional entrepreneurship literature that entrepreneurial activities 
could contribute to regional development. Scholars argue that new venture creation activities 
encouraged by policymakers could help shape a growth regime focusing primarily on new 
venture creations and therefore foster regional development by creating jobs and wealth, 
although this is certainly not the only approach for regional development (Audretsch and 
Fritsch, 2002). Some scholars also view the flourishing entrepreneurial activities as an 
important indicator for regional development (Pike, Rodríguez-Pose, and Tomaney, 2007). 
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Nevertheless, extant literature acknowledges the positive impacts of entrepreneurship over 
regional development, and these impacts mainly include economic impacts and social impacts 
(Müller, 2016). 
In terms of regional economic impacts brought by regional entrepreneurship, empirical work 
mainly focuses on measurements such as job creation and employment growth, as well as GDP 
growth and productivity growth. For example, Acs and Armington (2004) find that 
entrepreneurial activities as externalities have a positive impact on employment growth. 
Overall economic growth measured by job creation and GDP growth is also found to be 
positively associated with the extent of new venture creation activities in the region (Bruce et 
al., 2009). Audretsch and Keilbach (2004) further argue that entrepreneurship is an important 
mechanism in driving the diversity of a region’s knowledge base, which in turn boosts the 
labour productivity growth. 
Despite the fact that previous research focuses more on the debate around the positive impacts 
of regional development on regional entrepreneurship, it is intuitive to ask whether there exists 
reciprocity between the two, i.e., whether regional development has a positive impact on 
regional entrepreneurship. Delgado, Porter and Stern (2010) argue that the presence of 
complementary economics realised by regional clustering provides incentives and reduces 
barriers for new venture creation within a region. Surely, entrepreneurs are highly embedded 
into the regional contexts they operate within, and mobilise resources and institutions in the 
region in order to create and develop their new ventures (Mason and Brown, 2014). However, 
extant research has yet to fully understand the geographical and regional approaches to 
entrepreneurship, leaving spaces to explore the boundary conditions and underlying 
mechanisms of the reciprocity of regional entrepreneurship and regional development. 
2.2.2 Entrepreneurial systems 
As scholars gradually came to realise that a system view of entrepreneurship (Qian, Acs, and 
Stough, 2013) could offer new insights on how external environments influence entrepreneurial 
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process and performance, infrastructures of entrepreneurship (Van de Ven 1993) were proposed. 
Both Qian et al. (2013) and Van de Ven (1993) argue that an individual entrepreneur’s 
behaviours and characteristics are to some extent bounded by different actors and players in 
the specific locality in which that entrepreneur has embedded themselves. Van de Ven (1993) 
specifically addresses the need to take a macro perspective to examine entrepreneurial process 
and the industrial infrastructure that the focal region offers to facilitate (or constrain) new 
venture creation activities (Zahra, 2016). Fogel and Gnyawali (1994) have further identified 
four environmental conditions that influence entrepreneurial processes: government policies, 
financial and non-financial support, socio-economic conditions and entrepreneurial skills. 
Spilling (1996), instead of considering the micro impacts of environmental conditions on 
entrepreneurial processes, proposed a system view of entrepreneurship, to examine the region 
or locality as a system that brings together multiple interacting actors determining the 
performance of regional entrepreneurship, as is illustrated in Figure 2-1. Further research has 
identified some of the most prominent components or factors that enable new venture creation 
in an entrepreneurship system, such as the entrepreneurial culture, incubators and spin-offs, etc. 
(Neck et al., 2004). 
 
Figure 2–1 Spilling’s (1996) model of entrepreneurial systems 
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2.2.3 Entrepreneurial networks 
The earliest entrepreneurship research focused on the combination of resources and new 
venture creation as outcomes (Roberts, 2001; Schumpeter, 1934). Then, scholars highlighted 
differences of cognitive and behavioural factors of entrepreneurs (Baron, 2007) and their 
impacts on the identification and exploitation of business opportunities and resources (Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000). Subsequent research found that entrepreneurs had to acquire 
capability to coordinate the networked resources. Regarding the network issues of 
entrepreneurship, which emerged as a new area in recent years, network content, network 
governance and network structure (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003) have become the central themes 
that uncover the myths of how entrepreneurial networks affect the process and performance of 
entrepreneurial outcomes.  
While the network content addresses how actors exchange or access tangible resources within 
the social networks (Anderson, Park, and Jack, 2007; Birley, 1985; Rindova et al., 2012), it is 
also found that intangible resources such as emotional support (Brüderl and Preisendörfer, 1998) 
and reputational signalling (Stuart and Hybels, 1999) will alleviate the risks or perception of 
risks undertaken during the entrepreneurial processes (Hoang and Yi, 2015). Literature 
regarding network governance has identified trust as a vital element that facilitates the 
information and resource exchanging process (Larson, 1992; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999; 
Wareham, Fox, and Cano Giner, 2014). The third stream, i.e. the network structure, focuses on 
the patterns of relationships, including indirect and direct ties between actors within the 
networks (Hoang and Yi, 2015). In order to reveal the structures of entrepreneurial networks, 
researchers have measured the network size (Vissa & Chacar 2009), network centrality 
(Jonghoon et al. 2011) and network density (Krackhardt, 1995). 
Although the entrepreneurial networks do not necessarily address the geographical dimensions 
of entrepreneurship, such entrepreneurial networks are often specially bounded, as information 
spillovers and network tie formation are often coupled with easily accessible entrepreneurial 
networks within a certain region. Therefore, the entrepreneurial network approach provides a 
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useful perspective for understanding regional dynamics of entrepreneurship. 
2.2.4 Towards entrepreneurial ecosystems 
The entrepreneurial ecosystem concept was first proposed by Cohen (2006), building upon 
entrepreneurial systems (Spilling, 1996) and infrastructure (Van De Ven, 1993) as well as 
business ecosystem (Iansiti and Levien, 2004a) literature to describe a community consisting 
of various components such as formal and informal networks, physical infrastructure and 
culture that enables the creation and development of a sustainable entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
Since then, entrepreneurial ecosystem publications have burgeoned, as scholars come to realise 
that the new entrepreneurial ecosystem concept could potentially provide a new lens to study 
entrepreneurship in relation to the external environment. The key publications of 
entrepreneurial ecosystems primarily from leading (ABS 3 and 4) journals, since 1996, are 
listed in Table 2-1. 
The current entrepreneurial ecosystem research is categorised into three streams: ecosystem 
structures that identify the main components and roles in an entrepreneurial ecosystem and 
how they interact with each other; ecosystem/actor reciprocity that sheds light on how 
entrepreneurial ecosystems and the actors co-create value and the resultant mutual impacts; 
and ecosystem dynamics that reveal how entrepreneurial ecosystems emerge, evolve and 
decline/renew over time. 
The first stream addresses the ecosystem structures – the main roles that constitute an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem and how these roles interact with each other. This stream represents 
some of the early entrepreneurial ecosystem literature, such as Cohen (2006), who refers to 
entrepreneurial ecosystems as communities that consist of various components, and Isenberg 
(2011), who has identified six domains of entrepreneurship ecosystems, policy, finance, culture, 
supports, human capital and markets, as is shown in Figure 2-2. Further work by Spigel (2017) 
argues that an entrepreneurial ecosystem has three intrinsic attributes – material attributes 
consisting of policies, universities, infrastructure, markets and supporting services, social 
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attributes including networks, talents, mentors and role models, and investment capital, as well 
as cultural attributes such as entrepreneurial culture and histories, as is shown in Figure 2-3 
below. Further work by Autio et al. (2018) proposes a structural model of entrepreneurial 
ecosystems, highlighting the digital and spatial affordances provided by the region as well as 
their implications for the goals, processes and contingencies to the ecosystems, as is illustrated 
in Figure 2-4. As the foundational stream, this series of research underpins the criticality of 
entrepreneurial ecosystems in the broad entrepreneurship and regional development domains 
(Groth, Esposito, and Tse, 2015). 
 
Figure 2–2 Domains of the entrepreneurship ecosystem (Isenberg, 2011) 
The second stream addresses the ecosystem/actor reciprocity that highlights the interactions 
and mutual impacts between an entrepreneurial ecosystem and its actors. This stream started 
with the discussion of entrepreneurship in an ecosystem context (Nambisan and Baron, 2013; 
Zahra and Nambisan, 2012), where an ecosystem’s impacts on entrepreneurs include the 
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necessity of pursuing multiple goals due to the complexity of ecosystem competition as well 
as the demand of recognising promising growth opportunities within and outside of an 
ecosystem (Nambisan and Baron, 2013). Further work examines the reciprocity between 
entrepreneurial ecosystems and actors, for example, how entrepreneurs legitimise their new 
ventures within an entrepreneurial ecosystem (Kuratko et al., 2017), and how accelerators 
intermediate between entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial ecosystems (Goswami, Mitchell, and 
Bhagavatula, 2018), as well as the conditions under which entrepreneurial ecosystems can be 
strengthened in a city (Audretsch and Belitski, 2016). 
 
Figure 2–3 Relationship among ecosystem attributes (Spigel, 2017) 
The third stream examines the ecosystem dynamics that shed light on how entrepreneurial 
ecosystems as well as the embedded actors emerge, develop and evolve over time (Brown and 
Mason, 2017). Scholars have noted the dynamic (Alvedalen and Boschma, 2017) and temporal 
(Acs et al., 2017) nature of entrepreneurial ecosystems and therefore advocate adopting an 
evolutionary perspective (Mack and Mayer, 2015). Autio et al. (2018) also argue that the 
internal processes and mechanisms of entrepreneurial ecosystems have yet to be fully 
understood. Scholars further adopt a life cycle assessment on entrepreneurial ecosystem 
vibrancy and its developmental path (Auerswald and Dani, 2017). Studies in this stream 
include the exploration of entrepreneurial ecosystem emergence. For example, how clusters act 
as the foundations of the emergence of entrepreneurial ecosystems as well as ecosystem value 
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creation (Pitelis, 2012), and also how an entrepreneurial ecosystem takes form from the bottom 
up in a long process involving multiple actors (Thompson et al., 2018). Such dynamics are not 
limited to processes and mechanisms within entrepreneurial ecosystems; they also include the 
system evolution, as Spigel and Harrison (2018) point out that it is important to not only 
examine ecosystem processes but also the ecosystem as a process. 
 
Figure 2–4 Structural model of entrepreneurial ecosystems (Autio et al., 2018) 
It can be seen from the above three streams that extant entrepreneurial ecosystem literature 
focuses more on structures and configurations of ecosystems (Cohen, 2006; Nambisan and 
Baron, 2013; Qian et al., 2013; Spigel, 2017), with considerable room to explore the dynamics 
of an entrepreneurial ecosystem as well as its impacts on ecosystem actors over time 
(Alvedalen and Boschma, 2017; Spigel and Harrison, 2018). What is equally surprising is that 
there is very little research concerned with the performance and competitiveness of an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem, though it has been frequently acknowledged that the health of the 
whole ecosystem (Shi and Shi, 2016, 2017) is crucial to all the actors involved (Iansiti and 
Levien, 2004a; Iansiti and Richards, 2006).
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Table 2–1 A summary of definitions of the term entrepreneurial ecosystem and its related concepts 
Year Author Definition of Entrepreneurial Ecosystem & its Related Concepts Defining Keywords & 
Phrases 
Case Regions & 
Industries 
1993 Van de Ven Infrastructure for entrepreneurship: an industrial infrastructure that facilitates and constrains 
entrepreneurship. This infrastructure includes: (1) institutional arrangements to legitimate, 
regulate and standardise a new technology, (2) public resource endowments of basic scientific 
knowledge, financing mechanism and a pool of competent labour, as well as (3) proprietary 
R&D, manufacturing, marketing and distribution functions by private entrepreneurial firms to 






1996 Spilling Entrepreneurial system: the complexity and diversity of actors, roles and environmental 












Based on Spilling’s definition: an entrepreneurial system: encompasses the complexity and 
diversity of actors, roles and environmental factors that interact to determine the 





2005 West and 
Bamford 
Entrepreneurial economic community: generates new employment, leads to a growing tax 
revenue base, enhances prospects for self-generating innovation and future growth, and yields 
qualitative improvements to an area’s economic vitality. 
Community, economic 
development, innovation 
Finance. IT and 
Retail industries 
2006 Cohen  Entrepreneurial ecosystems represent a diverse set of inter-dependent actors within a 
geographic region that influence the formation and eventual trajectory of the entire group of 
actors and potentially the economy as a whole. Entrepreneurial ecosystems evolve through a 
set of interdependent components which interact to generate new venture creation over time. 
Interdependent, 





2011 Zahra and 
Nambisan 
Entrepreneurship in an ecosystem takes forms that include creating new companies, 
establishing new divisions that capitalise on technological change, and introducing radically 
new products and business models. The reciprocal relationships among the ecosystem, new 
venture creation and innovation perpetuate the dynamism of the ecosystem. 










capital and markets. domains paper 
2013 Qian, Zoltan 
and Stough 
Systems of entrepreneurship: those economic, social, institutional and all other important 









Entrepreneur-driven innovation ecosystem: a system that pairs austerity with well-focused 
spending on a new, structurally sound model for sustainable growth that will initially tackle 
financial deficits and ultimately create financial stability and act as a motor to pull Europe 





2015 Spigel Entrepreneurial ecosystems are the union of localised cultural outlooks, social networks, 
investment capital, universities and active economic policies that create environments 
supportive of innovation-based ventures. 
Social, material and 






2015 Mack and 
Mayer 
Entrepreneurial ecosystems (EE) consist of interacting components, which foster new firm 








Institutional and organisational as well as other systemic factors that interact and influence 




















2017 Sussan and 
Acs 
The Digital Entrepreneurial Ecosystem framework consists of four concepts: digital 






















2017 Acs, Stam 
and 
Audretsch 
The entrepreneurial ecosystem approach emphasises the interdependence between actors and 










Entrepreneurial ecosystems are evolutionary, and the evolution of an entrepreneurial 
ecosystem has a determinative impact on the adaptive life cycles of industry clusters 










Entrepreneurial ecosystems can be usefully viewed as structures that specialise in the 
facilitation and cultivation of a specific type of architectural knowledge – notably, 
knowledge about ‘what works’ in terms of organising for business model innovation and 
entrepreneurial opportunity pursuit and scale-up. 
Digital and spatial 
affordances, special 

























Entrepreneurial ecosystems possess three social capital dimensions, namely structural, 
cognitive and relational dimensions, and these dimensions interact with one another to 






2018 Spigel and 
Harrison 
A process-based perspective to create a framework to better understand how ecosystems 
develop, evolve and deliver benefits to entrepreneurs. It is important to understand how 
resources flow within the ecosystem, how they are produced by internal mechanisms such as 
recycling of both successful and unsuccessful ventures, and how they can also be attracted 
into the ecosystem by the global pipelines entrepreneurs create. 










2.3 Interdisciplinary linkages and antecedents to entrepreneurial 
ecosystems 
The emergence of the entrepreneurial ecosystem in the entrepreneurship literature could 
potentially provide a new lens to study entrepreneurship in relation to the external environment. 
This concept, however, draws on a few interdisciplinary concepts and antecedents in adjacent 
domains such as biology, strategy and regional economics. These concepts are reviewed in this 
section and their differences are also highlighted. 
2.3.1 Biological ecosystems 
The word ‘ecosystem’ was first proposed by Tansley (1935), after which it was widely accepted 
as the description of a community of living organisms in conjunction with the non-living 
components of their environment and that they are interacting as a system. Discussions around 
biological ecosystems focus on the ecosystem functions and services.  
Ecosystem functions is usually discussed along with the discussion of biodiversity (Goldstein 
and Goldstein, 1999; Grime, 1997), which refers to the diversity of genes and species, etc. 
When discussing biodiversity, current researches have three different major questions, which 
involve different usages of the term ‘functions’ (Jax and Setälä, 2005). 
The first question is how ecosystem biodiversity relates to ecosystem functions. In this case, 
function means processes, which normally include a wide range of ecological and physical 
processes that involve flux of energy and matter (Jax and Setälä, 2005). This stream of research 
focuses on exploring whether increasing biodiversity will have impacts on certain ecosystem 
processes such as biomass production and litter decompositions.  
Another question is to explore how biodiversity relates to the functioning of ecosystems. Here, 
functioning is a collective set of activities within the whole ecosystem and can sometimes be 
referring to the performance of the ecosystem (Risser, 1995; Schulze and Mooney, 1994). In 
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this scenario, ecosystem functions are more focused on exploring the minimum number of 
species or the lowest amount of biodiversity required for an ecosystem to function properly 
(Jax and Setälä, 2005). 
Another stream of ecosystem functions considers this concept to be similar to, and sometimes 
even equal to, ecosystem services. The concept of ecosystem services emerged in the area of 
biological conservation and ecosystem management as early as the 1980s. As mentioned above, 
it has been closely associated with ecosystem functions. A systemic classification of ecosystem 
services indicates that there are four types of functions, regulation, habitat, production and 
information, and they will deliver ecosystem services that eventually provide ecological, socio-
cultural and economic values to the society (De Groot, Wilson, and Boumans, 2002). Here, the 
boundaries of functions and services are becoming blurred. This framework is shown in Figure 
2-5. 
 
Figure 2–5 Framework for integrated assessment and valuation of ecosystem functions, goods 
and services (De Groot et al., 2002) 
The term ecosystem services was formalised and popularised by the United Nations in a report, 
where it is defined as “the benefits provided by ecosystems”, comprising provisioning, 
regulating, cultural and supporting services, and these services are considered to be closely 
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related to human well-being (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005, p.39), as is illustrated 
in Figure 2-6. 
 
Figure 2–6 Ecosystem services and human well-being (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005) 
These four services are defined as follows (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). 
Provisioning services are the products obtained from ecosystems, including food, fuel, water, 
biochemical and genetic resources, etc. Regulating services are the benefits obtained from the 
regulation of ecosystem processes, including air quality regulation, climate regulation and 
erosion regulation, etc. Cultural services are the nonmaterial benefits people obtain from 
ecosystems through spiritual enrichment, cognitive development, reflection, recreation and 
aesthetic experiences, including cultural diversity, knowledge systems, educational values and 
inspiration, etc. Supporting services are those that are necessary for the production of all other 
ecosystem services. They differ from provisioning, regulating and cultural services in that their 
impacts on people are often indirect or occur over a very long time, whereas changes in the 
other categories have relatively direct and short-term impacts on people. These supporting 
services include soil formation, nutrient cycling and water cycling, etc. This service is more 
fundamental compared to the first three services.  
Since the 2005 report, many researchers have investigated the definition and classification of 
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ecosystem services. Some argue that the definition of ecosystem services should be aligned 
with and consider the decision context, along with the characteristics of the ecosystems (Fisher, 
Turner, and Morling, 2009). Some argue that ecosystem services lack a consistent measurement, 
which has caused inconsistent methods and divergent definitions of ecosystem services, and 
therefore propose a systemic measurement framework (Boyd and Banzhaf, 2007).  
However, some researchers still contend that ecosystem services are different from ecosystem 
functions in that services should always be considered as outcomes rather than processes 
(Forsyth, 2015). In that sense, the concept of ecosystem services is closer to ecosystem 
functioning rather than functions. Nevertheless, it has been widely accepted that ecosystem 
services should be defined as the benefits that humans obtain from ecosystems. Employing the 
ecosystem services concept is intended to support the development of policies and instruments 
that integrate social, economic and ecological perspectives (Seppelt et al., 2011). 
2.3.2 Business/Innovation ecosystems 
The concept of the ecosystem in management literature was first introduced by Moore in 1993 
from the ecological literature and he later defined it as “an economic community supported by 
a foundation of interacting organisations and individuals” (Moore 1996, p.26). Ever since 
Moore’s seminal work, the literature on ecosystems has burgeoned and the topic has become 
popularised in academia and industry (Guo, Shi, and Tietze, 2017; Rong, Ren, and Shi, 2018). 
The current literature on ecosystems is divided into three streams, based on Adner (2017), as 
is shown in Table 2-2. 
The first and earliest stream is Ecosystem-as-Affiliation. This stream, as can be seen from its 
name, focuses more on the main roles and actors that constitute a business ecosystem (Iansiti 
and Levien, 2004b, 2004a). Scholars in this foundational stream have explored the implications 
of this concept for firm operation strategies and innovation strategies (Moore 1993, 1996; 
Adner 2006). In this stage, scholars agree roughly that an ecosystem is a community of actors 
that interact with each other and such interactions bring about impacts to actors within the 
 
 22 
ecosystem (Teece, 2007). 
Table 2–2 Business/Innovation ecosystem research streams 
Ecosystem-as- Affiliation Structure Process 
Representative 
definition 
The community of 
organisations, 
institutions and 
individuals that impact 
the enterprise and the 
enterprise's customers 




which firms combine 
their individual offerings 
into a coherent, 
customer-facing solution 
(Adner 2006) 
A community consisting of 
loosely connected and 
interdependent organisations 
that co-evolve with partners 
and their business environment 
(Shi and Rong, 2014) 
Main argument 





Evolutionary nature of 
ecosystems 
Unit of analysis 
Focal firms  Collaborative 
arrangements or focal 
firms 
Focal firms or ecosystems 
Method 







ups); mobile devices; IT   
Package software; IT; 







Iansiti & Levien (2004a, 
b); Moore (1993, 1996); 
Teece (2007)  
Adner (2006, 2012, 
2017); Adner & Kapoor 
(2010, 2015); Kapoor & 
Lee (2013); Hannah & 
Eisenhardt (2018); 
Jacobides et al. (2018) 
Garnsey and Li, 2012; Rong 
and Shi, 2014, Rong et al., 
2015; Clarresse el al., (2014), 
Thomas et al. (2014), Thomas 
and Autio (2015, 2016); Liu 
and Rong (2015); Ansari, 2016; 
Autio et.al. (2018) 
The second stream is Ecosystem-as-Structure. Adner claims the vital importance of 
complementors in value co-creation with focal firms (Adner 2006, 2012), in addition to the 
traditional supply chain scenario. Later, Adner and Kapoor (2010) argued that the bundles of 
innovation are crucial for focal firms to successfully deliver products to consumers by 
integrating the complementors’ innovations with their own. Further empirical studies have 
revealed how complementary activities in the innovation ecosystem affect firms’ technological 
investments (Kapoor and Lee, 2013), and how technology substitution is contingent on 
ecosystem challenges for new technologies and ecosystem extension for existing technologies 
(Adner and Kapoor, 2016). Complex interdependencies are also heterogeneous across the 
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ecosystem and should be managed differently (Shi et al., 2016) in order to cope with the 
coopetition dynamics (Hannah and Eisenhardt, 2018), as the technological interdependencies 
brought by modularity in both consumption and production sides determine the boundary of 
the ecosystem (Jacobides, Cennamo, and Gawer, 2018). 
The third stream is Ecosystem-as-Process. Scholars have noted the temporal and dynamic 
nature of business ecosystems and therefore adopted an evolutionary perspective. Moore (1993) 
first introduced business ecosystem life cycles. Rong et.al. further explored the co-evolution 
process of business ecosystems and called for a more dynamic ecosystem conceptual 
framework (Liu and Rong, 2015; Rong et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2016; Shi and Liang, 2015). 
Further work in this stream uncovered how new entrants leverage the ecosystem dynamics to 
introduce their disruptive innovations and how the process unfolds (Ansari, Raghu, and 
Kumaraswamy, 2016). Meanwhile, the assumed ex ante value propositions with which focal 
firms build their ecosystems in the Ecosystem-as-Structure stream do not hold when 
technology uncertainties are high, meaning that firms have to deal with ex post propositions as 
the ecosystem evolves (Dattée, Alexy, and Autio, 2018). 
2.3.3 Agglomeration economics 
Successful factors of agglomeration 
Agglomeration economics dates back to the 1920s, when Cambridge economist Alfred 
Marshall observed that firms tend to concentrate in particular areas and proposed three factors 
that led to this phenomenon (Marshall 1920): 
Local skilled labour pool. The first successful factor Marshall proposed is that industrial 
localisations can provide a pooled market for workers with specific skills. The local labour 
pool can, on the one hand, offer firms an abundant supply of workers when worker demand 
increases rapidly, and, on the other hand, provide firms with convenient access to workers with 
specialised skills, which reduces the training cost if otherwise (McCann, 2013).  
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Non-tradable specialised inputs. The second factor is that industrial localisations could support 
the production of non-tradable specialised skills. There are two types of non-tradable inputs. 
One is the specialised low-cost services or offerings to companies of the same industry within 
the area because the concentration of companies of the same industry has spread the costs of 
providing such services or offerings, such as testing firms in automobile clusters. The other is 
local infrastructure, which is provided to all firms in the same area (McCann, 2013).  
Information spillovers. Another factor is the information spillover, from which companies in 
the same area gain competence compared to those outside the cluster. The proximity and 
concentration of firms mean that the sharing and interaction between them happen more 
frequently and easily compared to in firms with dispersed distribution. Such information 
advantage will enable firms to deal with rapid market changes.  
Types of agglomeration 
Hoover then investigated the different types of agglomeration, which are internal returns to 
scale, economies of localisation and economies of urbanisation.  
Internal returns to scale. Hoover uncovered that sometimes agglomeration is not driven by 
external factors but is rather internal to firms in that achieving economies of scale will reduce 
cost significantly and therefore a huge investment in a particular region occurs, resulting in a 
large group of firms within the same industrial sector (Hoover, 1937). 
Economies of localisation. Another type of agglomeration is that suppliers of a particular sector 
concentrate within the same area as their customers (Hoover, 1948). For example, in 
automobile cities such as Detroit, suppliers of automobiles together with automobile 
manufacturers form a cluster. 
Economies of urbanisation. Further, the agglomeration extends to firms from totally different 
sectors, and attracts various service industries and residents, which then leads to the 
urbanisation of a region. This type of agglomerations has been classified as economies of 
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urbanisation (Jacobs, 1960).  
Drivers of agglomeration 
Following Marshall’s research into agglomeration, many researchers have proposed the 
potential drivers of agglomeration. Myrdal’s circular causation theory (Myrdal, 1957) and 
Arthur’s positive feedback theory (Arthur, 1989) have suggested that manufacturers’ 
production will tend to concentrate where there is a large market, but the market will be large 
where manufacturers’ production is concentrated, which partially explains why a cluster is 
formed. Further, Pred and Meyer examined the role of circular processes in the emergence of 
the US manufacturing belt during the 1850s to 1900s (Meyer, 1983; Pred, 1966), but they did 
not explicitly address the fundamental question of why agglomeration happened (Krugman, 
1990). 
In 1990, Paul Krugman finally proposed the reasons why agglomeration happened. He reveals 
how manufacturing generally ends up concentrating in one or a few regions (Krugman 1990, 
1991a, b): economies of scale, low transportation costs and the share of manufacturing in the 
national income. 
2.3.4 Cluster 
The concept of clusters is used in many areas. The business management community and 
economics community seem to have disputes regarding the use of clusters. In the management 
community, Porter’s concept of clusters is derived from his research into competitiveness 
(Porter, 1985), which laid down the foundation of strategic management. He then argued that 
the cluster is crucial for organisations and firms to compete and thus innovate, which gives the 
cluster higher competitiveness (Porter, 1990). Porter’s arguments are derived from his case 
studies in several different clusters and countries. In the economics community, the key reason 
for the divergence lies in the fact that the phenomenon of agglomeration is derived from the 
assumption of a firm’s behaviours, i.e. the location theory, which is very different from Porter, 
as he would not make any assumptions on the nature of the firm or the market conditions. As 
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Porter’s approach is widely accepted in the management community, this section follows his 
stream of research.  
Porter defines clusters as geographical concentrations of interconnected companies and 
institutions in a particular field (Porter 1991, 1996). He argues that clusters are critical to 
competition, which is reflected in productivity, innovation and new business formation. 
Subsequently, many researchers have complemented the research on clusters. For example, 
Tallman et.al. (2004) investigated the role of informal knowledge sharing within clusters and 
proposed that the informal knowledge sharing is indeed crucial for firms within the clusters to 
gain competitive advantages. There is also research on different types of clusters, in terms of 
who drives the cluster and what industries the cluster is specialised on (He and Fallah, 2011). 
However, the existing research is more from a static view rather than a dynamic view. Regional 
economics and cluster research among management communities has focused more on the 
drivers and factors leading to the agglomeration phenomenon but failed to investigate the 
subsequent evolution of clusters. Some researchers have realised this and tried to link clusters 
with industry life cycle (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Menzel and Fornahl, 2009). There is 
also some initial research regarding conceptualisation of cluster evolution (Boschma and 
Fornahl, 2011; Martin and Sunley, 2011). But this stream of research is still at its early stage. 
Also, research regarding cluster performance is very scarce. Although Porter acknowledges 
that the health or performance is vital to the development of clusters, there is surprisingly little 
research evaluating cluster health or performance. 
2.3.5 Regional innovation systems 
The concept of regional innovation system was first proposed by Cooke, where it was used to 
examine the role of regulation associated with innovation (Cooke, 1992). He identified three 
models of technology transfer: the grassroots approach, in which the need for technology 
transfer originates from the local level, the network approach, which highlights the necessity 
for policy guidance during the transfer process, and the dirigiste approach, which is the 
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opposite of the grassroots approach (Cooke, 1992). He then further clarifies the concept of 
regional innovation system by highlighting the definition of region and differentiating the use 
of the term ‘innovation’ from other similar concepts. He argues that strengthening regional-
level capacities could help promote both systemic learning and interactive innovation (Cooke, 
Uranga, and Etxebarria, 1997).  
Later, Cooke compares regional innovation system with clusters and concludes that the public 
innovation support systems along with institutional and organisational support from the private 
sector are crucial for filling the innovation gaps (Cooke, 2001). Other researchers joined in the 
dialogue and began to investigate regional innovation systems’ characteristics and dynamics. 
For example, some researchers have explored the Nordic regional innovation systems that help 
local firms gain place-specific resources (Asheim and Isaksen, 2002) and how the different 
types of regional innovation systems vary according to different knowledge bases (Asheim and 
Coenen, 2005).  
Nevertheless, regional innovation systems are more concerned with technology transfers 
between research institutes (Chen and Kenney, 2007) and industries, and how government 
policies could assist in this process (Tödtling and Trippl, 2005). The triple interaction among 
universities, governments and firms is the distinctive unit of analysis, differentiating this 
concept from other related concepts such as clusters. 
2.3.6 Summary: how is the entrepreneurial ecosystem different? 
Despite drawing from the above antecedents and interdisciplinary linkages, the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem serves as a key concept to tackle regional entrepreneurship and development issues 
in modern societies. The differences between entrepreneurial ecosystems and other related 
concepts are highlighted in Table 2-3. 
Entrepreneurial ecosystems are different from regional innovation systems or clusters. First, 
unlike regional innovation systems which are often organised and led by government bodies or 
universities, entrepreneurial ecosystems can emerge spontaneously, with a bottom-up approach, 
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as evidenced from Thompson et al. (2018). This approach also differs from clusters, where 
often large corporations and established companies lead the emergence and evolution, whereas 
the emergence and leadership of an entrepreneurial ecosystem can be attributed to SMEs and 
entrepreneurs. Second, as entrepreneurial ecosystems are less likely to be hierarchical and more 
likely to be decentralised, unlike regional innovation systems and clusters in particular, they 
tend to be more autonomous in terms of governance mechanisms and more divergent in terms 
of strategic orientations among actors. Third, different to clusters, which often represent one 
single industry, entrepreneurial ecosystems transcend the notion of industry (Moore, 1996; 
Spigel and Harrison, 2018) and focus more on facilitating new venture creation from any 
generative technologies. 
Table 2–3 Comparison of entrepreneurial ecosystems with other related concepts 
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Entrepreneurial ecosystems are also different from business/innovation ecosystems. Though an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem is also an ecosystem, it is in two ways different from a business or 
innovation ecosystem. One is, obviously, being entrepreneurial. An entrepreneurial ecosystem 
would mainly focus on new venture creation and start-ups’ interactions with ecosystem actors, 
while an innovation ecosystem is more concerned with value co-creation by different players 
due to complex interdependencies, regardless of the heterogeneous nature of the participating 
organisations. The other is that entrepreneurial ecosystems are typically regional-based, whilst 
business/innovation ecosystems do not take into account the geographical dimension. Such an 
ecosystem is normally a firm-based or industry-wide ecosystem, such as Apple’s ecosystem, 
or a smartphone ecosystem. An entrepreneurial ecosystem, however, is usually geographically 
bounded, such as Silicon Valley EE. The reason is twofold. On the one hand, the concept of 
entrepreneurial ecosystem emerged with a strong policy flavour, such as seen in Isenberg 
(2011), who has conceptualised the structures and domains of an entrepreneurial ecosystem 
with implications for economic policy. On the other hand, the emergence of EE is to some 
extent inspired by some successful entrepreneurial regions (Cohen, 2006; Mack and Mayer, 
2015; Spigel, 2017). In order to be clear and consistent in this dissertation, based on previous 
literature, an entrepreneurial ecosystem is defined as: a community of interconnected, 
interdependent and co-evolving actors that are involved in the new venture creation processes 
within a region. 
2.4 On ‘health’ 
‘Health’ as a concept has emerged in several different disciplines and domains. In order to build 
a solid theoretical foundation for the conceptualisation of entrepreneurial ecosystem health, 
this section will discuss different usages and definitions regarding the concept of ‘health’. 
2.4.1 Organism and human health 
Originally, ‘health’ as a term was used specifically for organisms and humans. For general 
organisms, it is defined as the level of functional or metabolic efficiency (Huber et al., 2011). 
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But, in relation to human health, debates have been carrying on for hundreds of years. There 
are currently five main streams of health definitions, which will be discussed below.  
Medical definition. The definition of health in medical practice and research is the absence of 
disease or disability (Larson, 1999). This definition goes back to as early as five hundred years 
ago when Descartes began to view the human body in the manner of a machine model, which 
is structured, and therefore gave birth to the idea of illness occurring in individuals. Although 
there have been debates about the definition and scope of disease such as the contention of 
physical and mental illness, social and biological disease, this view has helped medical research 
advance a great deal since the birth of modern science (Larson, 1999). 
WHO definition. The World Health Organisation has proposed a more holistic definition: health 
is “a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity” (WHO 1946, p.3). However, this definition has been questioned by many 
researchers. Firstly, the absoluteness of the word “complete” is widely criticised. Secondly, the 
nature of disease has changed rapidly and greatly since 1946, such as chronic diseases, and the 
old definition seems unfit and outdated. Thirdly, the operationalisation of the WHO health 
definition is very poor (Huber et al., 2011) and some even consider it as idealistic and 
immeasurable (Larson, 1999). 
Wellness model. The wellness model seeks to combine the impact of mental health with 
physical health and aims at a higher level of wellness (Larson, 1999). It defines health as 
“Health promotion and progress toward higher functioning, energy, comfort, and integration of 
mind, body, and spirit.” (Larson 1999, p.25). However, some have pointed out its problems 
such as: the perception of wellness is difficult to measure as it varies hugely across different 
age and gender groups. Despite these criticisms, this definition indeed brought mental status 
under the umbrella of health, which is a great advance for medical research and practice. 
Environmental consideration. Similar to the view of the wellness model that includes humans’ 
internal status in the concept of health, this definition incorporates the impact of the 
surrounding environment on human health. Breslow argues that health is not merely biological 
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elements or social role performance but is a dynamic equilibrium with the environment and the 
capacity to live physically, mentally and socially (Breslow, 1989; Larson, 1999).  
View of adaptation. As the definition of health continuously evolves, the view of adaptation 
has become more convincing. Since health includes environmental consideration, researchers 
have gradually turned to the view of adaptation, where they argue that health is about the ability 
to adapt, rather than about perfection or being “complete” or the “absence of disease” (The 
Lancet, 2009). The definition of this view has been summarised as “the ability to adapt and to 
self manage in the face of social, physical, and emotional challenges.” (Huber et al. 2011, p.2), 
which combines all the dimensions of the previous definitions. 
2.4.2 Biological ecosystem health 
The concept of natural ecosystem health stems from ecosystem stresses, which represent the 
responses of ecosystems to external stimuli (Odum, 1985). Ecosystem health was first defined 
by Rapport et al. in 1985. Relating to the concept of human health, Rapport argues that 
ecosystem health can be diagnosed and thus defined through multiple indicators and 
dimensions, which are changes in nutrient cycling, changes in primary productivity, changes 
in species diversity, retrogression (an apparent reversion to an earlier stage of the successional 
process) and changes in size distribution of species (Rapport, Regier, and Hutchinson, 1985). 
Further work has been conducted by other researchers to differentiate human or animal health 
from ecological health, reflecting a significant difference in diagnosing criteria and indicators 
(Schaeffer, Herricks, and Kerster, 1988). Rapport further developed the dimensions of 
evaluating ecosystem health, stating that ecosystem health, as a concept to assess the condition 
of the environment, could be evaluated in six dimensions: primary productivity, nutrients, 
instability, disease prevalence, size spectrum and contaminants (Rapport, 1989). In the 1990s, 
researchers focused on developing indicators for evaluating ecosystem health and conducting 
quantitative tests using their frameworks (Cairns, McCormick, and Niederlehner, 1993; 
Mageau, Costanza, and Ulanowicz, 1995; Rapport, 1992). At this point, there was no consensus 
on frameworks for evaluating ecosystem health.  
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In 1999, Rapport proposed his final definition and dimensions of ecosystem health, which is 
widely accepted as the most accurate and rigorous framework. He argues that ecosystem health 
can be defined and also evaluated through three dimensions (Rapport, Costanza, and 
McMichael, 1999):  
 Vigour: represents the activity, metabolism or primary productivity of an ecosystem; 
 Organisation: represents diversity and interactions between species in the ecosystem; 
 Resilience: the capacity of the ecosystem to deal with disruptions. 
2.4.3 Firm (financial) health 
There is no formal definition of firm health. When researchers talk about a firm’s health, they 
actually mean the firm’s financial performance or health. There are a number of models 
depicting the firm’s financial performance. 
For example, many investment banks use the firm bankruptcy model to estimate a firm’s 
financial status by calculating its bankruptcy probability. The Z-score model was the first of its 
kind (Altman, 1968) and the function is as follows: 
! = 0.012'( + 0.014'+ + 0.033'- + 0.006'/ + 0.999'1 
Where       '( = 2345678	:;<6=;> ?3=;>	;@@A=@⁄  
             '+ = CA=;67AD	A;47678@ ?3=;>	;@@A=@⁄  
             '- = E;47678@	FAG34A	67=A4A@=	;7D	=;HA@ ?3=;>	;@@A=@⁄  
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Building on the Z-score model, a ZETA model was proposed in order to reflect the new changes 
to the financial statements and align the model with them (Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan, 
1977). This model, compared to the Z-score model, has more indicators such as capitalisation 
measured by common equity to total capital and stability earnings measured by a normalised 
measure of the standard error around a 10-year trend in return on assets, thus adding up to a 7-
variable model (Altman et al., 1977). 
However, Altman’s work was criticised for its assumptions of linear separability, multivariate 
normality, and independence of the predictive variables (Lacher et al., 1995). Researchers then 
proposed a neutral network approach instead of the original MDA approach to overcome these 
problems. By adding a hidden unit which considers the impacts of bias, this model could 
produce more accurate and independent outputs compared to the traditional MDA approach 
(Lacher et al., 1995). Further studies have empirically confirmed that neutral networks are 
robust to sampling variations in overall classification performance (Yang, Platt, and Platt, 1999; 
Zhang et al., 1999) in different contexts (Mokhatab Rafiei, Manzari, and Bostanian, 2011). 
2.4.4 Business ecosystem health 
Business Ecosystem Health was first proposed by Iansiti and Levien (2004a) as three 
dimensions – Robustness, Productivity and Niche Creation – largely borrowed from biological 
literature discussing ecosystem health. They claim that the three dimensions are “measures of 
the extent to which an ecosystem as a whole is durably growing opportunities for its members 
and for those who depend on it”. Dimensions and their definitions as well as the main indicators 
within each dimension are listed in Table 2-4. It should be noted that some of these indicators 
might not be applicable in certain industries, according to Iansiti and Levien. 
Iansiti and Richards (2006) revised this framework to make it applicable to their analysis of 
the health of the IT sector. In this framework, they replaced ‘Niche Creation’ as ‘Innovation’ 
and specified some indicators within each dimension, where labour productivity, financial 
betas, market indices and the return on venture investment, etc., are added to the original 
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measures. This framework has provided some preliminary understanding and assessment for 
IT ecosystem health. The frameworks Iansiti, Levien and Richards proposed have indeed 
provided a solid foundation for further research and it turns out that subsequent literature 
discussing business ecosystem health is mostly based on their work.  
Table 2–4 Iansiti & Levien’s framework 
Dimension Definition Main Indicators 
Robustness Capability of a business ecosystem 
when “facing and surviving 
perturbations and disruptions” (Iansiti 
and Levien, 2004a, p33) 
Survival rates; 
Persistence of ecosystem structure; 
Predictability; 
Limited obsolescence; 
Continuity of use experience and use cases 
Productivity A network’s ability to consistently 
transform technology and other raw 
materials of innovation into lower 
costs and new products 
Total factor productivity; 
Productivity improvement over time; 
Delivery of innovations 
Niche Creation The capacity to increase meaningful 
diversity over time through the 
creation of new valuable functions 
Variety; 
Value creation 
Hartigh, Tol and Visscher (2006) constructed a model that “enables managers to monitor the 
financial and network health of their business ecosystem” (Hartigh et al. 2006, p.1). Meanwhile, 
they also discussed the managerial insights drawn from the application of their instrument 
regarding three aspects – benchmarking and improving business ecosystem performance, 
partner engagement process and business ecosystem governance. By selecting and specifying 
every indicator using different measures from different fields such as network analysis and 
financial performance, the authors have established a model that they claim to be useable in a 
management practice on multiple levels. The dimensions in this model are quite different from 







Table 2–5 Hartigh, Tol and Visscher’s model 
Dimension Definition Indicators 
Partner Health A long-term financially-based 
representation of a partner’s strength 
of management and of its 
competencies to exploit 
opportunities that arise within the 
ecosystem  
-EBIT/total assets 
-Total revenue/total assets 
-Liquidity 
-Solvency & solvency t-1 
-Retained earnings/total assets 
-Total asset growth 
-Working capital/total assets 
Network Health A representation of how well a 
partner is embedded in the 
ecosystem as well as the impact the 
partner has in its local network 
-Number of partnerships 
-Visibility in the market 
-Covariance of partner variety with the 
market 
2.4.5 Regional resilience 
A key notion in regional studies that scholars often draw upon when they think of a region’s 
sustained economic development and performance faced with external shock (Boschma, 2015) 
is regional resilience, as seen in Figure 2-7. Although there seems to be different approaches 
when it comes to how scholars perceive and measure risk and resilience in a region 
(Christopherson, Michie, and Tyler, 2010), a key common understanding of regional resilience 
adopts an evolutionary view, which argues that regional resilience is a manifestation of 
collective actions and behaviours of all relevant stakeholders within the region over time. This 
means that regions are in constant transition and between these transitions are key moments to 
study when probing into regional resilience (Christopherson et al., 2010). 
A key tension in the discussion of regional resilience is how regions can develop new growth 
paths (Boschma, 2015), going beyond merely overcoming the shocks at hand. Some argue that, 
in order for a region to possess the ability to develop new growth paths, from an evolutionary 
perspective, it has to reach a balance in adaptation and adaptability (Simmie and Martin, 2010). 
Adaptation means a region’s ability to identify multiple possible new growth paths, while 
adaptability means its ability to adapt to a certain direction of growth (Boschma, 2015). In this 
sense, a region with a fine balance of adaptation and adaptability is less likely to be vulnerable 




Figure 2–7 Different types of bouncing back from shocks (Simmie and Martin, 2010) 
But what are the contributing factors of a resilient region? Scholars have proposed different 
factors to explain why some regions are more resilient than others. Christopherson et al. (2010) 
point out that a resilient region normally has the following salient features: (1) a strong system 
of innovation; (2) strength in factors that create a learning region; (3) A modern productive 
infrastructure; (4) A skilled, innovative and entrepreneurial workforce; (5) A supportive 
financial system providing patient capital; and (6) A diversified economic base, not over-reliant 
on a single industry. Martin and Sunley (2015), similarly, argue that industrial and business 
structure, labour market conditions, financial arrangements, governance arrangements, as well 
as agency and decision making are the key factors required to resist and recover from external 
shocks, as can be seen in Figure 2-8. 
Although these factors describe the salient features of a resilient region in terms of economic 
development, particularly in terms of the individual and collective functionalities of different 
stakeholders of an innovative region, they do not necessarily shed light on the underlying 
mechanisms of how and why these factors contribute to regional resilience and in particular 
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for regional entrepreneurship. 
 
Figure 2–8 Determinants of regional resilience (Martin and Sunley, 2015) 
2.4.6 Determinants of regional entrepreneurship 
Scholars have long been interested to see what leads to regional disparities in terms of new 
venture creation (Armington and Acs, 2002). Muller (2016) has divided this stream of literature 
into four categories – how institutional structures, economic structures, social structures and 
spatial structures influence regional entrepreneurial activities. 
For institutional structures, scholars focus on both formal and informal institutional structures. 
Formal institutional structures include government and policy support that foster the creation 
of a knowledge base (O’Gorman and Kautonen, 2004) and provide entrepreneurial support 
services (Zhou, 2011). Informal institutional structures mainly refer to entrepreneurial culture 
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such as risk-taking perceptions, social acceptance and legitimacy, and entrepreneurial 
environment (Beugelsdijk and Noorderhaven, 2004). Economic structures mainly include 
macroeconomic performance such as labour availability, financial capital, unemployment rate, 
etc. (Audretsch and Fritsch, 1994; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004). Social structures address 
the impacts of social capital and formal and informal networks (Ma, 2002) over new venture 
creation activities (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004). Finally, spatial structures are concerned 
with the availability of supporting and complementary resources in the region, such as local 
infrastructure (Benneworth, 2004), proximity to universities and research institutes (e.g. 
Cambridge, UK) (Garnsey and Heffernan, 2005), as well as role models and other regional 
entrepreneurial capital (Meccheri and Pelloni, 2006). 
Extant literature on determinants of regional entrepreneurship has provided some useful 
directions to explore the health of an entrepreneurial ecosystems. However, the literature is 
rather scattered in this stream and, most importantly, fails to examine the reciprocity between 
these structures and regional entrepreneurship. Surely, the presence and availability of all kinds 
of regional resources and structures will have impacts on regional entrepreneurship. However, 
it remains unclear whether there would be impacts from regional entrepreneurship, in return, 
to regional structures. 
2.5 Research gaps and research question 
Four research gaps have been identified in terms of entrepreneurial ecosystems and regional 
entrepreneurship literature.  
Firstly, the performance and competitiveness of entrepreneurial ecosystems have not been 
sufficiently addressed in existing entrepreneurial ecosystem literature, although it has been 
frequently acknowledged that the health of the whole ecosystem is crucial to all players 
involved (Iansiti and Levien, 2004a; Iansiti and Richards, 2006). Despite the fact that there is 
an increasing number of studies on entrepreneurial ecosystems, especially on their key 
components and building blocks (Isenberg, 2011; Spigel, 2017), relatively less is known about 
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what constitutes the health of an entrepreneurial ecosystem and what are the key dimensions 
for unpacking entrepreneurial ecosystem health. Nevertheless, the importance of ecosystem 
health for the fate of all members has been noted in various literature (Iansiti and Levien, 2004a; 
Iansiti and Richards, 2006; Porter, 2000).  
Secondly, although extant entrepreneurial ecosystem literature has elaborated clearly on what 
constitutes an entrepreneurial ecosystem, i.e., the structures and domains of an entrepreneurial 
ecosystem (Autio et al., 2018; Cohen, 2006; Nambisan and Baron, 2013; Qian et al., 2013; 
Spigel, 2017), frameworks taking a dynamic and evolutionary perspective are still insufficient 
(Alvedalen and Boschma, 2017). Meanwhile, scholars widely acknowledge that 
entrepreneurial ecosystems are in their nature dynamic and temporal (Auerswald and Dani, 
2017; Thompson et al., 2018). Although a few scholars have made some early attempts on 
ecosystem lifecycle (Mack and Mayer, 2015), ecosystem process (Spigel and Harrison, 2018), 
and ecosystem structural models (Autio et al., 2018), more insights on how the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem evolves, and especially how ecosystems co-evolve with actors as well as the 
resultant implications can be offered via further empirical research (Acs et al., 2017). The 
dynamic perspective of entrepreneurial ecosystems may also be useful when considering the 
health of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Prior research on related concepts such as 
determinants of regional entrepreneurship, regional resilience and business ecosystem health 
generate insightful dimensions for understanding the competitiveness of entrepreneurial 
ecosystems, but largely remain static, providing snapshots of performances rather than an 
evolutionary picture.  
Thirdly, the reciprocity of entrepreneurial ecosystems and the actors embedded within them 
remains unclear. Prior entrepreneurship theorists, in particular, are more concerned with how 
entrepreneurial firms can access resources from innovation networks within the industrial 
clusters (Lechner and Dowling, 2003), the effects of knowledge spillovers on strategic 
entrepreneurships (Agarwal, Audretsch, and Sarkar, 2010) and new venture formations 
(Agarwal, Audretsch, and Sarkar, 2007; Grossman and Helpman, 1996). Although there has 
been abundant literature explaining how regional resources enable regional entrepreneurship 
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and how regional entrepreneurship promotes regional development, relatively less is known 
about whether regional entrepreneurship, in turn, benefits regional contexts, and, if so, what 
the underlying mechanisms are (Müller, 2016), as can be seen in Figure 2-9.  
 
Figure 2–9 Predominant research directions (Müller, 2016) 
Finally, extant research has shed less light on how individual entrepreneurs are connected to 
entrepreneurial ecosystems. Just like the discussions about who regional development is for 
(Pike et al., 2007), scholars ought to think about whom the entrepreneurial ecosystem serves. 
Although early entrepreneurial ecosystem literature was born with a policy flavour (Isenberg, 
2011; Mason and Brown, 2014), it is equally important to understand how individual 
entrepreneurs access resources from entrepreneurial ecosystems and, more broadly, how they 
benefit from the ecosystems, as doing so will also contribute to understanding how they benefit 
the ecosystems in turn. Indeed, some early work has drawn attention, for example, to how 
entrepreneurial ecosystems emerge with the efforts of individual entrepreneurs and 
intermediary actors (Thompson et al., 2018). This implies that individual entrepreneurial 
activities may contribute to the overall ecosystem health, yet extant research does not fully 
understand the underlying mechanisms. Examining the health of entrepreneurial ecosystems 
from an entrepreneurial process perspective may offer opportunities to shed light on the 
identified gaps in the current literature. 
Based on the literature review and research gap analysis, the overarching research question of 
this dissertation is: 
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How do we unpack the concept of entrepreneurial ecosystem health from an 
entrepreneurial process perspective? 
The overarching research question is further divided into three research sub-questions that will 
together be answered in the following chapters. 
Research sub-question 1: What are the dimensions for entrepreneurial ecosystem 
health? 
Research sub-question 2: How do individual entrepreneurial activities contribute to 
collective entrepreneurial ecosystem health? 
Research sub-question 3: How does a healthy entrepreneurial ecosystem facilitate 
new venture creation? 
2.6 Summary 
By reviewing three streams of literature – geographies of entrepreneurship, interdisciplinary 
linkages of entrepreneurial ecosystems, as well as various usage of ‘health’ and related 
concepts, this chapter identifies four research gaps:  
 Key factors for the performance or competitiveness of entrepreneurial ecosystems are not 
well understood; 
 Frameworks taking a dynamic and evolutionary perspective are still insufficient;  
 The reciprocity of entrepreneurial ecosystems and the actors embedded within them 
remains unclear 
 Less light has been shed on how individual entrepreneurs are connected to entrepreneurial 
ecosystems 
This dissertation therefore aims to answer the overarching research question: How do we 




3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the methodology used for the enquiry including research design, data collection 
and data analysis will be introduced based on the research question raised in Chapter 2. 
3.2 Research Design 
3.2.1 Epistemological positions 
How social science research should be conducted remains a debatable topic among researchers 
believing in different epistemologies. Positivism and interpretivism or social constructivism 
have become the two major positions (Johnson and Duberley, 2000). 
Positivists insist that social science should follow the natural science model and therefore make 
law-like generalisations. Meanwhile, they believe qualitative research, such as case study, is 
the precursor for conducting quantitative research such as survey (Johnson and Duberley, 2000). 
Just like natural science experiments, positivists would argue that, in social science, researchers 
should also act like outsiders and maintain ‘objectivity’. The detachment of researchers from 
data is a strong sign of positivism when a natural science paradigm is followed (Taylor and 
Bogdan, 1985).  
Strong interpretivists, however, completely disagree with the positivists’ stance, as they would 
reject any attempts to follow the natural science model, and argue that conceptual, instead of 
law-like, generalisations should be made through an inductive and interpretive approach (van 
Maanen, 2000). For social constructivism, researchers insist that data does not speak for itself 
and therefore all analysis is interpretive and, to some extent, subjective (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994). The idea is that social science researchers cannot and should not be totally detached 
 
 43 
from their research settings, but instead engage themselves in the research, which is very 
different from a natural science research paradigm. 
However, there are signs that researchers are taking a more dogmatic approach to social science 
research. They believe positivism and social constructivism are both practical in their own 
rights and can be reconciled in certain scenarios. For example, some argue that qualitative 
research can deductively build theories based on previous literature and provide a logical 
framework that can potentially be utilised by other researchers to explain different phenomena 
in other contexts (Bettis and Gambardella, 2015; Eisenhardt, 1989). Meanwhile, qualitative 
methods can also inductively explore more open-ended questions concerning new phenomena 
in an attempt to provide general insights (Bansal and Corley, 2012). The diversity of 
epistemologies and research methods could bring readers closer to what is being studied 
(Bansal and Corley, 2011). 
This research is regarded as weak social constructivism. The first part (Chapter 5) of the 
analysis follows an inductive approach to gain insights into entrepreneurial ecosystem health 
and its dimensions. The second part (Chapter 6) of the analysis also combines Eisenhardt’s 
(1989) multiple case logic to identify patterns by comparing the entrepreneurial firms’ resource 
acquisition behaviours, which helps develop propositions pertinent to the resource dynamisms 
of firm and ecosystem levels. Chapter 7 integrates findings in chapters 5 and 6 to offer a process 
model of how a healthy entrepreneurial ecosystem facilitates new venture creation over time. 
3.2.2 Selection of research method 
In social science research, there are several research strategies that are most frequently used, 
which are case study, experiment, survey, archival analysis and history. Each of these strategies 
has its own advantages and disadvantages, following different logic and rationales (Yin, 2009). 
The selection criteria are not based on the traditional hierarchical view that case study is most 
suitable for the preliminary research stage, survey is for the descriptive phase and experiment 
is for explanatory research. On the contrary, the criteria have nothing to do with the research 
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phases, but the three conditions listed in Table 3-1 (Yin, 2009): 
Table 3–1 Relevant situations for different research strategies (Yin, 1989) 
Strategy Form of research 
question 




Experiment How & Why Yes Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, 
how many, how much 
No Yes 
Archival analysis (e.g. 
economic study) 
Who, what, where, 
how many, how much 
No Yes/No 
History How, why No No 
Case study How, why No Yes 
Specifically, for this research, the form of question is a ‘how’ type of question, as is shown in 
Chapter 3. Also, it does not require any control over behavioural events, since case study 
involves direct observation of events and interviews with people who are involved in these 
events that are being studied in the research (Yin, 1989). Finally, this research is focused on 
contemporary events. Therefore, the methodology selected in this research will be case study, 
as is demonstrated in Table 3-2. 
Table 3–2 Selection of methodology for this research 
Methodology Form of research 
question: How 
Requires control over 




Experiment ✔ ✖ ✔ 
Survey ✖ ✔ ✔ 
Archival analysis (e.g. 
economic study) 
✖ ✔ ✔;✖ 
History ✔ ✔ ✖ 
Case study ✔ ✔ ✔ 
As shown in the literature review, there have been limited studies on entrepreneurial 
ecosystems, and in particular in terms of the dimensions of EE health. This indicates the 
necessity of an explorative study on entrepreneurial ecosystem health to build new theories 
(Yin, 2009). Further, according to Eisenhardt (1989), multiple case studies can be chosen to 
build up new theories in a more robust way, as patterns are consolidated in cross-case settings 
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(Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). In this sense, the intention is to inductively 
build a framework for entrepreneurial ecosystem health, and elaborate this new concept with 
adequate qualitative rigour (Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton, 2012).  
3.2.3 Unit of analysis 
An embedded multiple-case design was employed for this dissertation (Yin, 2009). The reason 
for an embedded design is that the research sub-questions pay attention to two different levels 
of phenomenon – ecosystem level and individual entrepreneurial firm level. This is because 
two levels of unit of analysis serve to answer three different sub-questions. For sub-research 
question 1, the unit of analysis is the entrepreneurial ecosystem, as the question sets out to 
explore possible dimensions for the ecosystem. For sub-research question 2, however, the 
intention is to explore how the individual entrepreneurial process benefits from a healthy 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. Therefore, the unit of analysis in this research sub-question 
becomes the key entrepreneurial firms identified in different evolutionary stages of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems. Sub-research question 3 is concerned with the interactions 
between the individual level and the ecosystem level.  
The reason for a multiple-case design is to increase external validity of the findings, for which 
single case studies are vulnerable. This is because a multiple case design offers opportunities 
to yield direct replications or contrasts, which therefore increase the generalisability of the 
findings beyond the specific case settings (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; 
Yin, 2009). A multiple embedded case design offers an opportunity to follow a replication logic 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) and at the same time approach two levels of enquiry (Yin, 2009).  
3.2.4 Selection of entrepreneurial ecosystems 
As the unit of analysis in this study is entrepreneurial ecosystem, a theoretical sampling 
approach was followed to select relatively successful entrepreneurial ecosystems (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Shenzhen in China and Silicon Valley in the US were selected as the main case 
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ecosystems, as is illustrated in Table 3-3. The author does realise that a case study approach is 
inherently defective in representativeness and generalisability (Siggelkow, 2007). However, 
the selection of cases in this dissertation can, to some extent, improve the validity of this 
research. The reasons are: (1) these two entrepreneurial ecosystems are the most successful 
ones in China and the US respectively; (2) China and the US are the world’s largest economies, 
whose total economic power puts them in the top two places in terms of GDP, with a 
combination of approximately 40% of the total GDP output globally. They also share over 70% 
of the Unicorns (start-up companies valued at over $1 billion) globally4; (3) the selection covers 
regions from both developed and emerging economies, considering the heterogeneity of 
entrepreneurial conditions in relation to different stages of economic development; (4) the two 
EEs have highly similar industry profiles, both specialising in the information and 
communications technology (ICT) industry, making them more comparable and thus 
increasing internal validity when conducting cross-case analysis (Yin, 2009). 
Table 3–3 Demographics of Silicon Valley and Shenzhen 
Key profiles Silicon Valley Shenzhen 
Industry Mainly ICT (Microcomputers, 
electronics, software, etc.) 
Mainly ICT (consumer electronics, 
telecommunications, software, etc.) 
Ecosystem engines Market (leading companies such as 
Google, Apple, etc.) 
Hybrid of market and government 
Innovation paradigm Bottom-up Hybrid of top-down and bottom-up 
Capital market Accounted for one-third of US venture 
capital investment 
Shenzhen and Hong Kong stock 
exchanges 
Population (million) 3.13 12.532 
GDP (billion $) 666.95 3326 
Area (km2) 48017 20502 
Only regions that are widely perceived as successful entrepreneurial regions were selected. 







Indeed, some may challenge the absence of failing regions in this research. However, to answer 
the research question of how to evaluate the health of an entrepreneurial ecosystem, one needs 
to examine the successful ones in order to aggregate the features that make them successful. If 
failed regions were to be studied, this research might only end up identifying the reasons for 
their failure, not success, and, without doubt, such reasons may vary a great deal considering 
the heterogeneity of the regions. More importantly, avoiding factors for failure does not 
necessarily guarantee success and may well prove to be unrealistic, as failing regions all have 
their distinctive reasons for failure. Hence, selecting failing regions does not answer the 
research question. 
The city of Shenzhen has a clear boundary set out by the central government of China, as shown 
in Figure 3-1. 
 
Figure 3–1 Map of Shenzhen (Google Maps, 2018) 
The boundary of Silicon Valley is relatively vague compared to that of Shenzhen as it is not an 
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administrative area of the United States. Rather, it is a collection of a few counties and cities 
in the broad southern San Francisco Bay Area. For the purposes of this enquiry, Silicon Valley 
includes San Jose, Mountain View, Palo Alto, Redwood City, San Mateo and San Francisco in 
the West Bay Area, as well as Berkeley, Oakland, Union City and Fremont in the East Bay Area, 
as seen in Figure 3-2.  
 
Figure 3–2 Map of Silicon Valley (Google Maps, 2018) 
3.2.5 Selection of organisations and key entrepreneurial firms 
As shown in section 3.1.3, two specific sets of interviewees and organisations are required to 
answer three different sub-research questions. Ecosystem-level informants were used to answer 
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sub-research question 1 and part of sub-research question 3, whilst entrepreneurial-process-
level informants served to answer sub-research question 2 and part of sub-research question 3. 
As for the interviewees and their organisations as ecosystem informants, the research sought 
different types of organisations operating in the entrepreneurial ecosystems, which could 
include individual entrepreneurs/start-ups, incubators and accelerators, government bodies 
such as city councils and regional governments, multinational corporations, and venture 
capitalists in different stages such as seed investors/angel investors (venture capitalists and 
individual investors) and mid-late stage investors (private equity), as have been outlined in 
previous literature (Spigel, 2017). When selecting start-ups to interview, the ICT industry was 
the primary focus, which is the main industry in the two case regions, and also the start-ups 
that are relatively successful in their respective market segment were selected. When selecting 
other ecosystem players, only those that are leading their respective sectors were chosen. 
As for the selection of entrepreneurial-process informants, a theoretical sampling approach was 
employed. As is introduced in more detail later, interviews with ecosystem informants 
constitute phase one of the data collection. After the phase one data collection, the evolutions 
of both ecosystems were mapped out, based on both interview data and secondary data. Based 
on the evolutions of both ecosystems, the sampling of the entrepreneurial-process informants 
was then started. On the one hand, the author set out to select the entrepreneurial firms in 
different timeframes that have significantly influenced the development of the ecosystems, for 
example, organisations who facilitated the substitution of new technologies and/or created 
novel ways of new venture creation. They are representative firms in the salient industries in 
their corresponding development phase. On other hand, as Spigel and Harrison suggested 
(2018), there exists a continuum of willingness and abilities for entrepreneurs to access 
resources from the entrepreneurial ecosystems, and those who better access the ecosystem 
resources could have a superior performance. Therefore, in order to control this variable, the 
author aimed to select the companies that are undoubtedly perceived as successful 
entrepreneurial firms. Surely, these successful companies do not succeed only because they are 
proficient in terms of leveraging ecosystem resources, but they must have demonstrated 
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considerable willingness and abilities to utilise the ecosystem resources in an attempt to stand 
out among their competitors in the same ecosystems. In other words, selecting failed ventures 
in the ecosystem could risk attributing their failures to the ecosystem’s resources not being 
readily available at the time of their new venture creation processes, rather than the endogenous 
factors, which does not serve to answer the research question. Regarding the selection from 
among a handful of successful ventures at the same stage, the criteria are as follows: (1) the 
venture must have substantial interactions with ecosystem resources; certainly, a firm can still 
succeed without much interaction with the ecosystem if the firm possess superior technologies 
or other resources and capabilities that could bring it competitive advantages. However, 
studying such a venture cannot yield sufficient insights for how the entrepreneurial ecosystem 
is benefiting the venture; (2) the firm needs to be impactful in its ecosystem’s corresponding 
stages of development, normally through leading the representative industry in the ecosystem. 
Based on the above criteria, the selection of key entrepreneurial firms can be seen in Table 3-
4. 
Table 3–4 Selection of key entrepreneurial firms 
 Ecosystem evolution Emerging Growing Mature Renewal 
Silicon 
Valley 
Timeframe 1956-1971 1972-1990 1991-2006 2007- 




 Key entrepreneurial firm Fairchild-Intel Apple Google Tesla 
      
Shenzhen Timeframe 1989-1997 1998-2007 2008- N/A 





Smart hardware N/A 
 Key entrepreneurial firm Huawei Tencent DJI N/A 
3.2.6 Selection of interviewees 
As for the selection of interviewees, they were not limited to only senior managers in the 
organisations. Instead, for ecosystem informants in particular, those who have stayed in the 
case region for a relatively longer time or are well informed about the region as a whole were 
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selected. In this way, a more comprehensive view of how the interviewed organisations interact 
with ecosystem players and benefit from the ecosystems could be obtained. As is mentioned in 
the selection of ecosystem informants, the range was maximised into different types of players 
in the EE: governments, incubators, entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, etc., to cover different 
perspectives.  
For entrepreneurial-process informants, the author aimed to select those who are familiar with 
the organisation’s history, considering the fact that some of the organisations date back to 
decades ago when they were at the entrepreneurial stage. Where available, informants close to 
the top management were interviewed. If they were not available, employees with relatively 
good knowledge about the company’s development were interviewed. These informants were 
familiar with the historical development of the key case companies because: (1) they might 
have stayed in the organisation for a long time and likely from the early stage of the venture; 
(2) they might belong to a particular division that requires them to understand more about the 
historical development of the organisation, for example, strategy analyst and public relation 
managers; (3) they might have had genuine interest in knowing about the entrepreneurial 
processes of their organisation prior to the interviews. What is equally important is that, during 
the interviews, the author asked for their recommendations for secondary sources such as books 
and monographs that most accurately describe the early stages of their companies.  
3.3 Data collection 
3.3.1 Data sources 
The data sources in this research include primary and secondary data, in order to triangulate 
and improve external validity (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009). Before primary data 
collection, secondary data for background research was searched, including news articles, 
websites, government and industry reports as well as relevant journal papers and book chapters. 
In this phase, secondary data focuses on revealing the history, background and performances 
of these regions. Based on all this background research and literature, a primary data collection 
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protocol was further developed to guide the data collection from the semi-structured interviews. 
The protocol can also ensure the reliability of this research (Yin, 2009). 
In the primary data collection phase, the author conducted site visits and collected data from 
all organisations, using semi-structured interviews complemented with observations and 
archival data. Suggestions from Eisenhardt (1989), Yin (2009) and Miles and Huberman (1994) 
were followed to design the interview process. The primary data collection took place in two 
phases, with the first phase from June 2016 to August 2016, and the second phase from March 
2017 to June 2017, in both Shenzhen and Silicon Valley, as can be seen from Table 3-5, which 
provides a summary of all data collected and used. Cambridge University’s formal rules on 
ethical considerations in social science research were applied during all the data collection 
phases. 
Table 3–5 Data sources 
Data Types Collection Dates Amount and Location 




74 Semi-structured Interviews lasting from 30 mins to 120 
mins (07/07/2016 – 09/06/2018, see Table 3-6 for details)
122 pages of transcripts (English) and 136 
pages of transcription (Chinese) from 
recordings 
   
Naturalistic Observation Visit to H&Q Asia Pacific Global Innovation Center 
(11/08/2016) 
1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to British Telecom Venture Silicon Valley office 
(11/08/2016) 
1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to Silicon Valley Venture Club (12/08/2016) 1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to Ufrate incubator (12/08/2016) 1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to Stanford University, Center for Sustainable 
Development and Global Competitiveness (12/08/2016) 
1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to IBM Research – Almaden (15/08/2016) 1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to Tesla Motors (15/08/2016 to TM headquarters, 
07/06/2017 to Fremont factory) 
2 visits (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to Institute for Industrial Technology (15/08/2016)  1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to Smarking (15/08/2016)  1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to Apple (16/08/2016 to Apple headquarters, 
09/06/2017 to a [non-disclosure] project site) 
2 visits (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to Sigrity, subsidiary of Cadence (16/08/2016)  1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to Google (17/08/2016 and 01/06/2017 to Google 
headquarters, 09/06/2017 to Google X) 
3 visits (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to Bluejay Mobile Health (17/08/2016)  1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to Huawei Silicon Valley office (18/08/2016) 1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to Upwork (18/08/2016) 1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to ZGC innovation centre (19/08/2016) 1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to Midas Touch (19/08/2016) 1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to SVInsight (30/05/2017) 1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to Intel Museum (01/06/2017) 1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to Facebook (01/06/2017) 1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 
Visit to Wisemont Capital (06/06/2017) 1 visit (Silicon Valley, US) 




Visit to Huawei (07/07/2016 and 19/07/2016 to Shenzhen 
headquarters, 11/04/2017 to Huawei Bantian base) 
3 visits (Shenzhen, China) 
Visit to Foxconn (08/07/2016 to Foxconn Shenzhen base) 1 visit (Shenzhen, China) 
Visit to BGI (08/07/2016) 1 visit (Shenzhen, China) 
Visit to Topray Solar (12/07/2016) 1 visit (Shenzhen, China) 
Visit to Songshanhu Xbot park (13/07/2016) 1 visit (Dongguan, China) 
Visit to Shenzhen Qianhai Financial Holdings 
(13/07/2016) 
1 visit (Dongguan, China) 
Visit to Shenzhen Innovation Fund (14/07/2016) 1 visit (Shenzhen, China) 
Visit to Mindray (14/07/2014) 1 visit (Shenzhen, China) 
Visit to Shenzhen Institutes of Advanced Technology, 
Chinese Academy of Science (18/07/2016) 
1 visit (Shenzhen, China) 
Visit to Shenzhen Technology and Innovation 
Commission, Shenzhen Development and Reform 
Commission (19/07/2016) 
1 visit (Shenzhen, China) 
Visit to Tencent (19/07/2016 and 29/03/2017 to Tencent 
headquarters) 
2 visits (Shenzhen, China) 
Visit to Han’s Laser (20/07/2016) 1 visit (Shenzhen, China) 
Visit to TusPark Space (22/03/2017) 1 visit (Shenzhen, China) 
Visit to Green Pine Capital (23/03/2017) 1 visit (Shenzhen, China) 
Visit to Nectac (24/03/2017) 1 visit (Shenzhen, China) 
Visit to China Merchants Group Shekou Branch 
(29/03/2017 and 03/04/2017) 
2 visits (Shenzhen, China) 
Visit to Midea (30/03/2017) 1 visit (Shunde, China) 
Visit to OPPO (31/03/2017 to OPPO headquarters) 1 visit (Dongguan, China) 
Visit to DJI (31/03/2017 to DJI headquarters) 1 visit (Shenzhen, China) 
Visit to ARM Shenzhen office (31/03/2017) 1 visit (Shenzhen, China) 
Attendance at Ten Year Anniversary of Green Pine Capital 
(06/04/2017) 
Activity attendance (Shenzhen, China) 
Focus group Internal Seminar Discussion on Entrepreneurial 
Ecosystems (mainly with researchers from the UK and 
China, 27/03/2018, 21/11/2017, 12/12/2016, 21/03/2016) 
4 meeting minutes (40 pages) and Q&A 
transcriptions (26 pages) 
 External Seminar on Cambridge Phenomenon as well as 
entrepreneurial ecosystems (researchers, practitioners 
from the UK, October 2017) 
1 discussion minute (6 pages) and Q&A 
transcriptions (8 pages) 
 External Workshop on measuring Cambridge 
Entrepreneurship Performance (researchers, practitioners, 
and policy-makers, March 2017) 
1 discussion minute (6 pages) and Q&A 




Articles pertinent to Silicon Valley entrepreneurship (all 
available dates) 
238 English articles from LexisNexis 
(Handpicked, excluding high similarity 
duplications) 
Articles pertinent to Fairchild’s entrepreneurial process 
(all available dates) 
16 English articles from LexisNexis 
(Handpicked, excluding high similarity 
duplications) 
Articles pertinent to Intel’s entrepreneurial process (all 
available dates) 
20 English articles from LexisNexis 
(Handpicked, excluding high similarity 
duplications) 
Articles pertinent to Apple’s entrepreneurial process (all 
available dates) 
49 English articles from LexisNexis 
(Handpicked, excluding high similarity 
duplications) 
Articles pertinent to Google’s entrepreneurial process (all 
available dates) 
47 English articles from LexisNexis 
(Handpicked, excluding high similarity 
duplications) 
Articles pertinent to Tesla’s entrepreneurial process (all 
available dates) 
62 English articles from LexisNexis 
(Handpicked, excluding high similarity 
duplications) 
Articles pertinent to Shenzhen entrepreneurship (all 
available dates) 
242 English articles from LexisNexis 
(Handpicked, excluding high similarity 
duplications) 
220 Chinese articles from Xinhua Multimedia 
Database 
Articles pertinent to Huawei’s entrepreneurial process (all 
available dates) 
42 Chinese articles from Xinhua Multimedia 
Database 
Articles pertinent to Tencent’s entrepreneurial process (all 
available dates) 
48 Chinese articles from Xinhua Multimedia 
Database 
Articles pertinent to DJI’s entrepreneurial process (all 
available dates) 
56 Chinese articles from Xinhua Multimedia 
Database 





Industrial reports regarding Silicon Valley’s regional 
development: Silicon Valley Index 1995-2018 
14 reports, 1396 pages 
Shenzhen Science and Technology Innovation 
Commission series reports 
15 reports, 985 pages in Chinese 
   
Books and monographs Books pertinent to Silicon Valley’s development: 
“Regional Advantage”, “Valley of Genius”, “The Secrets 
of Silicon Valley (in Chinese)”, “Secrets of Silicon 
Valley”, “A History of Silicon Valley” 
5 books, 4302 pages 
Book pertinent to Fairchild-Intel’s entrepreneurial 
process: “Collection of Laoqian (in Chinese)” 
1 book, 215 pages 
Books pertinent to Apple’s entrepreneurial process: 
“Collection of Laoqian (in Chinese)”, “Steve Jobs” 
2 books, 1433 pages 
Book pertinent to Google’s entrepreneurial process: “The 
Google Guys” 
1 books, 472 pages 
Book pertinent to Tesla’s entrepreneurial process: “Elon 
Musk” 
1 book, 378 pages 
Books (in Chinese) pertinent to Shenzhen’s development: 
“The History of Shenzhen’s Entrepreneurship (1979-
2009) I and II”, “There is a Model Called Shanzhai”, 
“Forty Years’ Development of Shenzhen” 
4 books, 1920 pages in Chinese 
Books (in Chinese) pertinent to Huawei’s entrepreneurial 
process: “Creating Huawei”, “Huawei’s Leadership, 
Culture and Connectivity”, “The Truth to Huawei” 
3 books, 1162 pages 
Books (in Chinese) pertinent to Tencent’s entrepreneurial 
process: “Tencent Business Insider”, “Biography of 
Tencent”, “How Tencent Grew up”, “Pony Ma’s Internal 
Seminars” 
4 books, 816 pages 
   
Videos, archives, and 
third-party interviews 
Videos regarding Shenzhen’s development: “Decoding 
Shenzhen: Huaqiangbei” 
4 videos by CCTV, retrieved from YouTube 
Shenzhen’s yearbook Retrieved from Shenzhen Library 
Third-party interview with DJI’s founder, Tao Wang Interview by Shenzhen Technology and 
Innovation Commission: 1 interview 
transcript (20 pages in Chinese) 
   
Websites and related 
online resources 
All interviewed organisations’ websites where they exist N/A 
 Articles from reputable English online sources 5 articles from Business Insider, 3 articles 
from Harvard Business Review, and 3 articles 
from the economist.com website regarding 
Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurship; 
 Articles from reputable Chinese online sources 5 articles from Tencent News, 5 articles from 
FT Chinese, and 5 articles written by 
reputable individuals published in WeChat 
accounts regarding Shenzhen’s 
entrepreneurship 
 Documentation and archives obtained from site visits to 
various organisations 
N/A 
Some interviews were conducted for two rounds. Usually, interviews with targeted 
interviewees were conducted on site. Each interview lasted between 30 minutes and 120 
minutes. Interview notes were summarised as soon as the interview had finished. Then, the 
basic facts summarised from the interview would be sent to the interviewee to ensure accuracy 
and transparency. If necessary, a follow-up interview was conducted to obtain additional 
information or data on some less clarified or inconsistent topics. Secondary data was also 
collected from the site visits, including brochures, internal archives, presentation slides and 
documents relevant to the topic. In total, 74 in-depth semi-structured interviews were 
conducted, as shown in Table 3-6. 
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Table 3–6 Interviewee list 
Ecosystem Organisation Type of Organisation Position Interview 
length 
Shenzhen Ecosystem Informants    
 BGI Start-ups Vice President 38 min 
   Operation Director 59 min 
 Han’s Start-ups Senior Manager 45 min 
 Douhe Start-ups CEO 65 min 
 Crazy Baby Start-ups Senior Product Manager 45 min 
 Guangxigu Start-ups CEO 62 min 
 Nectac SMEs Senior Manager 78 min 
 Topray SMEs President 22 min 
   Vice President 40 min 
 Mindray SMEs Director of R&D  85 min 
 Foxconn MNCs Marketing Director 55 min 
   President of FIT 30 min 
 OPPO MNCs Vice General Manager 65 min 
   Director of Administrative Office 56 min 
 Green Pine Capital VC Business Partner 72 min 
 Shenzhen Innovation Fund VC/PE Senior Investment Manager 56 min 
 ARM Shenzhen office, 
investment division 
Corporate VC Director of Investment 48 min 
 Shenzhen Qianhai Financial PE Director of Fund Management 49 min 
 Shenzhen Institute of 
Advanced Technology, 
Chinese Academy of Science 
University/ 
research institute 
Associate Professor, Director of 
Graduate Studies 
90 min 
 Shenzhen Graduate School, 




Professor in Regional Development 118 min 
 Shenzhen Science, 
Technology and Innovation 
Commission 
Government Deputy Director 79 min 
 Shenzhen Development and 
Reform Commission 
Government Deputy Director 79 min 
 China Merchants Group 
Shekou 
State-owned enterprise Director of Industry Research 30 min 
   Director of Investment and 
Development 
45 min 
   Deputy Director of Investment and 
Development 
45 min 
 TusPark Space Incubator Director of Operations 46 min 
   General Manager 35 min 
 SZL Xbot Park Incubator and early-stage 
investor 
Director of Public Relations 104 min 
 Chaihuo space Makerspace, incubator and 
early-stage investor 
Director 90 min 
 CVISC Industry development 
consulting firm 
CEO 110 min 
 Entrepreneurial-process 
Informants 
   
 Huawei N/A Vice President of Public Affairs 45 min 
   Personal consultant of Zhengfei Ren 29 min 
   Director of Supply Chain 
Management 
70 min 
 Tencent N/A Senior Product Manager 99 min 
   Senior Strategy Analyst 100 min 
   Director, Office of CEO 78 min 
 DJI N/A Director of Public Relations 72 min 
   Executive Assistant to CEO 75 min 
   Service Strategy Manager 60 min 
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Silicon Valley Ecosystem Informants    
 Apexigen Start-ups CEO 66 min 
 Efficient Drivetrain Start-ups Co-founder 65 min 
 Bluejay Mobile Health Start-ups CEO 73 min 
 Cloudminds Start-ups CEO 91 min 
 Midas Touch Start-ups CEO 60 min 
   CTO 60 min 
 Upwork SMEs CEO 82 min 
 Sigrity SMEs Senior Group Director 99 min 
 Facebook MNCs Senior Product Manager 101 min 
 Google MNCs Senior Product Manager 51 min 
 H&Q Asia Pacific Global 
Innovation Centre 
VC/PE Managing Director 99 min 
 
 SVC Venture Club VC/Platform CEO 63 min 
 Wisemont Capital VC Founder and CEO 59 min 
 British Telecom Silicon 
Valley Investment office 
Corporate VC Vice President of Technology and 
Innovation Scouting 
95 min 
   Managing Director of External 
Innovation 
90 min 
 Stanford University  University/ 
research institute 
Professor, Centre for Sustainable 
Development and Global 
Competitiveness 
112 min 
 IBM Research – Almaden University/ 
research institute 
Research Group Leader 88 min 
   Director, Cognitive Systems 66 min 
   IP counsellor 71 min 
 Sunnyvale City Council Government Council Member 76 min 
 Ufrate Incubator CEO 89 min 
 Institute of Industrial 
Technology 
Incubator Director 43 min 
 ZGC Innovation Centre Incubator Director 54 min 
 SVInsight Entrepreneurship and 
technology media 
Co-founder 77 min 
 Entrepreneurial-process 
Informants 
   
 Fairchild-Intel N/A Senior Engineer (30+ years 
experiences working in electronics 
industry in Silicon Valley) 
77 min 
 Apple N/A Senior Project Manager 
(Interviewed twice) 
78 min, 40 
min 
   Senior Hardware Manager 45 min 
 Google N/A Senior Software Engineer 
(Interviewed twice) 
69 min, 44 
min 
   Network Security Engineer 64 min 
   Senior Android Engineer 58 min 
 Tesla N/A Senior Strategy Analyst 
(Interviewed twice) 
71 min, 41 
min 
   Senior Business Development 
Manager 
69 min 
3.3.2 Data collection protocol 
Data collection was conducted as two phases, as is illustrated in Table 3-7. The first phase was 
to collect ecosystem-level data by interviewing different players in the entrepreneurial 
ecosystems. This data includes the historical and current perspectives of the entrepreneurial 
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ecosystems, as well as the interactions between different players in the ecosystems and how 
they benefit from the ecosystems. Before entering the field for first-phase data collection, 
secondary data including newspaper articles, books and industrial/government reports about 
Shenzhen and Silicon Valley development were compiled in order to understand the 
background. At the end of the first phase, the evolutions of Shenzhen and Silicon Valley were 
mapped out. During the mapping, interview data was triangulated with secondary data. Based 
on the evolutionary mapping which demonstrates the key events over time, the key 
entrepreneurial firms mentioned in 3.1.5 were identified. 
The protocol for ecosystem informants comprises four sections: (1) key contexts of the 
interviewed organisations within the entrepreneurial ecosystems, (2) the interactions of the 
interviewed organisations with other players in the ecosystems, (3) key events of the 
interviewed organisations along their development, and (4) how the EE benefits the 
interviewed organisations in different events. With these sections, it is possible to cover related 
topics on decomposing entrepreneurial ecosystem health, to answer research sub-question 1 
and partly answer research sub-question 3. As a broad range of interviewees from many 
different but related organisations were involved, this protocol has been tailored to fit with 
different types of organisations and interviewees. 
With the key entrepreneurial firms identified in each ecosystem during different stages of 
development, the second-phase data collection started. Similarly, before entering the field, 
secondary data including newspaper articles, books and monographs, as well as videos and 
third-party interviews regarding key entrepreneurial firms was compiled in order to understand 
the backgrounds and prepare the interviews.  
The protocol for entrepreneurial-process informants comprises three sections: (1) key contexts 
of the organisations and the ecosystem at the time of their entrepreneurial processes, (2) key 
challenges faced in different stages of entrepreneurial processes, and (3) ecosystem’s impacts 




Table 3–7 Data collection protocol 
Sub-research questions Data to be collected Key interview questions Secondary data used 
For ecosystem informants 
What are the 
dimensions of 
entrepreneurial 
ecosystem health?  
How does a healthy 
entrepreneurial 
ecosystem facilitate 
new venture creation 
processes? 
Key contexts and 





What attracts you to establish yourself in the 
ecosystem? 
Interviewee organisations’ 
websites where they exist; 
Brochures and other 
documents obtained from 
the organisations 
 
What do you think of your role in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem? 
   
The interactions of 
the interviewed 
organisations with 
other players in the 
ecosystems 
What do you offer (services or products or other 
benefits) specifically for other players in the 
ecosystem? Why? Demonstrate examples 
Interviewee organisations’ 
websites where exist; 
Brochures and other 
documents obtained from 
the organisations, News 
articles, books and 
monographs where possible 
 
What do you receive (services or products or any 
other benefits) from other players in the 
ecosystem, and Why? Demonstrate examples 
 
What are the key factors for other players in the 
ecosystem to be able to access the services or 
products you are offering to them? 
 
What are the key factors for you to be able to 
access the services or products other ecosystem 
players offer? 
   
Key events and 




Describe the major incidents and events you have 
come across during your development 
Interviewee organisations’ 
websites where exist; 
Brochures and other 
documents obtained from 
the organisations, News 
articles, books and 
monographs where possible 
 
What were the major challenges you faced when 
an incidents or event occurred 
  





Did your interactions with other players in the 
ecosystem help you go through the challenges?  
 
If yes to the first question, demonstrate examples 
 
If not, describe what the ecosystem should have 
offered you at that time 
    
For entrepreneurial-
process informants 







How does a healthy 
entrepreneurial 
ecosystem facilitate 
new venture creation 
processes?  
 
Key contexts of the 
organisations and 
the ecosystem at the 
time of their 
entrepreneurial 
processes 
What was the founder’s intention in setting up 
this organisation?  
Interviewee organisations’ 
websites; Brochures and 
other documents obtained 
from the organisations, 
News articles, books and 
monographs, founders’ 
biography where possible 
 
What were the key backgrounds of the industry 
and the business environment of the ecosystem at 
the time of founding? 
   
Key challenges 




What were the key challenges in the opportunity 
stage? 
Interviewee organisations’ 
websites; Brochures and 
other documents obtained 
from the organisations, 
News articles, books and 
monographs, founders’ 
biography where possible 
 
What were the key challenges in the organisation 
and technology set-up stage? 
 
What were the key challenges in the beginning of 
market exchange?  
   
Ecosystem’s impacts 
on the challenges 
faced 
Did the founding team acquire any resources 
from the ecosystem during the founding process? 
And if so, how did they obtain various resources 
during different stages? 
Interviewee organisations’ 
websites; Brochures and 
other documents obtained 
from the organisations, 
News articles, books and 
monographs, founders’ 
biography where possible 
 
To what extent do you think the resources 
obtained from the ecosystem helped the founding 




3.4 Data analysis 
The data analysis of this dissertation involves three types of approaches: process data analysis 
for making sense of the initial primary and secondary data, inductive coding for entrepreneurial 
ecosystem health, and cross-case analysis when deriving resource dynamisms in relation to the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems’ support for new venture creation activities. 
 
Figure 3–3 Seven strategies for sensemaking (Langley, 1999) 
3.4.1 Process data analysis 
As per the data collected in phase one, an evolutionary process is identified for both ecosystems, 
which fits into what Van de Ven and Poole (1995) have described as an evolutional model of 
development. Therefore, to make sense of this data, suggestions made by Langley (2011, 2013) 
were adopted in analysing the process data, as can be seen in Figure 3-3. Specifically, the 
narrative strategy (Langley, 1999) was first adopted to describe the evolution and development 
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of both ecosystems, as the embedded case design offers rich data within one main case. Further, 
to simplify the storylines and increase the potential for cross-case comparison and 
generalisability, a visual mapping strategy (Langley, 1999) was employed, as is illustrated in 
Figure 3-4, incorporating suggestions made by Phaal et al. (2011) in terms of technology road-
mapping. During the evolutionary mapping of the cases, the author set out to explore the key 
events and incidents that could enable the temporal bracketing strategy to be applied (Langley, 
1999) to specify different phases of development of both ecosystems. 
 
Figure 3–4 Extract from a process flowchart (Langley, 1999) 
Notably, the mapping of entrepreneurial ecosystems follows Isenberg (2011) as well as Mack 
and Meyer (2016) regarding the elements of entrepreneurial ecosystems – policy, finance, 
markets, human capital, supports and culture – in order to ensure key events during the 
development of the ecosystems were not left out. The mapping of entrepreneurial processes 
focused on the interactions between start-ups and ecosystems, and also considered industrial 
key events which might take place outside of the ecosystems. After process data analysis, an 
inductive coding approach was used to analyse the data collected in phase one. 
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3.4.2 Inductive coding 
Following Gioia’s suggestions (Gioia et al., 2012), a three-level coding was conducted to 
analyse all data. In the first stage, open coding was conducted in order to group together the 
most frequently mentioned phrases, through which the first-order coding was obtained. In the 
second stage, the author began to search for the potential relationships between different 
concepts and merged them into axial codes, which are illustrated in Figure 5-1 as second-order 
themes. The last stage in coding is theoretical coding, during which axial codes were converted 
into theoretical accounts. With this approach, data was linked to theories. The theoretical 
coding has grouped all categories in axial codes into aggregated dimensions, which enabled 
the author to consider contextual factors to fully understand these constructs. These theoretical 
codes are illustrated in the data structure as aggregated dimensions. The data analysis process 
was iteratively repeated until no further new codes could be derived from the data. In this sense, 
theoretical saturation is reached (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
3.4.3 Cross-case analysis 
After phase two data collection, data obtained for entrepreneurial processes within each main 
case ecosystem was analysed, following Eisenhardt’s suggestions of cross-case comparisons 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Hannah and Eisenhardt, 2018), and Miles and Huberman’s cross-case 
displays (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Specifically, the author compared across different 
phases of ecosystem evolution, how start-ups in different stages of their entrepreneurial 
processes access resources from the entrepreneurial ecosystems, as well as the resultant 
resource dynamisms on the ecosystems, as can be seen in Table 6-1. This cross-case 
comparison offers insights into how resource dynamisms in the individual entrepreneurial 
process are linked to those in ecosystem levels, and ultimately contribute to developing an 
integrative process model regarding how entrepreneurial ecosystems facilitate new venture 




In Chapter 3, research design employing a multiple embedded case design is adopted, with two 
levels of unit of analysis being ecosystem-level and entrepreneurial firm-level. Silicon Valley 
and Shenzhen have been selected as the case regions and their respective entrepreneurial firms 
in different time frames have also been identified. Primary data including site visits and 
interviews with key informants in both regions, and secondary data including books, websites 
and biographies etc. were used in the analysis. This dissertation combined process data analysis, 




4. Case Studies: Silicon Valley and Shenzhen 
Entrepreneurial Ecosystems 
Why isn't Airbus' global innovation centre in Europe [but in Silicon Valley] or 
its China innovation centre in Tianjin [but instead in Shenzhen]? The answer 
is that the real value in a jetliner isn't the aluminium tube of the body or the 
sleek aeronautics of the wings. It is in the electronics, everything from the 
avionics that control fuel consumption to the onboard Wi-Fi and entertainment 
systems. And tomorrow the value will be in the networks that link it all together. 
Salvatore Babones, Wall Street Journal8 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an account of the evolution of Silicon Valley and Shenzhen’s 
entrepreneurial ecosystems. Note that the account is compiled using both primary data and 
secondary data, details of which can be referred in Chapter 3. It also examines the 
entrepreneurial processes of key entrepreneurial firms in different phases as well as their 
interactions with the ecosystems over time. The case descriptions serve as a basis for further 
data analysis in Chapter 5, 6 and 7. 
4.2 Silicon Valley entrepreneurial ecosystem 
This section starts with an overview of the Silicon Valley entrepreneurial ecosystem’s 
development, providing historical and current accounts. It then documents the entrepreneurial 
processes of key companies in different stages of Silicon Valley ecosystem’s development. 





4.2.1 Silicon Valley EE overview: historical and current accounts 
Silicon Valley refers to the southern part of the San Francisco Bay Area in northern California, 
including Santa Clara, San Jose, Mountain View and Palo Alto right up to San Francisco, as 
well as the eastern Bay Area such as Berkeley and Oakland, etc. It is the world’s innovation 
centre and the headquarters of over 30 companies listed on the Fortune 500. The word ‘Silicon’ 
reveals its specialisation – it is home to a large number of high-tech companies whose products 
are based on silicon chips. With strong research & development capabilities due to the presence 
of many world-renowned research institutes such as Stanford University, California Berkeley 
and IBM research, and one-third of the US’s venture capitalists, Silicon Valley has become a 
vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystem and is attracting talents from all over the world.  
Silicon Valley’s evolution can be divided into five phases, as is illustrated in Figure 4-1. The 
genesis of the Silicon Valley ecosystem dates back to the early 20th century when the US 
government invested hugely in defence. The establishment of Stanford Industrial Park by 
Frederick Terman, the dean of the School of Engineering at Stanford University, after World 
War II marked the initiation of Silicon Valley’s ecosystem development. In the 1950s, the newly 
invented silicon transistors led to the establishment of William Shockley’s semiconductor lab, 
and the later Fairchild Semiconductor, which initiated the emerging phase of Silicon Valley. In 
the third phase, Silicon Valley ecosystem migrated to the fast-growing stage – the creation and 
accumulation of various resources accelerated, as Intel, together with Fairchild’s many other 
descendants, further developed integrated circuits (ICs) and produced the world’s first 
microprocessors, which effectively created the personal computer (PC) industry. Silicon Valley 
took off after then. The prospects of the ICT industry in Silicon Valley were further boosted by 
the mature of venture capital firms and a few later well-known firms were established in this 
period such as Apple. With a solid foundation in this industry, Silicon Valley entered the mature 
stage with a leading position in the software sector and Internet sector. Although the Internet 
bubble burst in 2000, Silicon Valley has renewed itself by leveraging the mobile Internet since 
2007. To date, Silicon Valley remains the best technology entrepreneurship region and has 
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Genesis: Stanford and the US military (early 20th Century-1955) 
The genesis of Silicon Valley dates back to the early 20th century, when the US military was 
searching for new technologies and applications that could help them win any future wars. In 
1933, the US Navy set up a military base in San Francisco and they were looking for radio 
communication applications that could be used between different ships in the US Navy’s fleets. 
The US Navy began to fund projects in Stanford and a few defence contractors in this area. 
World War II heightened the investments as the US Air Force was trying to deploy radar in its 
aircraft carriers as well as in its air defence. Subsequently, some famous defence contractors 
invested in and set up their factories in Silicon Valley. In 1939, NASA founded the Ames 
Research Center at the Moffett Federal Airfield in Mountain View, which was a major research 
centre for NASA. In 1952, IBM’s Almaden research centre was established, bringing in top 
engineers and scientists to the region. In 1956, Lockheed Martin founded an electronics lab in 
Stanford Industrial Park and a factory in Sunnyvale. These military-funded projects and 
research institutes nurtured the first batch of electronic component suppliers and manufacturers, 
as well as top-tier engineers and scientists in Silicon Valley. Besides the military presence, the 
genesis of Silicon Valley should also be credited to the support from Stanford University. 
Although Stanford University was established in 1891, it was not until Terman’s presence at 
Stanford that it began to have significant impacts on the region. When Terman, who was born 
into a Stanford professor’s family in 1900, finished his PhD in electric engineering from 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he decided to join his alma mater – Stanford – as a 
faculty member. Terman’s hard work in electronic engineering and telecommunications gained 
considerable reputation for Stanford and he was subsequently appointed as the dean of the 
School of Engineering. The Great Depression in 1929 made Terman contemplate how the 
university could collaborate with and impact real-world industries beyond pure academic 
research. This was the beginning of his efforts in facilitating technology transfer and 
commercialisation from Stanford’s research. He often encouraged students to set up their own 
ventures and led them to visit the earliest local electronic ventures, which helped the students 
gain hands-on experiences outside of textbooks. Hewlett Packard (HP) was established in 1939 
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by two of Terman’s students, under his initial support; he borrowed $1000 from a local military 
supplier for HP. Although HP turned out to be extremely successful in the following year, 
Terman was determined to institutionalise the collaboration of industry and university. He 
persuaded the then president of Stanford to set up the Stanford Industrial Park, the world’s first 
industrial park set up by a university, and let the land beside Stanford in Palo Alto to many 
different types of research institutes, companies and labs. The industrial park was highly 
successful in terms of encouraging new venture creation activities, especially for 
commercialising technologies born in the Stanford labs. By 1980, the park had 90 companies 
and housed some 250,000 employees. The high returns from the leasing contracts helped 
Stanford to further attract the best academics and professors, particularly in electronics and 
computer science, later on, which formed a positive feedback loop in laying down the 
foundation for the electronics industry in Silicon Valley. 
On the other side of the US, William Shockley, John Bardeen and Walter Brattin in AT&T’s 
Bell lab invented silicon transistors in 1948, which were further developed for scale 
manufacturing. In the 1950s, when the high-purity silicon manufacturing method was mature, 
Shockley thought of starting a new industry with his new technologies and believed that the 
dry climate in his hometown in northern California might serve as a good place. Terman and 
Shockley discussed the possibility of his returning to Stanford and Terman persuaded him to 
set up his new venture beside Stanford. The birth of Shockley Transistors opened up a new 
phase for Silicon Valley. 
Emerging: Fairchild and its descendants (1956-1971) 
Although Shockley Transistors could be regarded as the origin of nearly all other subsequent 
semiconductor companies in Silicon Valley, the company was not very successful. Shockley 
may have been a good researcher, but he struggled to be a good leader for his own company – 
especially after he was awarded the Nobel Prize for his invention of silicon transistors; after 
this, Shockley became even more self-righteous and failed to take in any advice raised by top 
scientists he himself had recruited from the East Coast to his lab. When scientists Robert Noyce 
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and Gordon Moore diverged with Shockley in terms of the technological roadmap of silicon 
transistors, they decided to set up their own company to fulfil their vision. Together with other 
six co-founders who were also from Shockley’s lab, collectively known as ‘Traitors Eight’, 
they established Fairchild in 1957. 
When Fairchild invented the planar manufacturing process in 1959, which significantly 
increased the accuracy in manufacturing silicon-based components, the company reached a 
historical high in terms of sales. However, soon after that, the Traitors Eight had conflicts with 
the parent company on the East Coast of the US and gradually left the company. Fairchild’s 
spinning-off journey had started. The first spin-off company was Rheem in 1959, which was 
founded by Ed Baldwin, the then general manager of Fairchild, leading to the future trend of 
spinning-off in the company, as is shown in Figure 4-2. In 1961, Jay Last, Jean Hoerni and 
Sheldon Roberts, three of the Traitors Eight, left Fairchild and founded Amelco. In the same 
year, Signetics was founded by four former Fairchild engineers, and Molectro, a later 
competitor of Fairchild, was founded by Jim Nall and D. Spittlehouse, who were formerly 
employed by Fairchild. In 1968, Intel was founded as Gordon Moore and Robert Noyce 
envisioned the use of integrated chips for personal computers. Jerry Sanders, former sales 
director of Fairchild, led seven former Fairchild employees to found AMD, which later became 
the second largest chip provider (and competitor with Intel) after Intel. 
By 1972, at least 60 semiconductor companies had been established in Silicon Valley, most of 
which were founded by former Fairchild engineers and employees. William Shockley, and 
Fairchild – established by the Traitors Eight from Shockley’s lab – as well as its numerous 
descendants essentially facilitated the emergence of Silicon Valley. 
Fairchild-Intel’s contribution to the entrepreneurial ecosystem is far more than spin-offs and 
technologies alone. The venture capitalist industry was essentially created by the establishment 
of Fairchild. Funded by Arthur Rock and an East Coast parental company, the Traitors Eight 
signed the first venture capital deal and created a new approach to investment – technology 
holders could exchange their technologies for shares in the start-ups. The venture capitalist 
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industry emerged. Rock went on to establish the Davis & Rock venture capital firm in 1961, 
one of the first such firms in Silicon Valley. Another later famous venture capitalist company, 
Draper & Anderson was founded in 1959. One of the Traitors Eight, Eugene Kleiner, decided 
to enter the venture capital industry himself. He found KPCB on Sand Hill Road, the world-
renowned venture capitalist road, together with former HP director Thomas Perkins. Apart 
from the creation of the venture capitalist industry, Intel is the first company that distributed 
shares to employees before floating. When Intel floated in 1971, many early employees became 
millionaires and some of them chose to reinvest their money in other start-ups, which further 
boosted the development of financing for start-ups. This innovation was then imitated by other 
Silicon Valley companies and later by start-ups worldwide, as a way to encourage talents to 
join start-ups with a vision of making considerable profits compared to traditional professions. 
 
Figure 4–2 The spin-offs of Fairchild 
When Intel’s first commercial microprocessor, 4004, was released in 1971, which included 
DRAM 4001, ROM 4002 and Register 4003, Silicon Valley was ready for the next growth 

















































Growing: The rise of the PC industry (1972-1990) 
The beginning of the 1970s marked the emergence of the PC industry in Silicon Valley. 
Although Douglas Engelbart, a researcher in the Augmentation Research Center at Stanford 
Research Institute, demonstrated the first personal computer in 1968 with a mouse and user 
interface, etc. However, it was not until Intel’s release of 4004, the first commercial 
microprocessor in a personal computer, that the PC industry started to take off. 
Silicon Valley’s PC industry was further propelled by companies like Atari and Apple. Nolan 
Bushnell invented the first video game console, using Intel’s 4004 microprocessors, which led 
to the establishment of Atari in 1972. Interestingly, Steve Jobs, the co-founder of Apple, had 
an internship in Atari, and was highly appreciated by Bushnell. When Jobs and Steve Wozniak 
aspired to create Apple computers, Bushnell connected them to Don Valentine, the founder of 
Sequoia, one of the biggest venture capitalists in Silicon Valley and worldwide. In 1976, Apple 
was established by Jobs and Wozniak in Jobs’ garage. The creation of Apple also benefitted 
from the creation and accumulation of essential resources including supporting infrastructure 
in the ecosystem. For example, Wozniak and Jobs demonstrated their prototypes to a local 
computer society called the Homebrew Computer Club. They received feedback on their 
product and gained the first order for Apple II, as well as successfully hiring several engineers 
they met at the club. Also, the growing venture capitalist community in Silicon Valley provided 
more options for Apple to gain investment from, compared to the new ventures in the emerging 
phase, as the most famous venture capitalists in Silicon Valley were all established by the mid-
1970s, such as KPCB and Sequoia. 
The role played by the Xerox research centre in this phase, which was established in Silicon 
Valley in 1970, was also notable. Although Xerox was not commercially successful in terms of 
their products in the PC industry, they had numerous inventions relating to personal computers. 
For example, Xerox invented the first User Interface that was widely used from the 1980s in 
all personal computers. Their prototype ‘Alto computer’ inspired Jobs, after his visit to the 
research centre in 1979, to create Macintosh in 1984, a revolutionary personal computer that 
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comes with a mouse and user interface, which became the dominant design of personal 
computers. Xerox also created the world’s first local networks, which they called Ethernet; the 
famous Portable Document Format (pdf) was also created and standardised by the Xerox 
research centre, which later led to the spin-off of Adobe. 
The flourishing PC industry stimulated the development of the software sector in Silicon Valley, 
especially commercial software, for instance, the relational database. In 1970, an IBM 
researcher published the theory of relational database. Several years later, IBM released the 
SQL (Structured English Query Language) to improve the efficiency of looking up information 
in a relational database. At that time, the theories of relational database did not draw much 
attention, as there were simply not enough computers and data that needed to be managed in 
an efficient way. However, in the 1980s, the number of personal computers and the amount of 
data accumulated increased the demand to manage data more efficiently and effectively. Larry 
Ellison, the founder of Oracle, was inspired by the IBM research paper and set out to 
commercialise the relational database. Oracle was established in 1984 and soon achieved huge 
success in the market – in less than 10 years’ time, Oracle grew to become a billion-level 
company. 
The growing number of personal computers and the need to connect them brought Silicon 
Valley to the next phase: Internet and the subsequent bubbles as the mature stage of Silicon 
Valley’s entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
Mature: Internet and bubbles (1991-2006) 
As the World Wide Web first appeared in 1991, the Internet industry began to grow rapidly. 
Following its leading position in the PC and related industries, Silicon Valley’s ecosystem 
continued to nurture new and impactful ventures in the Internet industry: in 1995, two Stanford 
graduates, Jerry Yang and David Filo, created Yahoo! in Sunnyvale, a web portal and search 
engine which was later expanded to other related areas such as email systems and social media. 
The creation of eBay in 1995 started e-commerce. In 1998, Google was established by another 
two Stanford graduates, Larry Page and Sergey Brin; it is a search engine based on the 
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PageRank system. In 2004, Facebook was established at Harvard University but was soon 
relocated to Palo Alto by its founder, Mark Zuckerberg. 
This series of sustained new venture creation activities is built upon the mature entrepreneurial 
ecosystem in Silicon Valley by 1990s: culturally, Silicon Valley has always been a particularly 
friendly and tolerant region for entrepreneurship. Its legal system is favourable to start-ups, for 
instance, job-hopping to competing companies is loosely regulated without the non-compete 
clause in contract law. Financial support is readily available – specialised venture capitalists 
with a clear division of different venture stages such as Angel investment and seed funding, 
rounds A, B, C, etc., right up to Initial Public Offering (IPO). Markets are mature, with leading 
companies such as Intel, Apple, Oracle and Cisco, and universities such as Stanford and UC 
Berkeley acting as hubs for innovation and attracting talents, as well as new ventures testing 
new business models and technologies Support is prevalent in Silicon Valley, with numerous 
incubators such as T-Combinator and legal service providers for start-ups such as WSGR. The 
talent pool grows rapidly with immigrants – particularly from countries like India and China – 
providing the sufficiently proficient and high-quality engineers required for product 
development. 
However, the fever of Internet companies in the capital market did not last long, as the Internet 
bubble burst in 2000 and the Nasdaq collapsed. The Silicon Valley ecosystem recovered from 
the shock, but not by sticking to the old path. Instead, the ecosystem renewed itself following 
the disruptive emergence of the mobile Internet. 
Renewal: Smart era and Silicon Valley as we know it (2007-Now) 
Although the mobile phone industry dates back to the 1980s when Motorola popularised its 
first-generation cell phones, it was not until Nokia’s Symbian system that mobile phones were 
connected with the Internet. However, the most impactful disruption was brought by Apple’s 
release of its iPhone in 2007. As the first genuinely ‘smart’ phone, the iPhone started the smart 
era: the sharpened integration of hardware and software, mobile Internet-based services, as 
well as the surge of platform economy. 
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On the basis of the existing mature resource base of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, new 
business models and technological applications continue to flourish in Silicon Valley, 
leveraging the mobile Internet technologies to disrupt existing industries. For example, the 
development of Tesla, founded in 2003, has leveraged the computational power and cloud 
storage embedded within the electric vehicle, as well as its superior battery management 
systems to maximise the battery life and other related driver experiences, disrupting the 
automobile industry. The new sharing economy, such as Uber and Airbnb in the late 2000s, has 
challenged the traditional car-hailing and hospitality industries respectively. Looking back to 
the past phases of Silicon Valley ecosystem’s development, in some sense, there were not many 
inventions. Instead, the Silicon Valley ecosystem is proficient at commercialising technologies 
that may or may not be invented elsewhere and using these technologies to disrupt existing 
industries. However, Silicon Valley did invent a lot of things in another sense, as it keeps 
reinventing and disrupting itself with different enabling technologies in different phases of 
development. Essentially, none of these would work without the underlying ecosystem behind 
Silicon Valley. 
4.2.2 Fairchild-Intel’s entrepreneurial process (1956-1974) and interaction 
with the EE 
The story of Fairchild and Intel dates back to the establishment of Shockley Transistors. In 
1956, William Shockley established this company producing transistors, with which he won 
the Nobel Prize. In the beginning, he hired the later renowned ‘Fairchild Eight’, including 
Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore, and focused on research and development of the next 
generation transistors to be used in computers. However, the Nobel Prize Laureate turned out 
to be a mediocre manager and he soon lost the trust of his best employees. Noyce and Moore, 
who were leaders of the Fairchild Eight, disagreed with Shockley on the future developmental 
avenue of transistors and decided to start their own companies to fulfil their ambitions. 
They soon found that they had all the technologies but no money; 1950’s Silicon Valley did not 
have venture capitalists (precisely nowhere did) as we know them today. The Fairchild co-
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founders had to look for help from the east – Eugene Kleiner, one of the co-founders, wrote to 
his father’s account manager about their venture, a letter eventually seen by Arthur Rock. Rock 
flew to San Francisco to meet the co-founders and they finally agreed upon an investment deal. 
In 1957, Noyce and Moore, together with the other six cofounders, resigned from Shockley 
Transistors and established Fairchild in Mountain View, sponsored by Rock and the parent 
company, Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp. It was the first venture capital fund ever in 
the Bay Area and paved a new approach to investment – technology holders could exchange 
their technologies for shares in the start-ups they set up. 
Fairchild’s first contract was from IBM in 1958, as the parent company on the East Coast was 
one of the shareholders of IBM. After that, Fairchild electronics grew rapidly. In 1959, 
Fairchild invented the planar process, which aided more accurate production of silicon 
components. Subsequently, Noyce designed a planar-based integrated circuit board, which 
helped the company take off. In 1960, Fairchild recorded sales of $21 million and was the 
eighth largest player in this industry. It also started to manufacture its own integrated circuits 
(ICs), when ICs started to be used in computers. 
In the meantime, Fairchild’s spinning-off journey started. The first spin-off company was 
Rheem in 1959, leading to a future trend of spinning-off in the company. In 1961, Amelco was 
founded by three of the Traitors Eight, Jay Last, Jean Hoerni and Sheldon Roberts. Hoerni 
would go on to found another 12 companies. Interestingly, Amelco was also sponsored by Rock. 
When Last told Rock that he was not happy in Fairchild and intended to set up a new company, 
Rock immediately introduced him to Teledyne, a semiconductor company providing 
components for the military. In the same year, Signetics was founded by four former Fairchild 
engineers, and Molectro, a later competitor of Fairchild, was founded by previous Fairchild 
employees Jim Nall and D. Spittlehouse. Eugene Kleiner, who initially attracted investments 
for Fairchild, finally decided to enter the venture capital industry himself. He would found 
KPCB, the world-renowned venture capital firm. In this spin-off trend, Tommy Davis and 
Arthur Rock founded one of the first venture capital firms in Santa Clara. The company 
received money from Fairchild co-founders to continue investing in new promising companies, 
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including those spinning-off from Fairchild. 
In the early 1960s, Fairchild enjoyed high growth. As demand for computer chips grew, Noyce 
persuaded Moore that integrated chips could be the future and would replace individual 
separate processing units, and, as a result, Fairchild invested more on chip design and 
production. In 1963, Fairchild became the number three player in this industry and opened its 
first overseas assembly plant, in Hong Kong. By 1966, the company was ranked second in the 
industry, encompassing TI and Motorola, and employed over 4000 people. However, the long-
standing conflicts with its parent company on the East Coast in terms of value distribution had 
strengthened as the company continued to grow. Many senior employees set out to start their 
own companies, including Intel. It is estimated that, between 1961 and 1972, at least 60 
semiconductor companies were established, mostly by former Fairchild employees. In 1968 
and 1969 alone, 13 semiconductor companies were established in northern California, eight of 
which were founded by former Fairchild employees. In 1969, at a semiconductor conference 
held in Sunnyvale that assembled most of the senior managers in this industry in Silicon Valley, 
only 24 out of the 400 attendants had nothing to do with Fairchild. 
In 1967, the then general manager of Fairchild left for National Semiconductors, moved its 
headquarters from Connecticut to Silicon Valley, and made it the sixth largest semiconductor 
company globally. The team also included Valentine, who later found the famous Sequoia 
Capital. Perhaps nothing can be compared to the movement away of Fairchild’s core team. In 
1968, Intel was founded by Andy Groove, Gordon Moore and Robert Noyce, and invested in 
to the tune of $2.5 million by Rock and 25 other investors, including the other five Traitors 
Eight. Noyce mainly handled marketing and Moore was in charge of the company’s operations 
and technologies. Jerry Sanders, former sales director of Fairchild, led seven former Fairchild 
employees to found AMD, which later became the second largest chip provider (and competitor 
with Intel) after Intel. As the competition increased and it lost its core management team, 
Fairchild’s revenue dropped by 95% and profit dropped from three million to $130,000, and 
the company gradually faded away. However, the foundations it lay down for the 
semiconductor industry and the whole Silicon Valley persisted. 
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Built upon the early success of Fairchild, Intel started by developing the Central Processing 
Units (CPUs) used in computers. Gordon Moore, who proposed the famous Moore’s Law that 
predicts the processing ability of computers would double every 18 months, led the project. 
Intel also hired new engineers from Stanford University, including Ted Hoff, who was an 
electronics expert specialising in computer sciences and who made a great contribution to 
Intel’s success in the CPU market. Intel went on to raise second- and third-round financing 
from investors and venture capitalists in Silicon Valley to support its R&D. In 1971, Intel’s first 
commercial microprocessor, the 4004, was released. The new product quickly inverted the 
market as every computer company except IBM had adopted this design by the end of 1971. 
In 1971, Intel floated on the stock market at $23.5 per share and 300,000 shares. More 
interestingly, Intel is the first company that distributed shares to its employees before floating; 
this was imitated by other Silicon Valley companies and later by start-ups all over the world. 
In 1972, Intel’s 8008 and 1103 microprocessors made the company the leader of the chip 
industry. Further, the 8088 microprocessors, for the first time, adopted the MOS (Metal Oxide 
Semiconductor) technology. This series of successful new product developments and launches 
was enabled by Noyce, Hoff and the former Fairchild MOS expert Federico Faggin. Faggin 
left Intel in 1974 and founded Zilog to compete with Intel. Intel’s entrepreneurial process also 
laid down the foundation not only for itself to claim the leadership position in the chip industry, 
but also for Silicon Valley to lead the semiconductor industry globally. The legacies left by 
Fairchild and Intel started Silicon Valley as we know it today. Fairchild’s and Intel’s 
entrepreneurial processes as well as their interaction with the ecosystem are mapped out in 




Figure 4–3 Fairchild-Intel’s entrepreneurial processes and their interactions with the Silicon Valley entrepreneurial ecosystem
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thousand shares
1972 Don Valentine founded Sequoia 
Capital, who is regarded as the godfather of 
SV venture capitalists
1972 Kleiner Perkins (KPCB) was 
founded by former Fairchild Eugene 
Kleiner and former HP director Thomas 
Perkins in Sandhill road.
1972 between 1961 and 1972, at least 60 
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directly back to the eight co-founders.
1972 Intel released 8008 
microprocessor. Its 8 didgits can 
represent 256 characters, include 
1-10 and A-Z and punctuations
1972 Intel's 1103 made it the industry leader in 
chip industry
1972 Intel released 8088 
microprocessor, developed by 
former MOS expert of Fairchild 
Federico Faggin, adopting MOS 
technology for the first time
1973 Intel applied for CPU 
patent. Noyce is crucial for 
the R&D of CPU. Hoff finally 
achieved it
1974 Faggin left Intel and 
established Zilog and 
released Z80 chips to 




4.2.3 Apple’s entrepreneurial process (1974-1986) and interaction with the 
EE 
Apple’s two co-founders, Wozniak and Jobs, got to know each other in 1969 in their high school. 
They were both enthusiastic about electronics and computers. Wozniak’s father was an 
engineer in Lockheed Martin in the Bay Area, and he taught Wozniak a great deal about 
electronics. The young Wozniak even got an internship in Silvania and worked with a computer. 
Steve Jobs was also excellent with computers. In 1969, he quit university but kept on attending 
computer science classes. A few years later, Jobs started to work for Atari, one of the first 
computer game companies. His experiences of working at Atari with its founder, Nolan 
Bushnell, helped Jobs understand product design in his early career. He also got to know 
Ronald Wayne at Atari, who had been very briefly involved with Apple at the beginning. In the 
meantime, Jobs attended a few computer science courses at Stanford University and started a 
joint project on personal computers, Apple I, with Wozniak. 
It was perfect timing. In the 1970s, people were starting to realise the power of computers for 
individuals, differing to the previous notion that computers should only belong to governments 
and research institutes. In 1975, French Gordon and Fred Moore founded a computer fan club 
called the Homebrew Computer Club was founded in order to create a platform for computer 
lovers to communicate and share ideas. The club is famous for its members sharing ideas and 
helping each other in all aspects of computing, which represented the open culture of Silicon 
Valley. Wozniak was a member of the club and, at the club’s first meeting, which discussed 
Altair, a microcomputer developed by a company in New Mexico, he was inspired to design a 
microcomputer. This was the start of their first project, Apple I. Initially, Wozniak wanted to 
use Intel 8080, but it turned out to be too expensive for them. He instead used Motorola 6800 
since a friend of his who was working in HP could get him the chip for only $40. Meanwhile 
Jobs managed to get DRAMs from Intel and asked an Atari employee to design the main board. 
Wozniak demonstrated their first Apple I sample at the Homebrew Club, and received a great 
deal of useful feedback that benefitted future versions. 
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At first Wozniak was thinking of selling this design to HP, where he was working. However, it 
turned out that HP was not interested. When Jobs asked him, Wozniak agreed to use this design 
exclusively in Apple computers. In 1976, Jobs and Wozniak performed another demonstration 
at the Homebrew Club and drew the attention of a local computer shop called Byteshop, 
established by Paul Terrell. Terrell made Apple’s first order – 50 Apple I computers. 
The Homebrew Club did not only bring ideas, but also helpers and competitors. As Jobs started 
to design Apple II, he hired Jerry Manock, whom he had met at the club, to design the body of 
the computer. Meanwhile, microcomputer SOL-20 from the Processor Technology Corporation, 
founded by Lee Felsenstein and Gordon French, who were also members of the club, was the 
earliest of Apple’s competitors. As Apple II’s development went on, Jobs’ prior network helped 
him get more people on board. For example, Atari’s director, Bushnell, introduced Rod Holt, a 
former Atari computer engineer, to Jobs; Holt then joined Apple to design the power supply. 
Apple II had a revolutionary design: it was the first whole-body computer, containing 
everything the customer would need inside one single box. 
In 1976, Apple was formally founded. Like any other start-up, Apple needed funding to support 
its new product developments. Bushnell suggested Jobs approach Don Valentine, the founder 
of Sequoia Capital, who agreed to invest and also introduced his former colleague, Mike 
Markkula, to Apple. Markkula, who was a former Intel sales director and had retired from the 
company at the age of just 34, joined Apple in 1976. He also invested and held 26% shares in 
the company. In 1977, Apple II was released and Markkula persuaded Rock to invest in Apple. 
After seeing a successful demonstration of Apple II at the West Coast Computer Fair, Rock 
was impressed and agreed to invest in Apple. Markkula also invited his former colleague at 
Fairchild, Mike Scott, to be the CEO of Apple. As Markkula had a controlling interest in the 
company, Jobs and Wozniak had little say in the matter, and it was in fact one of the reasons 
why Jobs later left Apple. In 1977, Apple was restructured following the addition of several 
new senior executives and the release of Apple II.  
Perhaps Apple’s most significant contribution to the personal computer sector was the 
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Macintosh. It all began in 1978, when Apple’s new employee, Bill Atkinson, and his mentor, 
Jef Raskin, introduced Jobs to the Xerox Silicon Valley research centre. As Xerox was involved 
in the second-round financing of Apple, they agreed to show Jobs what was going on at the 
research centre. In the meantime, Jobs was working on a new project, the LISA computer, and 
Raskin was leading the Macintosh project. They hired many engineers from HP and were both 
developing the next generation of personal computers. In a demonstration in Xerox Silicon 
Valley, Jobs was inspired by Xerox’s idea to adopt the Graphical User Interface (GUI) and 
mouse in the new Apple computers, which was significantly different from the command-line 
style of traditional computers. Although in 1981, Xerox released XeroxStar earlier than the 
Macintosh, the product was quite expensive and not user-friendly, and eventually proved 
unsuccessful. Jobs persuaded the then XeroxStar hardware manager Bob Belleville to join 
Apple and develop the Macintosh. Jobs took over the Macintosh project from Raskin and put 
the concepts of GUI and mouse into this new generation of computers. In 1984, the Macintosh 
was released and its advertisements at the Super Bowl helped it gain huge success. Jobs 
subsequently built up a factory to produce the Macintosh in Fremont. Apple became the most 
topical company worldwide. Its IPO was the largest since Ford’s in 1956. 
However, the conflicts in Apple were aggregating. As the sales of Apple III and LISA were 
cannibalised by the Macintosh, Jobs’ arbitrary actions on taking over Macintosh and lack of 
cooperation and communication with other projects had made senior executives and 
shareholders furious. When Markkula hired the former sales director of Pepsi, John Sculley, as 
the new CEO of Apple, Jobs was made a figurehead. He could not tolerate this and resigned 
after a conflict with Sculley over the Macintosh’s decline in sales in 1985. Jobs immediately 
sold all his shares in Apple and started NeXT, an animation company, with some loyal former 
Apple employees. Nevertheless, based on the success of its first 10 years, Apple managed to 
keep growing. Twenty years later, as Jobs returned and rejuvenated Apple with the iPod and 
iPhone, Apple became the most valuable company globally.  
Apple’s entrepreneurial process and interaction with ecosystem are mapped out in Figure 4-4, 




Figure 4–4 Apple’s entrepreneurial process and its interactions with the Silicon Valley entrepreneurial ecosystem
Opportunity stage Tech set-up & Organization creation stage Exchange Stage
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4.2.4 Google’s entrepreneurial process (1994-2004) and interaction with 
the EE 
Google is the world’s largest search engine company. It also owns the most popular smartphone 
operating system, Android. Listed as one of the most valuable companies globally, Google’s 
entrepreneurial process dates back to the 1990s, as mapped out in Figure 4-5. At that time, the 
Internet was filled with open source spirit: Internet pioneers such as hackers, online game 
players, software pirates and independent programmers wanted to share their creations with 
the world. However, to find the information required was difficult – imagine yourself surfing 
the Internet without any search engines – although the Internet industry changed dramatically 
in 1994 when Netscape introduced a graphical user interface for web browsers and Yahoo! was 
established as a portal to access other websites. There were even search solutions before Google 
– but the first type of search engines only returned websites and storage, not connections 
between them. This was where Google came in and completely inverted the whole industry. 
One of Google’s co-founders, Sergey Brin, entered the PhD programme at Stanford University 
in 1994, and met Larry Page in the summer of 1995; Page had joined Stanford as a new PhD 
student in the computer science department. Page first conceived the idea of identifying the 
links between webpages and told his supervisor, Hector Garcia-Molina, about ranking different 
webpages based on their connections with each other. Garcia-Molina encouraged him to 
undertake the project, named BackRub, and it became the origin of PageRank, the core of 
Google. In 1995, Page started the project. Interestingly, Brin started a complementary project 
on crawlers to the PageRank. When Brin and Page found out about each other’s project, they 
decided to merge them and work together to develop algorithms for evaluating the important 
links. Such a project needs huge computing capacity. Brin and Page borrowed idle computers 
and CPUs from various departments to run their program. Garcia-Molina also managed to get 
them funding from the Digital Libraries project for them to purchase more computers. The 
Google program consumed nearly half of the total network bandwidth, although Stanford was 
the best networked institution in the world. Fortunately, and the university allowed them to 
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continue their project. In 1996, the first version of Google was released. 
Initially, Brin and Page were not willing to commercialise Google because to do so went against 
their original intention, which was for the search engine to be free to everyone. This caused 
conflicts in the founding team. Brian Lent, a Stanford graduate, one of the starting members in 
the Google project, insisted on commercialising it but eventually left the team and became the 
CEO for Medio Systems Inc. When the duo finally made up their mind to profit from Google, 
they were only willing to sell it to the established companies. However, their offer was turned 
down by multiple companies. In the meantime, Brin’s advisor at Stanford encouraged him to 
start Google as a company and discontinue his PhD. Eventually, he and Page took the advice. 
In 1998, Google formally released its search engine with PageRank as its core system. 
Meanwhile, Brin and Page needed to look for investors. Google’s earliest investment of $0.1 
million was from a Silicon Valley entrepreneur, Andy Bechtolsheim, introduced to them by 
David Cheriton, a computer science professor at Stanford, who had started a couple of 
companies with Bechtolsheim. As a return for the project, Stanford held part of PageRank’s 
patent, which in exchange made a profit of $336 million later. In 1999, Brin and Page managed 
to get further investment from John Doerr at KPCB and Mike Moritz at Sequoia, $12.5 million 
from each with a 9% share, which was incredibly low for both companies considering their 
bargaining power in the industry. Since its earliest years, Google has kept attracting young 
computer science talents with employee perks: free food and drinks, massages, etc., and the 
culture of doing something incredible. In its first three years, Google's new employees were 
almost all from Stanford’s computer science department. Their talent strategy was smart – 
hiring only young people who could work long hours and accept the Google culture.  
As Google expanded and grew larger, Brin and Page felt that they needed a CEO to handle 
daily operations and also prepare for IPO. In a Personal Computer Industry Forum held in 
Silicon Valley, Page met Eric Schmidt, who was the CEO of Novell at that time. They had a 
good conversation and Page thought he would be a good choice for CEO. After the forum, 
Schmidt ran into John Doerr, co-founder of KPCB and investor in Google. Doerr informed 
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Schmidt that he was shortlisted to take over the CEO position at Google and persuaded him to 
accept the offer. In 2001, KPCB connected Google with AOL, which was invested in by KPCB 
as well. AOL had the intention to diversify its online advertisement businesses and Google also 
intended to profit from advertising. The two companies quickly reached an agreement for AOL 
to license Google’s search engine and put it on the AOL website to display advertisements 
dynamically, which generated huge profits for AOL. Meanwhile, Google was also developing 
its own advertising systems. When Schmidt became the CEO, he persuaded Hal Varian, who 
was the founding dean of UC Berkeley’s School of Information, to join Google as the Chief 
Economist and help to design Google’s auction-based advertising program. In 2002, Google 
officially released this new system to replace the traditional fixed-fee advertisements. It would 
also place advertisements on other websites depending on the users’ search history, rather than 
relying entirely on advertisements that only showed up in the search results when using Google. 
With this new advertisement system, Google’s profit escalated past $100 million in 2003. 
To this end, Brin and Page began to consider IPO. Being overly idiosyncratic, they did not want 
to follow the traditional IPO approach established by Wall Street. The traditional IPO approach 
was to prioritise the demand of major clients of big investment banks. Prior to the IPO of a 
prospective start-up, the investment banks will normally inform these major clients and offer 
them the opportunity to buy shares at a lower price beforehand. This means when the shares 
are being distributed on the day of IPO, most individual investors would not have the access to 
buy any shares. This was not Brin and Page wanted. Instead, they wanted all investors to have 
an equal right to buy shares in Google. There was indeed an investment bank that was willing 
to fulfil their wish. Bill Hambrecht, a former employee from H&Q, an investment bank in San 
Francisco established in 1968, started WR Hambrecht and Co., with the promise of setting IPO 
prices at the price the public was actually willing to pay and able to buy on the day. Larry and 
Sergey decided to go the unconventional way of IPO – taking control from large institutions 
and investors on Wall Street and being ‘fair’ to all investors. In 2004, Google floated. Although 
Google’s IPO was not as successful as Brin and Page had imagined, as the leading investment 
banks were reluctant to play Google's way and deterred institutional investors, they still 




Figure 4–5 Google’s entrepreneurial process and its interactions with the Silicon Valley entrepreneurial ecosystem
Opportunity stage Tech set-up & Organization creation stage Exchange Stage
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4.2.5 Tesla’s entrepreneurial process (2003-2010) and interaction with the 
EE 
Tesla is a world-leading company specialising in electric vehicles, energy storage and solar 
panel production; it is based in Palo Alto, California. Tesla’s electric vehicles have led the trend 
globally to gradually replace fossil fuel vehicles. The founder of Tesla, Elon Musk, has a long 
history of new venture creation in Silicon Valley. 
Musk went to Silicon Valley in 1994 to work as an intern for an energy start-up, Pinnacle, and 
a game company, Rocket Science Game. When he finally decided to stay in Silicon Valley in 
1995, he also persuaded his brother to come along. Initially, Musk wanted to pursue a PhD in 
material sciences at Stanford University. However, after two days at the university, he changed 
his mind and was determined to establish an Internet company instead. In 1995, Musk and his 
brother set up Zip 2 in Palo Alto, a website combining the features of what are now Yelp and 
Google Maps. In the beginning, Musk experienced a tough time – he had to borrow $28,000 
from his father. Later, Jim Ambras, who worked at HP and Silicon Graphics Inc., joined Zip 2 
as vice president of engineering. He also brought a few other Silicon Graphics engineers. In 
1997, Zip 2 achieved great success in the newspaper industry and acquired its main competitor, 
City Search. In 1999, when Compaq acquired Zip 2, Musk left the company.  
It was time for Musk to establish a new company. As early as 1995, Musk had conceived the 
idea of Internet banking, believing that Internet finance would soon emerge and disrupt 
traditional banking. With the $1.2 million he had obtained during Zip 2’s acquisition, he 
established X.com to fulfil his Internet banking idea. In the beginning, Musk created a star 
team for X.com, consisting of previous Silicon Graphics and Zip2 engineers. In 1999, 
Sequoia’s Mike Moritz decided to invest in Musk and X.com. Later, X.com established the first 
online banking system in collaboration with Barclays and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. The opportunity was sensed by others as well: in 1999, Confinity was established 
in Silicon Valley, by Peter Thiel and Max Levchin, as a direct competitor to X.com. In 2000, 
Confinity merged with X.com and was renamed PayPal, with Thiel being the CEO. Musk left 
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the company following the acquisition of PayPal by eBay in 2002 for $1.5 billion. 
Surprisingly, Musk founded SpaceX with all the money he had obtained from the eBay 
acquisition and set a goal for SpaceX to colonise Mars. However, he was ambitious enough to 
get involved in another seemingly impossible project. In the early 2000s, Jeffery Brian Straubel, 
a Silicon Valley entrepreneur who was passionate about electric vehicles, started to sell his idea 
of creating a solar energy car. Musk was very interested in this idea and immediately invested 
$100,000. As a result, Musk and Straubel visited AC Propulsion, a company producing the 
earliest electric vehicles in Los Angeles. Although they were not satisfied with AC Propulsion’s 
products, they learnt that the company had been invested in by Martin Eberhard and Marc 
Tarpenning. These two entrepreneurs had started to develop electric cars after their first start-
up NuvoMedia was acquired in Silicon Valley. In 2003, Eberhard and Tarpenning founded 
Tesla in Menlo Park and started to look for investors. Coincidentally, Eberhard and Tarpenning 
were told by AC Propulsion’s executives that Musk was looking for electric vehicle projects 
and they remembered attending Musk’s talk in 2001 where he expressed his interest in 
replacing fossil fuel vehicles with electric vehicles. They immediately decided to approach 
Musk, and Musk agreed to invest $6.5 million, making him Tesla’s biggest shareholder. 
Subsequently, Straubel was hired by Tesla at Musk’s request. As a Stanford graduate, Straubel 
recruited a few other Stanford engineers to Tesla. In 2004, Tesla established a factory in San 
Carlos to develop the Roadster. Initially, Tesla engineers only focused on the battery system 
and outsourced all other components to Europe and Asia. In 2005, the first Roadster model was 
developed and went on trial. Musk was excited and invested a further $9 million. However, as 
the capacity grew, Tesla found itself dealing with hardware issues such as battery safety. In 
2006, Tesla grew to 100 engineers and produced a black Roaster prototype, which was 
demonstrated in Santa Clara and was the subject of numerous reports in the media. As a result, 
many car show organisers invited Tesla to their shows for free. This helped Tesla to raise $40 
million afterwards, including famous VCs and investors in Silicon Valley such as Draper Fisher 
Jurveston, VantagePoint Capital Partners and Larry Page. The improvement in computational 
power in the 2000s granted small car manufacturers advantages compared to traditional car 
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giants, for example, the crash tests can now be implemented in the computer instead of physical 
tests  computer simulation saves small manufacturers a great deal of R&D investment. 
In 2007, the Tesla team grew to 200 engineers and completed a mission impossible – produce 
the most beautiful and elegant electrical car from scratch in only two years’ time. However, 
Tesla still faced with supplier issues when launching its products on the market. To lower costs, 
Tesla set up a battery factory in Thailand, and procured panels from France, electrical engines 
from Taiwan and single batteries from China. In addition, like what Google did in its early days, 
Tesla only hired fresh Stanford graduates rather than experienced engineers, to cut down 
operation costs. The second half of 2007 was not smooth for Tesla, as a few key employees left 
the company and the Roadster project was not going well. Eberhard was demoted from CEO 
to CTO, and finally left Tesla at the end of 2007. Former Flextronics CEO Michael Marks 
assumed the CEO position and wanted to sell Tesla when it was still worth the market value, 
which Musk was not interested in doing at all. Very soon, Zeev Drori, the founder of a DRAM 
company in the Valley, replaced Marks as the new CEO. 
To support the development of a new car, the Model S, Musk kept investing in Tesla. By 2008, 
he had invested more than $140 million in Tesla’s R&D and it was challenging to seek more 
investments during the financial crisis. Musk soon ran out of money and had to turn to his 
friends in Silicon Valley for additional help. In the meantime, he also sold his shares in 
SolarCity and Everdream to raise $20 million. The toughest time ended when Space X 
successfully launched its rockets and NASA agreed to place a $1.6 billion order, and they even 
agreed that Musk could use some of the money in Tesla temporarily. In 2009, Musk announced 
the official release of Model S, which ignited the market. The US government decided to 
provide a $465 million loan to Tesla to support its further product development. With these 
investments, Tesla acquired the assembly factory set up by General Motor and Toyota in 
Fremont, California, and entered mass production of Model S, following huge numbers of pre-
orders from all over the world. In 2010, Tesla’s IPO successfully raised $226 million. Tesla’s 





Figure 4–6 Tesla’s entrepreneurial process and its interactions with the Silicon Valley entrepreneurial ecosystem
























































































































































































































































































































4.3 Shenzhen entrepreneurial ecosystem 
This section starts with an overview of Shenzhen entrepreneurial ecosystem’s development, 
providing historical and current accounts. Then the entrepreneurial processes of key companies 
in different stages of Shenzhen entrepreneurial ecosystem’s evolution are demonstrated. 
4.3.1 Shenzhen EE overview: historical and current accounts 
Shenzhen, seated in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) region of the southern China and right next 
to Hong Kong, is among the most prosperous cities in China, coming right after Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou. Specialising in the ICT industry, Shenzhen has developed superior 
manufacturing capabilities over its years of contracted manufacturing and recently enhanced 
its innovation capabilities through industrial upgrading and transformation. It is the home of a 
handful of the most famous Chinese brands such as Huawei, Tencent and DJI. 
Shenzhen entrepreneurial ecosystem’s evolution is divided into four stages, as is illustrated in 
Figure 4-7: the genesis of Shenzhen when it opened up to the world as a special economic zone 
and provided the most basic manufacturing services for foreign companies; the emerging phase, 
marked by the accumulation of manufacturing infrastructure through contract manufacturing 
of electronics and the emergence of telecommunications equipment from the end of 1980s until 
the late-1990s; the growing phase, with the emergence of various specialised players for new 
venture creation and further accumulation of key resources evident through the Shanzhai 
copycats and the rise of the Internet industry from the late 1990s to 2000s; and the mature 
phase, marked by a highly modularised venture creation process, with numerous organisations 
in each of the new venture creation activities; as well as a dominant digital hardware industry 





Figure 4–7 The evolution of the Shenzhen entrepreneurial ecosystem 
Genesis Phase Growing Phase Mature Phase
Start-ups
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The inheritance of new venture creation in different stages of Shenzhen’s development is 
prominent, from Huawei in Shenzhen ecosystem’s emerging phase, to Tencent in the growing 
phase, and then to DJI in its mature phase, as noted by a senior consultant at Huawei: 
Shenzhen is definitely the best city for entrepreneurship in China because of its 
clearly tiered ecosystem divided by different phases of development in 
Shenzhen – the first tier is Huawei, second tier is Tencent, and third tier is 
companies like DJI and over 500 promising start-ups with sales between 2 
billion and 10 billion RMB… 
Genesis: ‘3+1 Trading Mix’ in Shenzhen special economic zone (1979-1988) 
Shenzhen is a very young city. As a small village historically, it has been built up from nearly 
nothing since 1979, when China decided to open herself up to the world again and the central 
government set up a few Special Economic Zones, including Shenzhen, to experiment with a 
market economy. It was a tough starting point. After 10 years of chaos brought by the Cultural 
Revolution, Shenzhen and even the whole of China did not have much to offer for the 
international markets. Yet, despite the chaos and the poverty and other depredations it brought, 
the country established a comprehensive educational system. Thus, even before the 
introduction of the open-door policy, Chinese workers were comparably better educated than 
those in other poor countries. This and the fact that they were willing to accept low wages, 
coupled with the vast market, attracted companies from richer, developed economies.  
In such circumstances, the Chinese government adopted the ‘3+1 Trading Mix’ policy. The 
model was simple yet highly attractive: Shenzhen would provide heavily discounted land and 
a cheap labour force whereas foreign companies would provide raw materials, 
prototypes/designs and required components for these Shenzhen (state-owned) companies to 
manufacture and assemble. Note that this is different from contracted manufacturing, as the 
former would not engage in anything outside of pure assembly and processing – they did not 
need to purchase any materials or test-run any prototypes, and they did not even have to 
purchase their own machines, all of which were supplied by foreign investments should they 
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participate in the scheme. Therefore, the ‘3+1 Trading Mix’ involved only the most basic 
assembling tasks and was purely taking advantage of the cheap labour and easily accessible 
land, in order to gain a start for Shenzhen. Along with the ‘3+1 Trading Mix’ initiatives, 
Shenzhen’s government also released stimulating policies to encourage further foreign 
investments and domestic spending, such as discounted import tax for industrial equipment, 
and designated labour wages than were higher than inland China but significantly lower than 
Hong Kong, along with other benefits including reduced administrative fees and procedures. 
Starting from the Shekou industrial zone in eastern Shenzhen at the beginning of 1980s, the 
primary focus of Shenzhen was on light manufacturing such as food processing, beverage and 
textiles, etc., many of which were actually transferred over from Hong Kong. Although in a 
modest position, Shenzhen’s electronics industry began with the establishment of Huaqiang in 
1979, a state-owned company that initially focused on manufacturing radios and tape recorders. 
By participating in the ’3+1’ scheme in cooperation with Sanyo, Huaqiang gained initial 
capability in electronics manufacturing. Sanyo’s investments further enabled a joint venture 
between the two companies in 1984, which set out to independently produce radios and tape 
recorders, granting Huaqiang further capabilities in product design and development. Huaqiang 
is among the numerous examples of Shenzhen’s fast-growing electronics industry. It is 
estimated that, between 1979 and 1985, the ’3+1 Trading Mix’ accounted for 76% of the total 
projects led by foreign direct investment (FDI) in Shenzhen, and the Shenzhen electronics 
industry grew from nothing to over 170 companies producing televisions, radios, tape recorders 
and telephones, etc., as well as the associated manufacturing technologies and infrastructure. 
The electronics industry accounted for more than 40% of the total industrial output in Shenzhen 
by the end of 1985. When SEG group, combining 117 state-owned companies across multiple 
sectors, and Shenzhen Industry Association for Electronics were both established in 1986 to 
further integrate the manufacturing capabilities that accumulated in the ‘3+1 Trading Mix’ 
period, Shenzhen began to shift to contracted manufacturing.  
Meanwhile, entrepreneurial activities and organisations emerged in Shenzhen, primarily led by 
governments at this stage. In 1985, the Shenzhen government and Chinese Academy of Science 
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jointly established Shenzhen’s first science park, Shenzhen Science Park, and first incubator, 
Shenzhen High-tech Entrepreneurship Centre. While previous venture creation activities were 
all initiated by the central and local governments, in 1987 the Shenzhen government issued a 
new regulation to allow technology start-ups by individuals with their private capital. After that, 
new venture activities by individuals started to take off: Huawei, which later became an ICT 
industry giant across multiple sectors, was founded in the same year.  
This period was experimental and disruptive for the whole society, as almost all institutional 
and non-institutional arrangements pertinent to laws and regulations as well as cultural beliefs 
and mind-sets had to be adjusted to fit with the new market economy. It was also marked by 
the first wave of immigrants from all over China, many of whom came with entrepreneurial 
mind-sets, hoping to make a fortune or at least improve their lives. It laid down the foundation 
for Shenzhen’s transition to ICT industry and movement up the value chains afterwards. By 
the end of 1988, as the traditional ‘3+1 Trading Mix’ companies began to relocate to other cities 
in Guangdong and inland China, Shenzhen’s ecosystem was ready to migrate to the next phase 
of development. 
Emerging: contracted manufacturing and telecommunications industry (1989-1997) 
As Foxconn set foot in Shenzhen for the first time at the end of 1988, Shenzhen’s ecosystem 
entered its emerging phase, which is marked by massive contracted manufacturing activities 
and the rise of the telecommunications industry. The SEG group, which was previously 
involved in the ‘3+1 Trading Mix’, started to engage in contracted manufacturing at the end of 
the 1980s. In 1991, SEG’s joint venture with Hitachi to produce colour picture tubes for the 
latter began operation. Foxconn, since its entry into China, quickly leveraged the local skilled 
yet cheap labour force and grew its business in contract manufacturing for consumer 
electronics. 
Telecommunications equipment also emerged in Shenzhen, as Huawei and ZTE gradually 
caught up with their overseas competitors. In 1989, when Huawei and ZTE both set out to 
independently develop their switching systems, there were some 200 small indigenous 
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manufacturers in Shenzhen which could only provide low-end products. By 1992, both ZTE 
and Huawei had considerable R&D teams by heavily hiring from universities in inland China. 
In the mid-1990s, Huawei and ZTE successfully developed their own products, and started to 
capture the market with competitive prices and superior services. The Chinese local and central 
governments supported them – for example, Huawei won the contract for Shenzhen GSM 
network deployment, and the central government issued favourable regulations to protect 
indigenous telecommunications equipment companies. The competition between ZTE and 
Huawei heightened from the mid-1990s and the two companies in turn boosted each other’s 
development. The impacts from the emergence of the telecommunications equipment sector 
were immense for Shenzhen, as companies in this sector such as Huawei and ZTE did not only 
attract talents from outside of Shenzhen, but also equipped these talents with knowledge and 
skills in the general electronics industry, as well as providing financial resources for those who 
joined Huawei in its early days and cashed out their share options. These people enriched 
Shenzhen’s talent pool after they left the companies and became individual investors for local 
start-ups or middle to senior managers in other companies in Shenzhen. 
In the meantime, the institutional environment in China was unprecedentedly loose, in terms 
of regulations, privatisation and corporate finance, in the early 1990s. In 1990, Shenzhen’s 
government publicly sold four state-owned enterprises, which enabled private capital to be 
invested into acquiring state-owned companies for the first time. Following this, mergers & 
acquisitions became prevalent in Shenzhen, which created a friendly environment for start-ups. 
In the same year, the Shenzhen stock exchange started its trial and was formally established 
one year later. In 1992, China’s then leader, Deng Xiaoping, visited Shenzhen again and 
reassured foreign companies that the Chinese government was determined to continue with the 
country’s economic reform. Following his assertion, foreign investments reached a historical 
high – some 5000 foreign companies were established in Shenzhen by the end of 1992. In the 
meantime, another migrant wave from inland China to Shenzhen started, contributing further 
to Shenzhen’s talent pool. Deng’s endorsements also helped Shenzhen obtain a special 
legislative power locally, which was almost immediately used after its approval in the Chinese 
National Congress in 1992. Indeed, six months later, Shenzhen’s government issued a series of 
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new regulations regarding the transformation of state-owned companies to shareholding 
companies, encouraging technology holders regardless of their nationality to acquire shares in 
exchange for their technologies. Another new regulation in 1994 pertinent to shareholding 
companies enabled Huawei to distribute its shares to raise R&D funding and also later as 
benefits for employees for the first time, which was imitated by other companies in Shenzhen 
to encourage young people, such as government and state-owned companies’ employees, to 
join start-ups rather than holding ‘iron rice bowl’ jobs, which were traditionally perceived as 
better, more secure jobs in China. 
In 1994, Shenzhen’s government decided to focus on supporting the development of personal 
computers and related software, telecommunications and electronic components, as well as 
new materials, etc. On the one hand, Shenzhen’s government actively supported private 
companies in the region to raise funding through the Shenzhen stock exchange and also 
financially supported private small-medium enterprises (SMEs) such as Huawei for their 
product development. Shenzhen’s first venture capital firm – Shenzhen High-Tech Fund – was 
established by the Shenzhen government in the same year, in order to provide investments and 
loans for the earliest start-ups in Shenzhen. On the other hand, the Shenzhen government 
shifted from the ‘3+1 Trading Mix’ to encouraging foreign direct investments, attracting 
international incumbents – such as IBM, Flextronics, Samsung, HP and Philips, etc. – to set up 
their advanced manufacturing in Shenzhen, which brought new technologies and tacit 
knowledge. By the end of 1996, Shenzhen housed more than 2300 electronics companies and 
the industrial output accounted for over 50% of the total productivity in the region. 
This phase is marked with the emergence and accumulation of a manufacturing base and 
infrastructure in Shenzhen’s ecosystem. However, there were also failed attempts to upgrade 
consumer electronics further, from the production of tape recorders and radios to mobile phones 
and personal computers, in the mid-1990s in Shenzhen by a Guangdong provincial company 
due to the untapped market and unestablished value chains in the region. The intention was 
advanced, but the timing was not quite right, until the next phase of Shenzhen’s development: 
Shanzhai mobile phones and the rise of the Internet. 
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Growing: Shanzhai copycats (1998-2007) 
The end of the 1990s witnessed the take-off of entrepreneurship in Shenzhen. This stage was 
activated by Shenzhen’s government and the central government, but was further propelled by 
the Shanzhai copycats, establishing a comprehensive value chain for electronics.  
The tipping point was the year 1999. Realising the growing demand of SMEs in financing, the 
Chinese central government decided to set up a Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) in the 
Shenzhen stock exchange, which was formally opened in 2004, after a five-year transitional 
and preparatory period. One of the most notable preparatory initiatives for the set-up of the 
GEM in the Shenzhen stock market was to establish venture capitalists in Shenzhen and also 
allow private capital into the venture capitalist industry, which essentially facilitated the 
emergence of a venture capitalist industry in Shenzhen and even in China, as a senior manager 
in a leading venture capital firm noted, 
1999 can be regarded as Year One for venture capitalists in China. The 
national government and Shenzhen government decided to establish a Growth 
Enterprise Market in the Shenzhen stock market and therefore open up the 
capital market to both state-owned and private companies to fund start-ups… 
Notable state-owned venture capitalists including the Shenzhen Innovation Fund and Shenzhen 
High-Tech Fund were established or expanded subsequently to support new venture creation 
activities in Shenzhen. Many private venture capitalists emerged at the same time and gradually 
developed into leading funds, such as Green Pine Capital Partners. More importantly, 
individual investors who used to be senior industry practitioners (e.g. engineers from Huawei) 
emerged, as the financial regulations were relaxed, further boosting the entrepreneurial 
activities in Shenzhen. Under this context, the first National High-Tech Fair was jointly held 
in Shenzhen by the central government, Shenzhen government and Chinese Academy of 
Science; it was the country’s first large-scale event for start-ups with leading technologies in 
China to demonstrate their products and solutions, together with upstream and downstream 
suppliers and manufacturers, as well as investors and industry delegates from other parts of 
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China. Many Shenzhen companies received venture investment for the first time, a novel form 
of investment for many of their founders. For example, Tencent, which entered the market in 
1998 with its first instant messaging software imitating ICQ and designed for Chinese users’ 
habits in SEG group’s science park, secured their first venture capital investments from a Hong 
Kong investment fund through attending the High-Tech Fair. This investment helped Tencent 
survive the toughest time in its entrepreneurial journey.  
Although the growing phase was initiated by governments, Shenzhen’s further growing 
entrepreneurial activities were propelled by Shanzhai copycats, as the early 2000s marked rapid 
growth and the emergence of specialised players readily available for coordination by future 
start-ups. Under the context of China becoming the largest mobile phone producer in 2001, as 
well as the introduction of 2G mobile phones, Shanzhai mobile phone OEMs emerged. In the 
early 2000s, China’s domestic mobile phone vendors had lost huge market share to foreign 
brands. Meanwhile, China’s grassroots huge demand for low-price mobile phones created a 
terrific market opportunity. It was, however, not until the emergence of MTK’s turnkey solution 
that Shanzhai began to take off. MTK, which is short for MediaTek, is a Taiwanese company 
that initially produced VCD chips. Having collaborated with many pre-Shanzhai companies 
that used to produce MP3s and VCDs in Shenzhen, it sensed the potential niche market for 
mobile phones in China and thus chose to develop mobile phone chips. MTK significantly 
lowered the barrier to producing mobile phones by providing an integrated total solution for 
mobile phone chip sets and it was adopted very quickly by Shanzhai mobile phone OEMs. 
Around 2005, the Shanzhai manufacturing network was established – TSC (Total Solution 
Company), ID/MD (Industrial Design/Mechanism Design), EMS (Electronics Manufacturing 
Service) and Shanzhai OEMs cooperated to manufacture Shanzhai mobile phones. Shanzhai 
OEMs were mainly responsible for the marketing channels while various specialised firms 
such as component suppliers, design houses and foundries in Shenzhen were coordinated by 
Shanzhai OEMs in order to gain capability as a whole. On the one hand, the huge market 
demand for low-end mobile phones resulting from the increase in rural purchasing power and 
the surge of overseas demand, greatly promoted Shanzhai’s development. On the other hand, 
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Shanzhai mobile phones’ low price – as low as £30 each – together with their abundant features 
and the company’s rapid reaction – releasing a new product within just a month – to both 
domestic and international demand, also contributed to the prosperity of the Shanzhai market. 
Shanzhai reached its peak in 2007. Before 2007, licences issued by the Chinese government 
were required for the production and sales of mobile phones in the Chinese market. Shanzhai 
mobile phone OEMs apparently could not get these licences, which effectively made them 
illegal, although they had operated for many years. In 2007, the Chinese government 
abandoned the licence control of mobile phones, which ensured Shanzhai’s legal status, after 
years of legitimising efforts. By 2008, it is estimated that there were some 30,000 firms in total 
collaborating on producing Shanzhai mobile phones in the Shenzhen area. Shanzhai shipments 
reached 200 million in 2008 alone, accounting for 1/6 of global shipments (Zhu and Shi, 2010). 
During the 2008-2009 period, Shanzhai not only captured about 30% of China’s market, but 
also exported huge numbers of mobile phones to emerging markets such as India, Brazil and 
Africa. 
As a result, a highly comprehensive and specialised value chain of electronics manufacturing 
was finally established in Shenzhen – the clustering of various specialised players such as 
component suppliers, design houses, circuit board providers and OEMs, etc., was so 
tremendous that one could get nearly any component of an electronic product within 30 minutes’ 
drive. Although Shanzhai manufacturers were not primarily involved with new venture 
creation activities, what is more important is that the heritage and infrastructure of Shanzhai 
continued to have a significant impact on the electronics industry and the wider Shenzhen 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. The accumulation of various resources led to the next phase of 
Shenzhen’s entrepreneurial ecosystem: the Silicon Valley of smart hardware. 
Mature: The Silicon Valley of smart hardware (2008-Now) 
The 2008 financial crisis also severely affected Shenzhen’s electronics industry and the wider 
ecosystem, as the previous focus of contracted manufacturing was heavily shocked by the 
reduced demand from multinational companies in developed economies. From then on, 
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Shenzhen gradually upgraded its ICT industries and developed strong innovation capabilities. 
This upgrading process was facilitated by both governments in the first instance, and, as the 
ecosystem resources accumulated, Shenzhen’s entrepreneurial ecosystem began to massively 
nurture new and competitive ventures with considerable technological capabilities. 
The efforts that Shenzhen’s government made with regard to the upgrading of Shenzhen from 
contract manufacturing and copycats can be traced back to the mid-1990s, when it was figuring 
out how to encourage companies to develop their own technologies. A dilemma confronted 
Shenzhen’s government: on the one hand, financial support from government was absolutely 
essential for the vast SMEs in Shenzhen which basically did not have sufficient funds to 
conduct R&D, forming a vicious cycle; on the other hand, such financial support would be 
easily taken advantage of if not properly supervised, which was almost impossible considering 
the vast number of funded companies. Shenzhen’s government solved the dilemma by raising 
the funding application bar year by year, as a former government official noted: 
… [W]e started to encourage companies to apply for [government] financial 
support [for] R&D in 1995. In the beginning it was very easy [to obtain the 
support] as long as they applied…One year later, when more companies came 
to us, we asked them to not only set up R&D offices, but also acquire qualified 
researchers and developers… Then, many companies went to universities to 
hire scientists and researchers… another year later, the application required 
specific projects... and the next year we asked for a report of market projection 
and analysis, etc.... Five years later, we have a few companies who went on the 
path of independent R&D unconsciously and got used to it… in this way, 
Shenzhen had the first batch of innovation-driven companies… 
The 2008 financial crisis confronted Shenzhen’s government with even higher challenges. 
Another dilemma emerged: whether they should financially support the traditional contracted 
manufacturing companies and help them survive, or not, and, if not, Shenzhen’s economy 
would be staggering should the upgrading process not go well. Under huge pressures, 
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Shenzhen’s government boldly decided to relinquish the once outstanding contracted 
manufacturing label that helped Shenzhen grow to be a prominent manufacturing base. 
Fortunately, the booming new venture creation activities, which exploited the abundant 
resources accumulated from the ‘3+1 Trading Mix’, contracted manufacturing and Shanzhai 
copycats helped facilitate the upgrading process, as a number of technologically advanced 
start-ups such as DJI emerged. As can be seen in the section on DJI’s entrepreneurial process 
later in this chapter, its success has largely been attributed to the resources accumulated and 
provided by Shanzhai. The upgrading of Shenzhen’s entrepreneurial ecosystem is also reflected 
in existing companies; for example, when smartphones surged in China, some Shanzhai OEMs 
managed to develop their own smartphones and brands to stay alive in the market. Also, some 
of the previous Shanzhai component suppliers quickly adapted themselves to meet the demand 
of the smartphone OEMs, such as Sunny Optical Technology, who used to be a camera provider 
for Shanzhai mobile phones, and which has successfully grown to be one of the largest camera 
providers for the global smartphone market. 
Following the central government’s national policy of ‘Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation’ 
encouraging new venture creation activities in 2015, Shenzhen’s government has also invested 
in entrepreneurship education and encouraged universities to set up more events and courses 
related to entrepreneurship and innovation. Also, to further enhance Shenzhen’s innovation 
capabilities, the Shenzhen government has proactively attracted a few top universities in China 
and Hong Kong to establish campuses in the region, such as the Graduate School of Tsinghua 
University and Chinese University of Hong Kong Shenzhen campus. 
Shenzhen has now become the best city in China for technology entrepreneurship in the broad 
ICT industry and is frequently regarded as the Silicon Valley of Hardware9 due to its mature 
and comprehensive value chain in terms of electronics products. To date, a mature 
entrepreneurial ecosystem in Shenzhen with all required resources and specialised elements for 




start-ups has fully emerged for continuous new venture creation. 
4.3.2 Huawei’s entrepreneurial process (1984-1998) and interaction with 
the EE 
Huawei is a world-leading Information Communication and Telecommunication (ICT) 
solution provider. Its products include B2B (Business to Business) solutions and services such 
as telecommunications equipment, as well as B2C (Business to Customer) products such as 
smartphones and tablets. Huawei now has over 180,000 employees globally and covers more 
than 170 countries. However, like any ordinary start-up, Huawei had a humble start in the late 
1980s. 
The early 1980s was an important time for Shenzhen and China. The then Chinese leader, 
Xiaoping Deng, decided to open up China again to the world and develop her economy. 
Shenzhen was established as a special economic zone and thus attracted the earliest batch of 
entrepreneurs from all over China. Zhengfei Ren, a military veteran, was one of them. 
In 1984, Ren became a deputy director of an electronics company in Shenzhen and led the 
company to develop switching systems. Although it failed, this gave him experience which was 
valuable in creating Huawei. He left the company and a friend in Shenzhen introduced him to 
work as an agent selling HAX switching systems. In fact, this became Huawei’s initial business. 
In 1987, Huawei was officially founded in Shenzhen, with only 14 employees and $2600 
registration capital. Within six months, the agent business had attracted hundreds of 
competitors in Shenzhen, but 95% of them failed within a year. 
The time when Huawei was established was not actually favourable for an indigenous 
telecommunications equipment company. One of the reasons that there were so many agents is 
because China provided tax reductions for purchasing foreign telecommunications equipment 
in order to rapidly populate the Chinese telephone coverage. This, of course, seriously affected 
the development of any local companies who tried to develop switching systems themselves. 
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As of 1989, there were only 200 small Chinese indigenous switching system manufacturers 
and all of them were in the low-end market. Huawei decided to develop their own products 
partly because of Ren’s personal ambitions to defeat the foreign brands, and partly because this 
was a seriously huge market – as of 1987, the telephone coverage in China was only 10%. 
However, at that time, Huawei did not have sufficient technology capabilities and Ren started 
to seek cooperation from universities in China, just as a senior manager at Huawei noted: 
After several years’ sales experience, Huawei had established considerable 
marketing channels. At this time, Ren decided to develop Huawei’s own 
products but did not have any technologies. Ren therefore signed a co-
development contract with a professor in Tsinghua University and also hired 
graduates from the professor [for product development]. 
In 1990, the first product that Huawei developed, Private Branch Exchange (PBX) switches, 
based on the product that they agented, was launched on the market. With nearly 600 R&D 
staff, Huawei started the R&D of PBX (Private Branch Exchange) switches independently, 
focusing on the rural area consumers. One year later, Huawei’s first independently developed 
product – the BH03 switching system – was successfully released onto the market. 
After this time, Chinese indigenous telecommunications equipment companies started to 
emerge and rise. ZTE, another Shenzhen-based company, independently developed ZX500A 
PBX switch systems. Shenzhen Changhong also developed its own 2000-line switching 
systems. The increasingly more competitive market compelled Huawei to develop a new 
generation of switching systems – C08. In 1992, Huawei started the R&D of C08 and hired a 
large number of engineers for its R&D division from all over the country to develop this new 
model. These new recruits include many later renowned Huawei employees, such as Ping Liu, 
Yinan Li and Ping Guo, who then persuaded Baoyong Zheng to join, who later became the 
Chief Engineer of Huawei, as one of the early executives of Huawei noted, 
I entered Huawei after the Chinese New Year in 1993…That year was when 
Huawei started to massively hire engineers to develop C08… Many later 
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influential employees came from that batch… (Q5.2.18) 
In order to motivate the early engineers, Huawei was among the first companies to distribute 
shares to its employees, following the reform of share-holding company policies in China. 
Huawei also benefited from its proximity to Hong Kong in developing C08, as engineers could 
get product samples from Hong Kong within one week after the design was settled. The earliest 
Huawei employees, however, had some hard times in terms of their daily lives in the ‘primitive’ 
Shenzhen, such as residence permits – one would have to obtain a residence permit to stay and 
work in Shenzhen in the 1980s – and safety issues, as there were many theft incidents in 
Huawei's area. Despite these difficulties, Huawei managed to successfully launch C08 in the 
Chinese rural market. In 1994, C08 had an initial success in the market, enabling Huawei to 
achieve sales of 0.8 million RMB. As a result of C08 and its market performance, Zhengfei 
Ren had the opportunity to talk to the then Chinese President, Zemin Jiang, and appealed to 
the Chinese government to issue policies that were favourable to Chinese domestic 
telecommunications equipment manufacturers. 
Huawei’s technological and R&D capability kept growing. In 1995, an R&D headquarters was 
set up in Shenzhen and an R&D centre was established in Beijing, with Yinan Li being its first 
director, to further attract talents to Huawei. In the same year, Huawei’s penetration in the rural 
areas of China was significant and this helped the company achieve sales of 1.5 billion RMB. 
However, as major Chinese cities including Shenzhen started to deploy GSM networks, 
Huawei’s products followed this upgrading and captured the opportunity to enter the high-end 
market. In 1996, Huawei won the contracts from China Unicom Shenzhen and Shenzhen Post 
Office to deploy GSM networks. In the meantime, Huawei started the R&D of the next-
generation system, CDMA, supported by the China’s 863 national project. By 1997, Huawei 
had successfully established its presence in major Chinese cities and reached sales of 4.1 billion 
RMB, with a 60% increase compared to 1995 and 5600 employees. 
Following this momentum, Huawei took a brave action. Ren began to encourage senior 
employees in Huawei to leave and start their own companies. Many of these early employees 
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either entered other start-ups or started their own companies. Years later, these people became 
individual investors in the Shenzhen venture capitalist industry. 
In 2009, the Exhwer club was established by several previous Huawei senior managers in 
order to facilitate the cooperation and communication among Huawei ex-employees. This 
club occasionally held venture investment forums, technology trends forums and 
entrepreneurship forums. Huawei’s contribution to the Shenzhen area is significant in terms 
of entrepreneurship. It is estimated that nearly 50% of the companies founded by Huawei 
ex-employees stay in Shenzhen as of 201710, and half of these start-ups are in the ICT 
industry. 
Their work experiences in Huawei have no doubt helped the company’s former employees 
in setting up new businesses or working in other companies. In this sense, Huawei’s 
considerable outputs such as human resources, managerial routines and company cultures 
have spilled over to many other private companies in Shenzhen, including top companies 
like Tencent, which has many previous Huawei employees as middle to senior management 
people. Huawei’s entrepreneurial process and interaction with the ecosystem are mapped out 
in Figure 4-8, with major events highlighted.





Figure 4–8 Huawei’s entrepreneurial process and its interactions with the Shenzhen entrepreneurial ecosystem
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4.3.3 Tencent’s entrepreneurial process (1996-2004) and interaction with 
the EE 
Tencent is among the most successful Internet companies in China and globally. As of 2017, 
Tencent’s world-leading services include social network, instant messaging, mobile payments, 
music, web portals, online games and mobile games, etc. Its mobile social app WeChat has 
integrated many of its current services into one single application and has become Chinese 
people’s must-have app. The story of Tencent began with its earliest endeavour in the field of 
instant messaging software, QQ, some 20 years ago. 
Huateng Ma, also known as Pony Ma, Tencent’s founder, came to Shenzhen with his family in 
1984. Three years later, he and his co-founders met at Shenzhen High School. After high school, 
Ma was admitted to Shenzhen University to read Computer Science and Electronics, as were 
three of his co-founders. In his sophomore year, he developed a keen interest in C programming 
and, in his final undergraduate year, he undertook an internship in Shenzhen’s LiMing 
Computer Network Co. During this period, he developed a stock market analytical system and 
sold it to the company for 50,000 RMB. 
In 1993, after his graduation, Ma joined the RunXun software company, which was in the 
paging centre business then. After finishing work, he enjoyed surfing the Internet as one of the 
first Chinese Internet users. After playing with FidoNet, an online BBS (Bulletin Board 
System), Ma established FidoNet Shenzhen branch, named Ponysoft, which became very 
popular among software developers in China. He developed his unique sense of user 
experiences in maintaining FidoNet Shenzhen branch. Under Ma’s influence, Bojun Qiu and 
Jun Lei, who both later became famous Internet entrepreneurs in China, established FidoNet 
Zhuhai and Beijing respectively in 1996. Lei Ding, who Ma hosted when he came to Shenzhen 
as a FidoNet user, developed an email system which made Ding a millionaire. This made Ma 
very eager to start his own business. As Ma mentioned in an interview later: 
I should say that there were influences from Ding. [After his success,] I thought 
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I could do something in the Internet industry… 
In 1996, Zhidong Zhang, Ma’s high school classmate, joined LiMing Computers, where he met 
Ma again and they had an historic conversation about starting their own company together. 
Initially, their idea was to combine the traditional paging centre business with the Internet. 
However, at the end of the 1990s, mobile phones started to overtake beepers to become the 
major communication tool. This endangered their paging centre business. Along with mobile 
phones and the Internet, an instant messaging software came to Ma and his co-founders’ 
attention – ICQ. ICQ was developed by Israeli developers and quickly became the most popular 
instant messaging software globally – or it literally created this market. The software was also 
translated into Chinese and entered the Chinese market in 1998. This is when Ma and his co-
founders conceived the idea of developing a Chinese version of ICQ. At the end of 1998, 
Tencent was formally established, by Ma and his five co-founders, in a state-owned science 
park.  
In the earliest days of its foundation, Tencent had a tough time and the co-founders were willing 
to undertake any project to raise enough funding to develop OICQ – the Chinese version of 
ICQ. One of the co-founders, Liqing Zeng, exploited his social networks in Shenzhen 
Telecommunications and secured an email system development project for Tencent. In the 
meantime, Zhidong Zhang, led a team composed of former employees from Runxun and some 
other Shenzhen companies, who used to be users of Ma’s FidoNet Shenzhen and were attracted 
to join Tencent, to develop OICQ. With the support from the funding gained through the project 
with Shenzhen Telecommunications, OICQ was successfully released. 
Compared to ICQ, OICQ had two innovative improvements: one was to retain historical 
messages on servers in order to enable Chinese customers who did not have personal computers 
to access these messages on different computers and to read offline messages. Note that this is 
a very effective approach to attract Chinese customers, as, at the end of 1990s, compared to the 
US market, personal computers were rare in families and people tended to use computers in 
Internet cafes. The second improvement was to reduce the size of the software dramatically in 
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order to enhance the user experience, because the bandwidth in China was very narrow. 
After its release, OICQ’s number of users increased exponentially, which put huge pressure on 
Tencent’s servers. Due to a lack of money, Zhidong Zhang had to purchase components in 
Huaqiangbei and assemble a server by himself. A turning point for Tencent in terms of raising 
money was its participation in the High-Tech Fair. The first National High-Tech Fair was held 
in Shenzhen in 1999 and it assembled a huge number of technology companies in China, as 
well as various investors who were keen to see projects with high potential. At the fair, Tencent 
drew attention from several investors and also successfully advertised itself by giving out many 
penguin dolls based on Tencent’s logo. 
Tencent caught a good time – 1999 marked the surge of venture capitalists in China. When 
Tencent was faced with funding problems, IDG and Yingke Hong Kong set up by Zekai Li 
helped them out. Although the Tencent co-founders had never heard of VC before, they reached 
an agreement on the first venture capital investment in Tencent. They were lucky enough to 
seal the deal before the Internet bubble burst in early 2000. 
In 2000, Tencent continued to grow and hired its first employees, who were formerly from 
Huawei. In fact, many Huawei employees joined Tencent during the 2000s. Meanwhile, OICQ 
had to be changed to QQ because the company lost a lawsuit against ICQ in the US. Further 
collaborations with local players continued. Referred by one of the co-founders, Liqing Zeng, 
Tencent started to cooperate with China Unicom (Shenzhen office) on using QQ on mobile 
phones running China Unicom’s networks. This is different from what we now perceive as 
using ‘apps’. Instead, the service is bundled with SMS (short message service) provided by the 
network operators. For example, if a user sent an instant message on QQ to a friend who is 
using the service, even though the recipient is not online, s/he could receive the message via 
SMS and be able to read and reply via SMS, instead of having to use a personal computer. 
Anyway, the collaborations turned out to be very successful and was well received by the 
customers as they were able to use the instant messaging service, which had previously been 
exclusively on personal computers, ‘on the move’ for the first time. Following this success, 
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China Mobile (Shenzhen office), another major network operator in China, decided to 
collaborate with Tencent in the same way, and it was subsequently introduced to other regions 
in China. 
The year 2001 marked another round of financing for Tencent. MIH from South Africa made 
a $20 million investment in the company and became its second largest shareholder. The 
collaboration with major network operators in China went on smoothly and achieved a profit 
for the first times. Although Tencent was still struggling to search for an appropriate business 
model for QQ, the number of QQ users reached 100 million. In 2002, Tencent decided to charge 
new users of QQ a fee for registering and using the software. This angered many potential users 
and they turned to other instant messaging products. In fact, many Internet giants in China had 
an eye on this market and one of the biggest competitors, UC, developed by Sina, was released 
in the market in the same year. Under huge competitive pressure, Tencent had to make QQ free 
again and look for other ways of profiting from it.  
QQ Show – a personal virtual image system – was released and ignited the market instantly. 
Westerners may find it quite difficult to understand why such a product could be so popular. 
Culture-wise, Westerners do not lack channels in reality to express themselves in the way they 
prefer, but this is not the case in China under the traditionally perceived social norm – the way 
you dress and interact with people is, to some extent, standardised and therefore young people 
often find it interesting to express themselves online, including dressing themselves online as 
they wish, be it pop star, hipster or anything reflecting their wildest thoughts. QQ Show 
provided exactly what they wanted. Another smart move embedded with QQ Show was that 
Tencent launched a virtual currency system and users would have to convert cash into QQ 
currency in order to buy new QQ shows. This series of moves established Tencent as the no.1 
in the instant messaging market. Following its success with QQ, Tencent expanded into Internet 
gaming and news portal segments and, in the meantime, prepared for IPO with Goldman Sachs 
Hong Kong office. It would float on the Hong Kong stock market in 2004. Tencent’s 





























































































































































































































































4.3.4 DJI’s entrepreneurial process (2006-2014) and interaction with the 
EE 
DJI is the top consumer drone company, whose entrepreneurial process and interaction with 
the ecosystem are mapped in Figure 4-10. As of 2017, DJI captured over 70%11 of the market 
worldwide. DJI owns core technologies in flight control systems and platforms for cameras on 
the drones. The founder, Tao Wang, arrived in Shenzhen in 1993 with his parents, who founded 
their own business there. Around the same time, his future master supervisor, Professor 
Zexiang Li, who would later make a significant contribution to Wang’s entrepreneurial process, 
had just joined Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and founded the numerical 
control and automation lab there. In 1999, the Shenzhen government, Peking University and 
HKUST jointly established the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Research and Industry Collaboration 
Centre. As a result of this, Li was asked to found Googol, a motion control system company, 
at the centre. As a precursor, Googol has nurtured equipment manufacturers, system integrators 
and complementary companies in the motion control industry, which has contributed 
significantly to the upgrading of this industry in China, as Professor Li noted in an interview: 
[I]n the beginning, many entrepreneurs were local farmers who were simply 
processing raw materials for foreign companies using imported machine tools, 
taking advantage of the cheap labour… However, this cannot be sustainable, 
and we need to have our own core technologies in equipment manufacturing, 
etc., and [a] motion control system is at the heart of the equipment. 
Professor Li learnt from his experiences in Googol that his students would need to be practical 
– familiarising themselves with Shenzhen’s hardware value chains is one of the major tasks of 
applying theory to practices – and that was what he taught to Wang as well. In 2005, Wang 
joined HKUST as an undergraduate student majoring in Computer Science and Electronics, 




where he developed a genuine interest in Robotics upon participating in ‘Robocon’, a Robotics 
contest held by the university. During this contest, Wang got to know the co-founders of DJI. 
After the contest, Wang decided to conduct his degree project in developing a flight control 
system and, as a result, he successfully developed a new technology enabling a drone to hover. 
It was about time to build the drone when the enabling technologies were ready. As Wang’s 
master supervisor, Professor Li, suggested that he continue the project in Shenzhen as the value 
chains are comprehensive and easily accessible. Wang went on to conduct his drone project in 
Shenzhen, and particularly near Huaqiangbei, where all kinds of electronic component 
providers were clustered, so that he could source components easily. The beginning was very 
difficult. In order to get through the early difficulties, Wang had to borrow about $90,000 from 
a family friend, in exchange for shares in the company. Professor Li also introduced him to a 
few students from a research centre the professor had co-founded with the Harbin Institute for 
Technology Shenzhen Graduate School back in 2004. These students would work with Wang 
on the flight control systems. With all this support, DJI was established in 2006. 
The year 2007 marked DJI’s first flight control system, XP2.0, being introduced to the market; 
it allowed a helicopter model to fly beyond visual range for the first time. Its subsequent version, 
XP3.1, was used in assisting with recovery after Sichuan’s earthquake in 2008. DJI continued 
to grow as Professor Li introduced more students to the company. However, due to some 
internal conflicts, the founding team broke up. One of the four co-founders, Zhihui Lu, left DJI 
and joined another Shenzhen company to develop consumer drones. He would later found his 
own company and continue developing consumer drones. Jinying Chen, another co-founder, 
went on to establish a new company focusing on First-Person-View solutions for drones and 
aircraft models. The third co-founder started a company focusing on satellite communications. 
In 2010, DJI embraced several successful events that marked its rise in the market. The flight 
control systems were finally developed and patented and significantly reduced the size of 
drones. The ‘consumer’ drone market emerged from this: traditionally, drones were only used 
by technology and aircraft-model lovers, but DJI successfully created a consumer drone market 
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by launching relatively smaller and cheaper ($2000 in 2006 to $400 in 2011) drones with 
excellent videoing functions. DJI began to attract the attention of investors as well as the local 
government. In 2014, Phantom II and Inspire I were released and ignited the market. These two 
products made DJI the best consumer drone company globally and it became headline news on 
famous media such as The Economist and Forbes. In 2015, DJI’s market value was estimated 
to be $10 billion and the company received another round of financing. DJI’s entrepreneurial 
process relied heavily on Shenzhen’s vibrant ecosystem, as Wang noted: 
A very important factor for our success is that we took advantage of the mature 
value chains in Shenzhen. In fact, at that time, our quantity was not that big, 
probably some 50 per month. If you are looking for a foundry in the US to help 
you develop boards and hardware, etc., it would be really difficult [for that 
small capacity]. Only in Shenzhen, there are some small manufacturers who 
would be willing to accept your small batch orders. In Huaqiangbei, you can 
buy a small number of electronic components, although some are refurbished. 
During that time, we basically established competitive advantages over 
industry competitors in Germany, US and UK. Although it was a small market 
then, we successfully beat these competitors. Around 2011, the multiple-rotors 
market suddenly became very popular. We then put all our accumulated 
resources and technologies into this market and became the market leader. 
Surprisingly, another reason for DJI’s success actually dates back to the ‘Shanzhai’ 
phenomenon, which refers to the 2006-2010 period when a huge humber of 2G feature mobile 
phone manufacturers clustered in Shenzhen and nurtured a comprehensive supply network for 
producing not only mobile phones but many other consumer electronics. The comprehensive 
value chain, as noted by Wang and his supervisor, was of course crucial for DJI to flourish. 
However, another reason behind the scenes was actually the size reduction of electronic 
components in the development of Shanzhai mobile phones and subsequent smartphones, as 
the earliest angel investor of DJI noted: 
 
 115 
The success of DJI is also about timing. Shenzhen, of course, provides easily 
accessible components with comprehensive supply chains. But what’s more 
important is that the development of Shanzhai mobile phones and smartphones 
around 2010 significantly reduced the size of electronic components and these 
components were used in DJI. This is very important for drones, as battery 
[power] is limited; to ensure the drone can fly far enough, it has to be small 
and light – which requires the components to be as small as possible. Another 
important timing is the popularity of smartphones around 2012…DJI at that 
time wanted to capture a wider market beyond traditional technology lovers. 
What they did was to launch a product without the need for assembly by the 
end-consumers. Instead, consumers can use an app on their smartphone to 
control their drones to fly straightaway. This further expanded DJI's market. 
Benefitting from Shenzhen’s environment made Wang and Professor Li better aware of the 
power of the local ecosystem and they accelerated their steps in giving back to the industry and 
to Shenzhen: in 2013, DJI started to sponsor RoboMaster robotics competitions every year in 
Shenzhen and provide further support for winners; in 2014, Professor Li established the 
Songshanhu Robotics Industrial Park to nurture more robotics companies. As Li noted: 
The incubator was established in the hope of attracting more and more talents 
from Shenzhen, Hong Kong and all around the world to start their own 
companies in this area…. We can share our experiences and build up a world-
class platform for the robotics industry. In 10 or 20 years’ time, there could be 
more unicorns…. We hope DJI and Wang Tao is just a start… 
4.4 Summary 
Chapter 4 describes the evolution of Silicon Valley and Shenzhen entrepreneurial ecosystems, 
as well as the key entrepreneurial firms in different phases of development. The rich 




Figure 4–10 DJI’s entrepreneurial process and its interactions with the Shenzhen entrepreneurial ecosystem 
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5. Entrepreneurial Ecosystem Health 
What we seek are measures of the extent to which an ecosystem as a whole is 
durably growing opportunities for its members and for those who depend on it. 
Iansiti and Levien (2004a, p.32) 
5.1 Introduction 
Iansiti and Levien (2004a) pointed out the need to appreciate the novelty of ‘health’ as a concept 
to describe the durable or sustained performance of an ecosystem. Similarly, as will be shown 
later, the entrepreneurial ecosystem health is different from the traditional static dimensions of 
related concepts, such as determinants of regional entrepreneurships. This chapter therefore 
sets out to answer the first sub research question ‘what are the dimensions for entrepreneurial 
ecosystem health’. 
In this chapter, the main dimensions of entrepreneurial ecosystems and their associated sub-
dimensions (axial codes) are derived based on the primary codes obtained from interviews and 
secondary data, as is illustrated in Figure 5-1. These dimensions include ecosystem resources, 
entrepreneurial processes, ecosystem performance, ecosystem robustness, ecosystem 
adaptation, and enabling conditions for the four resource dynamisms – resource replenishment, 
recycling, diversification and exit. While ecosystem resources, entrepreneurial processes and 
ecosystem performance entail the traditional static, linear dimensions in understanding the 
competitiveness of an entrepreneurial ecosystem or regional entrepreneurship, this dissertation 
adds onto these by delineating the dynamic elements – robustness and adaptation – as well as 




Figure 5–1 Data structure 
Prior to elaborating on entrepreneurial ecosystem health, Figure 5-2 shows what an 
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an entrepreneurial ecosystem ultimately consists of start-ups and ecosystem resources, which 
include other actors that are involved in the new venture creation processes. 
 
Figure 5–2 Illustration of an entrepreneurial ecosystem 
5.2 Ecosystem resources 
The resources within an entrepreneurial ecosystem are the fundamental elements that enable it 
to function properly. These resources together provide a base for start-ups and other 
organisations involved in the new venture creation process to exploit and leverage. From the 
primary data, three types of resources within the ecosystems were identified – supply-side 
resources, intermediary resources and demand-side resources. As is listed in Table 5-112 the 
three different types of resources and illustrative quotes for each type of resource will be 
                                               
12 In each table from 5-1 to 5-8, illustrative quotes that are embedded within the main texts are indexed as Q 5.X.X, while 
those that are not shown in the main texts are presented in full in the table. 
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discussed in this section. 
Table 5–1 Ecosystem resources and illustrative quotes 
Illustrative Quotes Primary Codes Axial Codes 
Q5.1.1 
“Manufacturing sectors tend to be neglected here but they did contribute to 
the rise of the Valley in the 1990s…We were able to acquire Toyota’s factory, 
[at a] relatively lower price due to the economic crisis, to manufacture our 
cars…” An employee in Tesla 
Production resources Supply-side 
resources 
Q5.1.2, Q5.1.3 Technology holders 
Q5.1.4, Q5.1.5 
“…Shenzhen is regarded as the youngest city in China – it attracts young 
talents from different parts of China… The deep human resource base boosted 
Shenzhen’s development over the years…” A senior government official in the 
Shenzhen government 
 “…Also, the diversified talent pool is also a key factor for Silicon Valley’s 
success. People here are highly diversified, with different backgrounds and 
races. The diversification is critical because, when these diversified people 




“To create a Silicon Valley takes massive, continuous investments. The 
investments are not just money. At first, they were money and talents. Then 
they were the VC...” A director in an MNC in Silicon Valley 
Financial capital 
Q5.1.10, Q5.1.11 Social capital Intermediary 
resources Q5.1.8, Q5.1.9 Intermediaries (incubators, 
accelerators, etc.) 
Q5.1.12, Q5.1.13 Organisational resources 
Q5.1.16 
“…Proximity to market and industry information is key to identify 
opportunities because electronics companies are clustered here…” A director 
of an EDA company in Silicon Valley 
Market channels Demand-side 
resources 
Q5.1.14, Q5.1.15 Customer base 
5.2.1 Supply-side resources 
Among the key regional resources, it is found that supply-side resources which enable start-
ups to quickly set up their technologies and organisations at the very early stage play a vital 
role in attracting entrepreneurs and in the prosperity of the ecosystems. The supply-side 
resources include production resources, talents, financial resources and technologies, which 
are fundamental resources for start-ups of all types.  
Production resources in Shenzhen are crucial for the ecosystem to thrive and adapt. As 
proximity to production resources such as component suppliers is important for start-ups, 
especially those in the ICT industry, these resources continuously attract companies from 
outside of the ecosystem and also nurture companies within the ecosystem. The founder of an 
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electronics start-up told the author one of the most important reasons for moving to Shenzhen: 
…the upstream and downstream infrastructures are easily accessible here... It 
is more important than you might think to get close to where the components 
are. We are able to make a prototype, test it and revise it very quickly just 
because we’ve got manufacturers and component suppliers just on the other 
side of the street. (Q 5.1.1) 
Another important source of supply-side resources comes from technologies. Evidently, 
universities and research institutes constitute major sources of new technologies. With the 
technologies provided by these technology holders, entrepreneurs, who are often the inventors 
of the new technologies, might be able to transform these technologies into real business. 
Silicon Valley’s early days saw the rise of Stanford University in terms of research first, and 
then the deep research base of Stanford in turn gave birth to numerous start-ups, amongst which 
a few become renowned multinational corporations, such as Cisco and Google, as the founder 
of a venture capital firm in Silicon Valley noted, 
…Stanford was crucial for the success of Silicon Valley… many academics 
commercialised their technologies, for example, Cisco and Google, etc.… 
(Q5.1.2) 
Similarly, Shenzhen witnessed the great potential of commercialising new technologies from 
the success of DJI, which was born in the lab of Hong Kong University of Science and 
Technology. Recognising the importance of proximity to technology holders, the Shenzhen 
government set out to attract more universities to establish a presence in Shenzhen in order to 
boost the city’s innovation capability, as a senior Shenzhen government official noted, 
DJI is a good example of how university technologies can become bigger and 
stronger…. We all know that Shenzhen lacks good universities and we are 
working to attract renowned universities, such as Tsinghua and some 
universities in Hong Kong, to establish their branches here…(Q5.1.3) 
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Local talent pool is another basic source of supply-side resources that enable start-ups to 
emerge, grow and expand. Since the implementation of China’s opening policy in the 1980s, 
Shenzhen has attracted people with entrepreneurial mind-sets from all over China, as a senior 
manager in a local consulting firm for regional development noted,  
People are always the key…. Since the 1980s, Shenzhen has attracted 
entrepreneurial people from all over China…. You need to know that, in the 
1980s, people usually had jobs allocated by the government. Therefore, people 
who came here at that time were highly risk-taking and self-motivated…. They 
helped build Shenzhen into what it is now… (Q5.1.4) 
If Shenzhen has gathered some of the best talents in China, Silicon Valley may have gathered 
some of the best talents from all over the world. The deep talent pool has provided enormous 
opportunities for the start-ups and mature companies in Silicon Valley to continuously grow 
and innovate, as a co-founder of an incubator in Silicon Valley told us, 
Silicon Valley is an immigrant area – almost half of Silicon Valley’s working 
population were not born in the US – and these immigrants are often talented 
people in their home countries…. (Q5.1.5) 
As one of the most important sources of supply-side resources, financial support for start-ups 
in both Silicon Valley and Shenzhen is easily accessible, mostly through venture capitalists. 
For example, a director of a venture capital firm in Silicon Valley told us: 
…Venture capitals are really big here. Good start-ups would always have lots 
of eyes on them and they can actually choose whose money they want. (Q5.1.6) 
In Shenzhen, venture capitalists arrived later in the 1990s, but have contributed enormously to 
the growth of Shenzhen’s entrepreneurship, as a senior manager in a venture capital firm in 
Shenzhen told us, 
 The end of the 1990s was a key milestone for Chinese venture capitalists… 
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and the development of VCs directly stimulated entrepreneurship in 
Shenzhen… (Q5.1.7) 
5.2.2 Intermediary resources 
Even with all supply-side resources ready to be tapped into, start-ups still face multiple 
problems in terms of legal issues, investment choices and financing timing, etc. Many 
intermediary organisations such as incubators and accelerators are aimed at providing a 
greenhouse for start-ups to grow. These intermediary organisations could provide services that 
start-ups need during each phase of their entrepreneurial processes, and thus the presence of 
these organisations could increase the attractiveness of the ecosystems. For example, the CTO 
of a smart parking app start-up described why he moved to Silicon Valley from the East Coast: 
 We were selected by Y-Combinator’s programme and moved to Silicon Valley 
at that time…. As a start-up, money, people and supporting services are what 
we are looking for. And I think Silicon Valley provides us with such an 
environment for us to grow…. That’s why we moved here. (Q5.1.8) 
Similarly, in Shenzhen, although incubators and makerspaces only emerged in the last 10 years, 
these organisations are now coupled with the rapid growth of local entrepreneurship. The co-
founder of the first makerspace in Shenzhen described how organisations like his changed the 
landscapes of regional entrepreneurship: 
 In recent years, incubators [have been] burgeoning in Shenzhen…. Numbers 
of makerspaces are also increasing as more and more individuals are keen to 
try out their ideas…. As the first makerspace in Shenzhen, we saw many 
talented people who were originally white-collars and teachers, etc.; [they] 
came to us and tried out their new ideas…. Many of them actually attracted 
investments. (Q5.1.9) 
Social capital is also a critical intermediary resource as social networks between entrepreneurs 
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and investors are important for both sides to match their needs. With sufficient social resources, 
entrepreneurs may be able to better leverage other resources, as an individual investor in 
Shenzhen noted, 
 To be inside the loop is very important. Not only for entrepreneurs who would 
like to get investments, but also for investors who would like to invest in good 
projects…. Most of the time [when I make the decision], I look at the founder 
more than the project (Q5.1.10) 
Unlike the sometimes informal ‘guanxi’ networks in Shenzhen, Silicon Valley’s social 
resources are mainly built upon various formal activities such as investor day and entrepreneur 
networking events; an entrepreneur explained why he attended the investor day in Silicon 
Valley: 
…It is a small circle here [in Silicon Valley]…. Attending this [investor day] is 
a good opportunity to get to know not only investors but also people who have 
similar interests and to see what else is going on here... these networks may be 
useful at some point of time…(Q5.1.11) 
Another important intermediary resource is the organisational resource, a term which is used 
here to refer to best practices, organisational routines, organisational forms and business 
models, etc. In Shenzhen, the fast and iterative business model of Shanzhai mobile phone 
manufacturers has inspired many later smartphone companies in China to develop new 
products with a shorter lifecycle and customised features for specific target market segments, 
as a senior management of a smartphone company in Shenzhen told us: 
 …[there are] always new species emerging in Shenzhen. For example, 
Shanzhai mobile phones… many Chinese smartphone companies later 




The take-off of Silicon Valley started right after the birth of venture capital firms, with the 
founding of Fairchild being the first formal VC investment, which opened up a new way for 
technology holders to quickly raise funding for their technologies to be commercialised, as a 
director in a multinational corporation in Silicon Valley noted,  
…VC is an important invention by Silicon Valley…. A new way of doing things: 
technology can be exchanged for shares in the start-ups. Venture capital is a 
key factor for Silicon Valley’s take-off. (Q5.1.13) 
5.2.3 Demand-side resources 
With supply-side and intermediary resources in the entrepreneurial ecosystems, start-ups may 
be able to tap into the ecosystems along their entrepreneurial processes. However, although not 
as evident as the supply-side and intermediary resources, demand-side resources, which 
include marketing channels and local customers, are also critical. Surely, as more and more 
companies are born global, the importance of local customers may decrease. However, in a 
start-up’s very early stage, local market acceptance could be a good signal and also help it 
obtain the first pot of gold. For example, Huawei and Tesla’s early orders from local customers 
helped to maintain their financial stability and gain the opportunity to expand their market into 
other areas, as a senior PR manager of Huawei noted, 
Huawei’s early success included winning a few contracts with local operators 
such as China Telecom…. It was difficult to penetrate the market simply 
because operators trusted foreign brands more than indigenous brands, 
although with fairly similar quality and much cheaper price from our side…. 
(Q5.1.14) 
Great importance was also attached to Tesla’s early pre-orders from local investors and 
entrepreneurs. These pre-orders also acted as endorsements from top-tier investors and 




The early pre-orders from entrepreneurs and investors in the Valley were 
crucial for Tesla’s fund raising…. The cutting-edge design and technologies in 
the cars fit with technology geeks in the Valley quite well…. [Winning orders 
from these people] also means that our products are labelled with ‘high-end’ 
and [seen as] fashionable in the technology circle. (Q5.1.15) 
Besides end customers, the existing local market channels could also foster market penetration 
for new companies. In Shenzhen, it is observed that smartphone vendors inherited and utilised 
the market channels formed in the 2G feature phone era and quickly entered the market, as a 
senior manager of a smartphone company in Shenzhen noted.  
…We utilised the channels accumulated during the Shanzhai period of mobile 
phones. [These market channels are] important for us to reach the customers… 
especially those in the rural areas who are the major target customers… 
(Q5.1.16) 
The three types of resources, together, constitute a resource pool, which could be leveraged 
and integrated by entrepreneurs to create new ventures. 
5.3 Entrepreneurial process 
The second theme identified is the entrepreneurial process. It is argued that, in assessing the 
health of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, it is essential to make sense of the effectiveness of 
entrepreneurs’ accessibility to key resources from the entrepreneurial ecosystem, during 
different stages of their new venture creation processes. Table 5-2 lists the key resource-
accessing behaviours in individual entrepreneurial activities and the corresponding illustrative 
quotes. 
In identifying different phases of entrepreneurial process, the author refers to Bhave (1994) 
and set out to examine the resource dynamisms in the opportunity identification, organisational 
creation, technology set-up and market exchange/exit stages. It is found that the resource 
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dynamisms in individual new venture creation processes can be roughly divided into three 
categories, i.e., resource acquisition in the opportunity and organisational creation stage, 
resource exploitation in the organisational creation and technology set-up stage, and the 
resource feedback in the market exchange and exit stage. The three categories will be discussed 
in the remainder of this section.  
Table 5–2 Entrepreneurial process and illustrative quotes 
Illustrative Quotes Primary Codes Axial Codes 
Q5.2.1, Q5.2.2 
“…Pony and the early co-founders knew each other from 
high school and some of them even went to the same 
university… They gathered out of the same passion for the 
Internet and entrepreneurship…” A senior product manager in 
Tencent 
Looking for co-founders through 
informal means 
Resource 
acquisition in the 
opportunity and 
organisational 
creation stage Q5.2.5, Q5.2.6 
 “After we finalised our VR technology, we participated in 
several entrepreneurship contests and demonstrations…We 
also submitted our business plans to several venture 
capitalists.… Our technology is the key for getting their 
investments…” A co-founder of a VR start-up in Silicon Valley. 
Seeking investments through 
informal means 
Q5.2.3, Q5.2.4 
“The first batch of Google’s employees were almost all from 
Stanford computer science department… Hiring fresh 
graduates from Stanford and giving them all kinds of perks, 
such as free food, etc., remains the culture of Google until 
now” A research scientist in Google 
Hiring employees through informal 
or formal means 
Q5.2.7, Q5.2.8 Developing or acquiring 
technologies or prototypes with 







Q5.2.9, Q5.2.10 Expenditure of investment in 
organisational creation 
Q5.2.11, Q5.2.18 
“As we started off, we recruited some of the early software 
engineers from established companies in Shenzhen, such as 
Huawei…”A senior strategy analyst from Tencent 
Attracting new employees through 
enhanced formal or informal means 
Q5.2.12, Q5.2.13 Employees or co-founders spin-off 





and exit stage Q5.2.14, Q5.2.15 Acquisition by leading companies 
and dissolving of founding teams 
Q5.2.16, Q5.2.17 New technologies, tacit knowledge 
or organisational forms/resources 
spillover to other local companies 
5.3.1 Resource acquisition in the opportunity and organisational creation 
stage 
Before establishing their organisations, entrepreneurs need to access and acquire resources 
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from the entrepreneurial ecosystems. Specifically, they need to acquire some of the supply-side 
resources including human resources and financial resources, for example, searching for co-
founders through informal means. These could be friends with similar interests, colleagues 
working on the same projects, etc. DJI’s founding team was actually formed while members 
attended a robotics contest while they were students in Hong Kong, as an executive assistant 
at DJI noted, 
Tao and his co-founders met in a robotics contest and they teamed up for the 
contest, which afterwards led to the co-development of the flight control system 
that constitutes the key technology of DJI…. (Q5.2.1) 
Similarly, in Google’s creation process, Brin and Page actually knew each other when they 
were reading for a PhD at Stanford University and the same interest in search engines brought 
them together to work on the PageRank system, as a research scientist described the 
development of PageRank system. 
 Sergey and Larry both joined Stanford’s computer science PhD programme 
and they got to know each other back then… soon they collaborated on the 
search engine project, which was the prototype of Google as we now know… 
(Q5.2.2) 
Early employees are equally as important as the founding teams. In the opportunity and 
organisational creation stage, start-ups mainly rely on informal means including personal or 
friends’ networks to hire employees to develop technologies in the next phase. When Tencent 
was founded, some of the software engineers were actually from Ma’s previous company, as a 
senior strategy analyst from Tencent told us, 
…Many of Tencent’s early [employees] are from Pony’s previous company 
Runxun…. When Pony and Zhidong founded Tencent, some Runxun engineers 
followed them and joined Tencent…. (Q5.2.3) 
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When Wang, DJI’s founder, was looking for software engineers to co-develop the flight control 
systems, his supervisor in Hong Kong introduced a few of his students from an institute in 
Shenzhen, which helped DJI quickly develop and scale up its core technology, as a senior PR 
manager at DJI told us: 
Tao’s supervisor, Professor Li, had a collaborative institute in Shenzhen with 
Harbin Institute for Technology…. When DJI was first established, he 
introduced many of his students to join us… (Q5.2.4) 
Financial resources as one of the key supply-side resources are also critical for the start-ups to 
survive and thrive. With the human resources acquired, start-ups also need to access financial 
resources through either formal means such as investments from venture capitalists, or informal 
means through friends and personal networks. For example, Wang obtained financial support 
from both his family and his supervisor in Hong Kong, to develop the flight control systems, 
as the executive assistant at DJI noted, 
While developing the flight control systems, [Tao] got support from his family 
members and friends…. His supervisor, Professor Li, in the HKUST also 
supported him financially in the early days of DJI…. (Q5.2.5) 
Financial resources obtained through venture capitalists are also prevalent in both Shenzhen 
and Silicon Valley. A senior product manager in Tencent also described how Tencent 
successfully attracted its first venture capital investment in Shenzhen: 
The high-tech fair was very important for Tencent…. In the fair, Tencent 
attracted attention from several investors from Hong Kong although our 




5.3.2 Resource exploitation in the organisational creation and technology 
set-up stage 
Entrepreneurs could exploit some of the key supply-side resources including human resources 
and financial resources to gain further capabilities and create other resources. One of the most 
important tasks is to develop technologies or prototypes required before entering the market. 
For example, DJI’s founding team members together with early employees developed the flight 
control system for the drones, as an individual investor who made the first investment in DJI 
noted,  
…DJI’s core technology is actually its flight control system. For example, how 
to remain stable while shooting videos…. Tao and his team developed the 
system in Hong Kong and the team further developed the current flight control 
system based on that version…. (Q5.2.7) 
Similarly, a senior product manager in the Google search team described how Google’s current 
search engine was developed and what it was based on: 
Google’s core searching technology is based on PageRank, which was 
developed by the founding team including Larry and Sergey in the early days 
of Google.... PageRank could illustrate the connections between webpages in 
addition to just the webpages.... (Q5.2.8) 
Moreover, start-ups also need to complete the administrative work related to the organisational 
creations, such as legal issues, offices, employee-related issues, etc. Many start-ups choose to 
enter an incubator and receive a full package for all kinds of services, in exchange for a portion 
of the investments they have obtained or are about to obtain, as a senior manager in an incubator 
in Shenzhen told us: 
We took care of the administrative tasks such as legal services in IP filing, HR 
services, office handling costs etc.…. Of course when they get investments we 
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will take a portion of that as a prior agreement… (Q5.2.9) 
Alternatively, some start-ups choose to operate independently, without seeking the help of 
intermediary organisations such as incubators or accelerators, as a co-founder of a virtual 
reality start-up in Silicon Valley described their company’s development, 
After getting the investments, we chose to grow independently and rented an 
office rather than entering an incubator…. The investments enabled us to set 
up our office and necessary facilities for further development of our products 
and technologies… (Q5.2.10) 
As the new venture set out to explore the market and prepare for its product launch, more 
employees are needed. With the financial support obtained, they are able to recruit more 
engineers or developers to further develop the technology or the prototype; a senior strategy 
analyst at Huawei described why they hired the first batch of university graduates in Shenzhen: 
…The first batch of university graduates we hired was in 1994 as we set out to 
develop C08 [telecommunications equipment] and therefore needed more 
engineers… (Q5.2.11) 
5.3.3 Resource feedback in the market exchange and exit stage 
Perhaps the most significant stage for the entrepreneurial ecosystems in which the start-ups 
embed themselves is the resource feedback in the market exchange and exit stage. This is 
because, in this stage, the start-ups will release what they have created into the ecosystem for 
further exploitation by other start-ups, after successfully exiting the market – either through 
Initial Public Offering, or being acquired by large companies, or failure in the market. 
On the one hand, the founding members or employees could start again in their own companies 
and create new ventures successively, with the financial returns, experiences and linkages they 
obtained during the previous new venture creation process. For example, Musk established 
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Tesla after selling PayPal, as a senior engineer at Tesla noted,  
Musk sold his previous companies and used the money and resources to set up 
Tesla and Space X at the same time…. It was tough, especially in the beginning, 
but he managed to make it through… (Q5.2.12) 
An individual investor who is a former senior sales engineer in Huawei also described how 
Huawei’s employees are shaping the landscape of Shenzhen’s entrepreneurship by either 
becoming investors themselves or establishing their own companies: 
A lot of former Huawei employees like me became independent investors… and 
many started their own companies…. There is even a Huawei alumni 
organisation helping former Huawei employees starting their own businesses. 
(Q5.2.13) 
On the other hand, many start-ups are acquired by large companies in the ecosystems, resulting 
in team members joining these large companies, as a senior manager at Google who was a 
serial entrepreneur described why he moved to Silicon Valley: 
…Obviously Google, Apple, Facebook – these companies attracted really great 
talents…. I sold my company to Google and moved here and will stay here for 
as long as I can…. That critical mass really matters… (Q5.2.14) 
An M&A analyst in the investment department of Tencent in Shenzhen also described how the 
acquisition works for large companies: 
We sought strategically for companies whose technologies are complementary 
and beneficial to ours, as a corporate VC.... We will normally offer them 
positions in our company after acquiring them… (Q5.2.15) 
In situations where the resources are released to the ecosystem’s resource pool, the experiences, 
tacit knowledge and technologies will spill over to other companies or new ventures in the 
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ecosystem. For example, many former Huawei engineers and managers joined other companies 
in Shenzhen and have contributed enormously to the growth of these companies, as a senior 
consultant to Huawei noted, 
Huawei can be regarded as the Huangpu Military Academy [West Point of 
China] for Shenzhen technology companies. [Huawei] contributes many 
entrepreneurs to Shenzhen…. More importantly, many senior management 
people in leading companies like Tencent were originally managers from 
Huawei… (Q5.2.16) 
A former Huawei senior manager who started his own company also described how his 
experiences at Huawei helped him in his new venture creation process: 
…Until now, the frameworks of product management, customer-centric 
thinking and sales techniques [that I learnt in Huawei] have been really 
important in my entrepreneurial process. (Q5.2.17) 
5.4 Ecosystem performance 
Besides the ecosystem resources and the entrepreneurial process in which entrepreneurs access 
and leverage the resources, the performance of the ecosystem in terms of new venture creations 
within the region and its impact over regional economic development is a key dimension to 
consider when assessing the health of entrepreneurial ecosystems. Although these dimensions 
identified through interviews are well established in the literature (Armington and Acs, 2002), 
it is worth noting that they are largely outcome-oriented, focusing on the results of regional 
entrepreneurship. This differs from the notion of ecosystem health in this research, which takes 
a process view that encompasses the antecedents and the outcomes, as well as the mechanisms 
of the new venture creations within the region. In the remainder of this section, the two axial 
codes – regional economic impact and regional entrepreneurship performance – will be 
discussed, as illustrated in Table 5-3. 
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Table 5–3 Ecosystem performance and illustrative quotes 
Illustrative Quotes Primary Codes Axial Codes 
Q5.3.3 GDP growth contributed by entrepreneurships Regional 
economic 
impact 
Q5.3.4, Q5.3.5 Job creations contributed by entrepreneurships 
Q5.3.6 Increased household incomes contributed by 
entrepreneurships 




“…And also, you really get a bunch of 
companies who are willing to buy your 
companies if you are doing well. You have 
companies like IBM, Amazon, AOL and Google 
who are prepared to acquire start-ups all the 
time. This is something very difficult to find 
elsewhere…” A senior manager in a corporate 
venture capitalist in Silicon Valley 
Well-functioning exit channels for start-ups 
5.4.1 Regional entrepreneurship performance 
The fundamental objective for an entrepreneurial ecosystem is to serve new venture creations 
in the regions. In other words, the direct outcomes of the new venture creations within an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem are the performance of regional entrepreneurships. Therefore, to 
evaluate the performance of an entrepreneurial ecosystem, it is essential to assess its actual 
results of generating new ventures, for example, the number of start-ups generated in high-tech 
segments including ICT, bio-tech, etc., just as a director of a business network noted: 
For me, the number of technology start-ups each year is a direct measure for 
the performance of a start-up ecosystem… (Q5.3.1) 
More importantly, the exit channels for start-ups are also critical. This is because, even though 
entrepreneurs are generally less risk-averse than average, these channels could mitigate the 
financial risks entrepreneurs need to take and reduce the perceived uncertainty should the new 
venture creations fail. Consequently, this could encourage more entrepreneurial activities, as a 
co-founder of a smart parking app described the typical exiting channels in Silicon Valley: 
…The exit channels are diversified and healthy here in Silicon Valley. Surely, 
promising projects can grow to become unicorns…. The Majority can either be 
acquired by other companies, or simply start again for a new project (Q5.3.2) 
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5.4.2 Regional economic impact 
Another crucial outcome brought by regional entrepreneurial activities is the contribution to 
regional economic development. To evaluate ecosystem performance, it is also necessary to 
consider the impact on regional economic development resulting from the regional 
entrepreneurial activities. This impact also arguably becomes the major driving force for the 
Shenzhen government and also the Chinese central government to promote entrepreneurship 
and innovation, as a senior government official in Shenzhen noted,  
…We are most concerned with the economic contributions made by promoting 
entrepreneurships in Shenzhen…. The most direct measure is to see how much 
more GDP growth the local entrepreneurial activities can generate… (Q5.3.3) 
GDP growth is not the only concern, as a senior manager in a science park in Shenzhen shared 
his observations on the recent policies initiated by the local and central governments: 
Entrepreneurship and innovation policy nowadays is a smart policy for the 
central and regional governments to increase employment rates and promote 
economic development… (Q5.3.4) 
Since 2015, China’s central government has issued a policy of mass entrepreneurship and 
innovation, which encourages and supports new venture creation activities throughout the 
country. This has decreased unemployment rates and fostered economic growth. Indeed, the 
same Shenzhen government official agreed that promoting entrepreneurship and innovation 
also benefits Shenzhen in terms of creating new jobs and increasing the employment rates, 
especially for many recent university graduates, who make up a large portion of the total new 
ventures that have been created: 
…Another important reason why we promote regional entrepreneurship and 




The impact on regional economic development is also reflected in the increased incomes and 
ease of daily life due to new technologies and businesses, as a senior government official in 
the Development and Reform Commission of Shenzhen’s municipal government noted,  
…As you can see, there are positive impacts of entrepreneurships in Shenzhen 
on the publics such as the increased ease of daily life, increased average 
incomes due to increased total outputs [by the new ventures]… (Q5.3.6) 
5.5 Ecosystem robustness 
The aforementioned three dimensions largely take a traditional, static approach to examine the 
competitiveness of entrepreneurial ecosystems and the determinants for regional 
entrepreneurships. However, it is found find that, as the entrepreneurial ecosystems evolve over 
time, the resources embedded within them will change, intensify or fade alongside the 
entrepreneurs’ new venture creation processes that involve the acquisition and exploitation of 
ecosystem resources. This reflects the need to take an evolutionary perspective to examine the 
anticipated levels of performances and outcomes, in addition to the static measures. In other 
words, it is essential to capture the dynamics of an entrepreneurial ecosystem in order to fully 
understand its health. 
Table 5–4 Ecosystem robustness and illustrative quotes 
Illustrative Quotes Primary Codes Axial Codes 
Q5.4.1, Q5.4.2 
“To create a Silicon Valley takes massive, continuous 
investments. You need to invest heavily in order to keep in 
running…” A senior director of an MNC in Silicon Valley 
Attractive to financial capitalists Ecosystem 
resource 
replenishment 
Q5.1.6, Q5.4.3, Q5.4.4 Attractive to human capital from 
diverse backgrounds 
Q5.4.5 
“…Serial entrepreneurs are definitely not rare here. 
Actually, I would be keen to know about their past experiences 
of start-ups and these could help me make the decisions” An 
individual investor in Shenzhen who worked for Huawei 
Serial entrepreneurs, with human, 





Q5.4.6 Employees from previous 
successful or failed start-ups, with 
knowledge and skills 
Q5.4.7, Q5.4.8 Successful entrepreneurs becoming 
investors for start-ups in the region 
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The ecosystem robustness dimension identified through primary and secondary data actually 
describes such a situation, where an entrepreneurial ecosystem can sustain its current status 
and performance without drifting away to potential failure or decreased levels of performances. 
However, this is only if it is not subject to any external disruptions, for example, major 
technological change resulting in paradigm shifts and economic crisis that reduces demand 
significantly for particular segments. In the remainder of this section, ecosystem robustness 
will be discussed based on the axial codes derived from primary codes and quotes, as is 
illustrated in Table 5-4. 
5.5.1 Ecosystem resource replenishment 
The first axial code is the ecosystem resource replenishment in order to keep the ecosystem on 
track. Specifically, it is found that the replenishment of basic supply-side resources such as 
human resources and financial resources is critical in maintaining the normal functioning of an 
ecosystem. This is akin to any power system that needs energy in order to sustain its operations, 
such as internal combustion engines that need fossil fuels to keep running. The replenishment, 
from the case evidence, is often from outside of the ecosystem. It can be from other 
entrepreneurial ecosystems in the same country, or even from outside of the home country. In 
this sense, ecosystem resource replenishment constitutes a key mechanism for an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem to be considered robust. 
On the one hand, continuously attracting financial resources from outside of the ecosystem can 
be critical to sustain new venture creations. On the other hand, the attractiveness for financial 
resources increases as the entrepreneurial activities intensify within the ecosystem. Silicon 
Valley, which gave birth to the first venture capital investment in the world, is attractive to both 
financial resources within the US and those from other countries. This arguably becomes the 
key for the ecosystem to maintain its leading position, as a co-founder of an incubator described 
the attractiveness of Silicon Valley to investors from outside of the ecosystem: 
…Silicon Valley is the home of venture capitalists…. With so many promising 
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projects here, the Valley attracted a lot of money not only from the East Coast, 
but also from all over the world…. For example, Chinese investors are now 
very active here…. This helps the Valley continue to lead entrepreneurship and 
innovation globally (Q5.4.1) 
Shenzhen is also actively attracting financial resources from inland China and Hong Kong, and 
this has helped Shenzhen entrepreneurs to quickly scale-up their ideas and projects, as a senior 
investment manager in a state-owned (and one of the biggest) venture capitalist firm in 
Shenzhen commented: 
…For me the [financial] capital is the key. If you look at Beijing, because the 
capital is very active, the entrepreneurial activities are active…. The same 
applies to Shenzhen…. Shenzhen is close to Hong Kong where many investors 
gather… (Q5.4.2) 
Besides financial resources, human resources are another important basic resource that an 
ecosystem needs to replenish in order to sustain its development. Indeed, Silicon Valley has 
assembled some of the best talents from not only the US but also from all around the world, 
who are adept at generating new ideas, commercialising and scaling-up technologies. The 
massive talent pool has provided many possibilities for local companies and start-ups to exploit 
and reconfigure. A senior director at an MNC described the historical development of Silicon 
Valley: 
To create a Silicon Valley takes massive, continuous investments. But the 
investments are not just money. At first, they were actually money and talents…. 
The growing, massive talent pool we have here in the Valley is at the heart of 
its success. (Q5.4.3) 
Similarly, since the 1980s, many people from different parts of China have moved to Shenzhen 
with their distinctive skills and knowledge. Regarded as the youngest city in China, Shenzhen’s 
entrepreneurial ecosystem has assembled many people with entrepreneurial mind-sets and 
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visions, which provides a solid base to build generations of start-ups, as a senior Shenzhen 
government official noted: 
…Since the open-door policy and Shenzhen becoming a special economic zone, 
many talents with entrepreneurial mind-sets from other parts of China chose to 
come to try their fortune…. Now, nearly half of Shenzhen’s residents were not 
even born in Guangdong province and this number is growing every year… 
(Q5.4.4) 
5.5.2 Ecosystem resource recycling 
However, attracting human and financial resources from outside of the ecosystem does not 
necessarily guarantee the result of a robust entrepreneurial ecosystem. It is equally important 
to retain these resources in the ecosystem and keep recycling them over time (see also Mason 
and Harrison, 2006). In other words, financial and human resources attracted from outside can 
be embedded into the ecosystem resource pool and therefore be repeatedly utilised and 
exploited in order to create more high-quality start-ups. However, this is not to say that 
resources should never leave the ecosystem; rather, it is to say that the net resource flow should 
be positive towards the focal ecosystem, in order to keep the ecosystem robust. If the ecosystem 
resources keep outflowing, the robustness of the ecosystem will decrease significantly (see also 
Spigel and Harrison, 2018). 
For example, many entrepreneurs become serial entrepreneurs in the ecosystem – they 
consecutively create new ventures, during which the resources along with the entrepreneurs 
stay in the ecosystem and are highly likely to be utilised by other entrepreneurs, as a professor 
described the entrepreneurial culture in Silicon Valley: 
…We call them exit channels… we don't consider the entrepreneurs as failures 
even if their companies did not survive…. In fact, there are many serial 
entrepreneurs who start companies again and again…. Their experience and 
knowledge accumulated [during their new venture creation processes] are 
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valuable not only for themselves but also for others (Q5.4.5) 
Another type of resource recycling can be the flow of skilled and experienced employees from 
a successful or failed start-up to other start-ups in the ecosystem. A senior consultant to Huawei 
described how important Huawei and Tencent are to the upcoming start-ups after their success 
in Shenzhen: 
 …Many senior management people in leading companies like Tencent were 
originally managers from Huawei…. Now that Tencent has grown up, many 
Tencent employees became entrepreneurs or joined other companies in 
Shenzhen (Q5.4.6) 
Financial resources can also be recycled, for example, when successful entrepreneurs who 
profited from their start-ups become investors and invest in other start-ups in the same 
ecosystem. This is especially the case in Silicon Valley, as a co-founder of an incubator in 
Silicon Valley noted,  
…Many investors or founders of venture capitalists are actually entrepreneurs 
themselves or used to be entrepreneurs who successfully exited their companies, 
leaving them with a big fortune. They then started to invest in other 
companies… investors of this type are actually most welcomed by the 
entrepreneurs because of their experiences and networks… (Q5.4.7) 
In Shenzhen, individual investors who had previously profited from their start-up experiences, 
came on the scene from the end of the 1990s, when the government relaxed its control of private 
capital, as an individual investor in Shenzhen who worked for Huawei back in the 1990s told 
us: 
…Individual investors emerged at the end of the 90s in Shenzhen…. Many of 
these investors previously worked for successful companies like Huawei. When 
they earned enough money, they started to get themselves involved in investing 
 
 141 
[in] other companies in Shenzhen (Q5.4.8) 
Together, resource replenishment and recycling ensure the continuous development of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems, i.e. the robustness of entrepreneurial ecosystems, on the condition 
of the absence of external disruptions. 
5.6 Ecosystem adaptation 
However, sufficient robustness of entrepreneurial ecosystems, marked by well-functioning 
resource replenishment and resource recycling of basic supply-side resources, does not 
guarantee the resilience of the entrepreneurial ecosystems from exogenous disruptions. Indeed, 
from what the author observed in Silicon Valley and Shenzhen, it is often the case that external 
disruptions brought by radical technological change – such as the migration of 2G mobile 
phones to 3G smartphones and other highly interconnected smart-devices, and major economic 
crises such as the one in 2008 that significantly reduced the demand-side resources within and 
outside of the Shenzhen entrepreneurial ecosystem – will dramatically change the landscape of 
the entrepreneurial ecosystems.  
Faced with such uncertainties and disruptions, for an entrepreneurial ecosystem to remain 
‘healthy’, new resources, both supply-side and intermediary ones, need to be created and 
embedded into the ecosystem to diversify its resource portfolios, which constitutes a 
prerequisite for emerging start-ups to adapt to the new environment. Collectively, the 
ecosystem will then adapt itself to the next possible status which reconciles with the disruptive 
events. In the meantime, it is also critical for obsolete supply-side and intermediary resources 
to exit the ecosystem in a timely manner, in order to create more space for the aforementioned 
new resources to emerge.  
Hence, as is illustrated in Table 5-5, the two resource dynamisms, i.e., ecosystem resource 




Table 5–5 Ecosystem adaptation and illustrative quotes 
Illustrative Quotes Primary Codes Axial Codes 




diversification Q5.5.3, Q5.5.4 Adoption of new technologies 
Q5.5.5, Q5.5.6 
“…The vertical integration led by Intel for the semiconductor 
industry was the dominant model before the 1980s in Silicon Valley. 
This means, if you wanted to run a semiconductor company, you 
needed to have the capabilities to design software to the final wafer 
production and assembling. This model was inverted in the 1980s 
due to the rise of EDA [Electronics Design Assistance] industry and 
contract manufacturing service providers like TSMC in Taiwan. 
Since then, even a small company with 10 employees can run the 
electronics business. This is because they can almost buy everything 
in the market. For example, purchasing software instead of 
developing independently and having someone else to manufacture 
for you.” A director of an EDA company in Silicon Valley 
Emergence of new business 
models and business practices 
Q5.5.7, Q5.5.8 Substitution and replacement 
of existing technologies 
Ecosystem 
resource exit  
Q5.5.9, Q5.5.10 Decline and exit of obsolete 
industry 
5.6.1 Ecosystem resource diversification 
The first resource dynamism to enable ecosystem adaptation when facing external disruptions 
is the ecosystem resource diversification. From what is observed in the cases, three types of 
emergence of new resources are identified: emergence of new organisational forms, adoption 
of new technologies, and emergence of new business models and practices. It is argued that 
these resource diversification activities have enabled the ecosystems to adapt to new 
environmental and technological challenges, often brought by external disruptions. 
Emergence of new organisational forms mainly refers to the emergence of key intermediary 
resources such as venture capitalists, incubators and accelerators. The emergence of these 
resources in both Shenzhen and Silicon Valley is key to scale-up the start-ups that are otherwise 
disadvantageous in terms of both resources and capabilities in the market competition against 
other established companies. For example, before the venture capitalists emerged, technology 
holders, usually from universities and research institutions, relied on personal funds or family 
and friends’ funds to start their companies and, even after they had founded the companies, 
they were unable to obtain financial support from the banks because of the perceived high risks. 
Although the technologies in this instance may be advantageous, the local ecosystem cannot 
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scale them up. If other ecosystems utilise such assets and disrupt the market, the focal 
ecosystem would face substantial challenges of adaptation. The emergence and take-off of 
venture capitalists in Silicon Valley opened up a new way of new venture creation – 
entrepreneurs were able to obtain investments that they were not required to pay back should 
they fail, in exchange for a portion of the potential profits should they succeed in the market. 
Along with the incubators and accelerators that later emerge, these intermediary resources 
lower the threshold and barriers to starting a new business, thus providing more opportunities 
for new technologies or business models to be adopted and diffused in the regional ecosystem. 
This will significantly increase the adaptability of the ecosystem as a whole, should it face 
external disruptions in the future, as a senior director at an MNC in Silicon Valley noted, 
…Then they were the venture capitalists…. They were important inventions in 
Silicon Valley since the first deal of Fairchild and its successor, Intel…. Other 
new players like incubators and accelerators are also critical for breaking the 
bottlenecks… (Q5.5.1) 
The same story happened in Shenzhen at the end of the 1990s. The emergence of new 
organisational forms such as venture capitalists and incubators, co-working spaces and 
makerspaces has boosted the regional entrepreneurship and diversified the regional resources, 
as a senior partner in the top private venture capital firm described the emergence of venture 
capitalists in Shenzhen: 
…1999 can be regarded as the year one of Chinese venture capitalists… the 
central government and the Shenzhen government initiated a few new policies 
that boosted the entrepreneurship in Shenzhen. One of these policies was to 
allow the entry of private capital in the market…. Our company was among the 
first private capitals in Shenzhen. Along with the first state-owned venture 
capitalist, Shenzhen Innovation Investment, we have invested since then [in] 
many famous Shenzhen start-ups… (Q5.5.2) 
New organisational forms such as intermediary resources indeed provide more opportunities 
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for resource diversification. However, in situations such as the presence of disruptive 
technologies (Bower and Christensen, 1995; Christensen and Bower, 1995) and emerging 
industries, the existing supply-side resources are just not enough to keep the ecosystem ahead 
– with the existing suppliers and technologies, it is difficult to upgrade and transform the region 
into the next stage. In this sense, the adoption of new technologies in time, or even ahead of 
the others, can be crucial for the ecosystem to gain sufficient adaptability, just as the same 
senior director in Silicon Valley noted, 
As the infrastructure gets better and better it might take less investment to 
create successful start-ups. But you always need to have something new to 
catch up with the next wave of technology advancements…. It once was semi-
conductors and the Internet… in the future it could be artificial intelligence, 
virtual reality and augmentations… These new technologies enable Silicon 
Valley to always lead the wave of technology advancements… (Q5.5.3) 
Similarly, in Shenzhen, the upgrading of technologies – and, more importantly, the adoption of 
these new technologies in other segments – has triggered the ecosystem to diversify its 
resources through nurturing the next generations of technology start-ups, as an individual 
investor who was among one of the first investors in DJI in Shenzhen told us: 
…But what’s more important is that [for the success of DJI] the development 
of ShanZhai mobile phones around 2010 significantly reduced the size of 
electronic components and these components were subsequently used in DJI…. 
Similarly, many recent start-ups in robotics benefitted from the development of 
Shanzhai in terms of value chain and advanced electronic components… 
(Q5.5.4) 
The emergence of new business models and practices also contributes to the diversification of 
ecosystem resources, as a senior management of a smartphone company in Shenzhen describes 
how the business models of Shanzhai – which are highly disintegrated and modularised across 
the whole mobile phone value chain, resulting in an extremely affordable and responsive 
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mobile phone portfolio – inform the next generations of smartphone manufacturers, especially 
those start-ups which are initially resource-poor and technologically disadvantageous, to 
capture the local market and even lead the global market: 
The development of Shanzhai companies brought new types of players for 
technologically disadvantageous local companies, such as the design houses 
and total solution providers. This highly disintegrated and geographically 
clustered business model has laid down a solid foundation for the later 
smartphone manufacturers to thrive…. For example, although we lacked key 
technological and manufacturing capabilities when we started, we were able 
to outsource many of these activities and focus on the design and marketing of 
the smartphones…. (Q5.5.5) 
The practice of distributing shares to employees in a start-up originated from Fairchild and 
Intel, in order to provide incentives and compensation to employees who undertake the risk of 
losing their jobs should the start-up fail. As new organisational resources, this practice began 
in China from Huawei, as a former Huawei employee pointed out how the new practice not 
only encouraged Huawei employees to work very hard, but also contributes to increasing the 
financial resources that are used afterwards to invest in other start-ups in the ecosystem: 
The practice of giving out shares in China to employees for start-ups actually 
began from Huawei…. Huawei started to distribute shares to its employees 
after the reform of share-holding companies in China in the 1990s… of course, 
Huawei colleagues are very hardworking and productive…. When they left the 
company around their 40s, many of them gained a large sum of money in 
exchange for the shares… I became an investor in Shenzhen after I left 
Huawei… (Q5.5.6) 
It is worth noting that our definition of new resources mainly refers to resources that bring 
disruptive changes in the way of new venture creation in the ecosystems. These changes 
normally have positive impacts on the new ventures as they address some of the bottlenecks in 
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the entrepreneurial processes. For example, the emergence of venture capitalists in both Silicon 
Valley and Shenzhen mitigates the financial restraints in commercialising new technologies 
and business models; new technologies and applications such as smartphones and related smart 
devices open up new spaces for both ecosystems to nurture new ventures; new business models 
such as the disintegrated yet coordinated value chains of Shanzhai built up the foundations for 
later new smartphone entrants in China; new business practice such as Huawei’s distributing 
shares to employees was emulated by other start-ups in Shenzhen and thus encouraged more 
talents to join start-ups for higher returns than if they had joined multinationals in the past. 
With the continuous emergence of new organisational forms, new business models and 
practices, as well as commercialising new technologies in emerging industries, Silicon Valley 
and Shenzhen entrepreneurial ecosystems have retained their leading positions in technology 
entrepreneurships and continuously adapted themselves to the changing environment, when 
faced with the fast evolution of generations of technologies. 
5.6.2 Ecosystem resource exit 
However, resource diversification alone only ensures adaptability, not adaptation. When new 
resources are created, sufficient spaces in the ecosystem resource pool are needed for them to 
come into existence and function. In this sense, obsolete and inefficient resources should exit 
the ecosystems, either spontaneously, for example, by the market competition, or passively, for 
instance, by policies, in order to create spaces for the diversification of new resources. From 
our observations, the exit of resources is reflected by the replacement and substitution of 
obsolete technologies, as well as the decline and exit of obsolete and inefficient industries. 
The technology substitutions are critical for new technologies to be adopted and, collectively, 
these new technologies could enable the ecosystem to make the transition to the next phase of 
development. For example, in the 1960s’ Silicon Valley, the emergence of the planar 
manufacturing process for transistors replaced the traditional manufacturing methods within a 
few years. The more reliable manufacturing process started Silicon Valley’s semiconductor, as 
a senior director in a semiconductor company in Silicon Valley noted: 
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 The invention of the planar [manufacturing] process by Fairchild in 1959 was 
revolutionary in the semiconductors industry…. It significantly improved the 
reliability of the transistors.... In the early 1960s, the planar process replaced 
the existing manufacturing methods and became the mainstream in the 
semiconductors industry…. I think Fairchild created the real Silicon Valley by 
leading us into the semiconductor age… (Q5.5.7) 
In Shenzhen, it is also observed how serial substitutions of technologies take place over time, 
as the technologies and products advance and evolve from beepers to analogue phones, VCDs 
and DVDs, all the way through to mobile phones and smartphones. These changes were 
enabled by the Shanzhai cluster, which makes up a comprehensive value chain for later 
Shenzhen companies to utilise and commercialise their hardware innovations, as a senior 
manager in a smartphone company in Shenzhen described briefly how Shanzhai evolved: 
…Shanzhai cluster actually existed a long time ago since the beepers’ 
age…Shanzhai OEMs continuously renewed their products and migrated from 
beepers to VCD, DVDs and all the way to mobile phones, and some of them 
even started to produce smartphones… (Q5.5.8) 
Sometimes going along with the technology substitutions, the decline and exit of obsolete 
industries could provide spaces and release resources to the resource pool for emerging 
industries to utilise and grow. For example, Shenzhen’s ecosystem is exemplary in terms of 
how obsolete and inefficient industries decline and exit the ecosystem upon external 
disruptions, in this case, the financial crisis in 2008 that resulted in decreased orders from 
abroad and increased labour costs. The eventual exit of these industries released resources back 
to the resource pool embedded in the Shenzhen entrepreneurial ecosystem, which had been 
leveraged by technology start-ups subsequently, such as DJI, which grew up in a remote area 
of the Nanshan district yet with easily accessible production resources, as a senior government 
official in the Shenzhen development and reform commission noted: 
 The 2008 financial crisis shocked Shenzhen as well. We see the capital-driven 
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and resource-driven industries relocated to other regions because of the 
decreased orders and increased costs of labour…. However, this created a good 
opportunity for innovation-oriented companies to emerge and thrive in 
Shenzhen after the crisis… (Q5.5.9) 
The same government official also traced back to the 1980s when contract manufacturing 
services were prevalent in Shenzhen and how these manufacturing service providers gradually 
either relocated to other regions or upgraded themselves as their manufacturing capabilities 
and experience accumulated over time: 
In the very early days of Shenzhen, we took over some of the electronic 
components’ contracted manufacturing services from Hong Kong…. Many of 
these manufacturing services either moved to other regions or upgraded to 
advanced manufacturing companies who possessed [their] own technologies… 
(Q5.5.10) 
Along with ecosystem robustness, ecosystem adaptations add to the resilience of the ecosystem, 
thereby forming dynamic elements when evaluating ecosystem health. However, to achieve 
ecosystem robustness and adaptations is not without conditions. 
5.7 Enabling conditions for resource replenishment and recycling 
The first set of conditions serves for resource replenishment and recycling. As can be seen in 
previous sections on ecosystem robustness, the main resources that need continuous 
replenishment and recycling are the key supply-side resources such as human resources and 
financial resources. Therefore, the enabling conditions for resource replenishment and 
recycling should be attracting and recycling human resources and financial resources 
continuously. Pertinent to this set of conditions, it is found that attractive living conditions and 
infrastructure, open-minded and eclectic culture, as well as supportive private and public 
capital market could enable these two resource dynamisms. 
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Table 5–6 Enabling conditions for resource replenishment and recycling and illustrative quotes 
Illustrative Quotes Primary Codes Axial Codes 




infrastructure Q5.6.3, Q5.6.4 Sufficient education and healthcare systems  





“…Shenzhen has formed a strong culture for 
entrepreneurship since the 1990s…. At that 
time, many people from other cities quit their 
jobs and came to Shenzhen with all their 
money to start companies…. This city is full of 
young and talented people who are willing to 
take risks…”A manager in a robotics 
incubator in Shenzhen 
Entrepreneurial mind-sets – risk taking and 
serial entrepreneurs; attracting top talents to 
join start-ups 
Q5.6.9, Q5.6.10 Government/university funding for start-ups Supportive 
public/private 
capital market 
Q5.6.11, Q5.6.12 Specialised and mature capital market and 
funding providers: angels, venture capitalists, 
corporate VCs, and private equity, etc. 
It is quite straightforward to understand why resource replenishment and recycling require the 
same conditions. This is because these two mechanisms serve for attracting and retaining 
talents and financial resources, sometimes competing with other entrepreneurial ecosystems 
for these resources. Therefore, they do not involve the creation of anything new. Human and 
financial resources are largely free to flow to any ecosystem that meets their living and career 
demands at one particular time. To retain these resources, the ecosystem, therefore, has to 
sustain the conditions that initially bring them in. The underlying assumption here is that human 
and financial resources are homogenous, including their intentions to move in and what 
conditions could align with these intentions. This may not be true from the individual’s 
perspective, but from the entrepreneurial ecosystem’s perspective, human and financial 
resources involved in new venture creations can be treated as largely homogenous. The 
interviews with key informants in the two ecosystems indeed aggregate to the three conditions, 
as is illustrated in Table 5-6. 
5.7.1 Attractive living conditions and infrastructure 
Attractive living conditions and infrastructure (Florida, 1995) are essential to continuously 
attract talents to a region. This is a rather basic condition for any ecosystem that attempts to 
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attract and retain talents. A co-founder of a venture capital firm in Silicon Valley described why 
the Valley’s climate is an important factor for the continuous inflow of talents: 
…the difference is that people really want to be here…. Silicon Valley’s 
temperature in winter time is 10-15 degrees Celsius, in summer time probably 
20-25 degrees Celsius. So, very attractive weather. Actually, if you look at other 
places in the California, their weather is not as good as here. In the summer, 
from April to November, it never rains. Never worry about anything like rains 
coming down… (Q5.6.1) 
Similarly, located in the southern part of China and situated next to Hong Kong, Shenzhen’s 
natural environment and climate are comparatively more pleasant than some of its northern 
rivals such as Beijing. The founder of an electronics company in Shenzhen also mentioned how 
the recent haze in cities like Beijing and Shanghai affects entrepreneurs’ decisions on, for 
example, where to start their companies: 
…Shenzhen’s climate is very pleasant. It is warm in winter time and not too hot 
in the summer. Also, it is close to the sea and we can enjoy good scenery at the 
seaside…. More importantly, nowadays people are trying to escape from the 
haze, which is, as you may know, very serious in Beijing and Shanghai. 
Shenzhen’s air quality is much better than the two cities… (Q5.6.2) 
In the Shenzhen interviews, the author was also frequently told that education and healthcare 
systems are the key factors when many entrepreneurs, especially the ones that typically relocate 
with families, decide where to start their companies. The Shenzhen government’s recent efforts 
in building better education and healthcare systems show the importance of local infrastructure, 
as a senior government official in the Health Commission of the Shenzhen government noted: 
…We are catching up fast in terms of education such as quality of high schools, 
and healthcare systems, for example, we bring in Peking University affiliated 
hospital…. These are important for people who come to Shenzhen and settle 
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down… we still have a long way to go though, compared to Beijing and 
Shanghai… (Q5.6.3) 
A senior manager in an incubator in Shenzhen also believes that having good universities could 
be a key enabler for attracting and retaining resources, especially talents, but Shenzhen 
currently does not have a reputable university which could serve the purpose that Stanford and 
Berkeley serve in Silicon Valley: 
…. What Shenzhen [lacks] are good universities…. It’s not only about research, 
but also about talents…. If you look at Silicon Valley, Stanford and Berkeley 
could provide such a large number of talented graduates every year for the 
region… (Q5.6.4) 
5.7.2 Open-minded and eclectic culture 
The second condition in enabling human and financial resource replenishment and recycling 
in the region is an open-minded and eclectic culture. From the data, there are actually two 
different aspects of the local culture that influence the new venture creation in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems. The first one is to have a receptive attitude towards newcomers 
with diverse backgrounds. This is essential for attracting and especially retaining immigrants 
with different backgrounds, beliefs and customs. As a city with no more than 40 years’ history, 
Shenzhen is famous for its inclusive culture towards immigrants from other parts of China, as 
the founder of an electronics company in Shenzhen described how he perceived Shenzhen’s 
attitude towards immigrants and how this takes form: 
…Shenzhen is a very young city. Unlike many other cities in China, it is so 
friendly and tolerant to newcomers. We often say, once you come to Shenzhen, 
you are one of the Shenzhen citizens.... This is very rare in other cities because 
essentially Shenzhen does not have any historical traditions or burdens; it 
provides all people from all over China [with] equal opportunities…. (Q5.6.5) 
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Silicon Valley is even more diverse than Shenzhen, as the former includes many immigrants 
from all over the world well beyond the boundary of the US. Similarly, the Valley also adopts 
an open-minded and inclusive attitude towards immigrants, as a CEO of a start-up based in San 
Francisco noted:  
….Silicon Valley is a culturally diverse area with many immigrants from other 
places in the US and other countries such as China, Europe and India…. It is 
very open-minded and inclusive… (Q5.6.6) 
The other aspect is the social perception of entrepreneurship and especially towards the 
possible failure of new venture creation. This is important for entrepreneurs who undertake 
huge opportunity costs to justify their choices. Moreover, it could assist entrepreneurs acquire 
resources in the ecosystem such as talents, as people are more likely to join a start-up if the 
entrepreneurial culture is deeply rooted in the ecosystem. As the world’s entrepreneurship 
centre, Silicon Valley has a long tradition of having an extremely positive attitude towards 
entrepreneurship and failures in the new venture creation process (see also Saxenian, 1983, 
1990, 1991, 1996). A senior manager in a corporate venture capital firm in Silicon Valley noted,  
…People are not afraid of failure and that’s always the case here in the Valley. 
Of course, failure still matters. However, here in the Valley, there are so many 
investors, who have made enough money to sustain that number of failures, 
without bringing any personal impact to themselves.... I’m not only talking 
about the entrepreneurs; you can see it has become a trend for talented people 
to join start-ups as a prioritised career choice. (Q5.6.7) 
Though relatively young, Shenzhen’s entrepreneurial culture has also become prominent since 
the 1990s, when the first high-tech fair was held, and private capital was allowed into the 
venture investment market. The entrepreneurial culture was further reinforced when some of 
the 1990s start-ups became market leaders in their respective industries, such as Tencent, as an 
individual investor in Shenzhen who worked for Huawei told us: 
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 …I would say this is a good time for people to start their own companies in 
China, especially in cities like Shenzhen…. The serial entrepreneurs we’ve just 
talked about were not actually positive in the past…. However, in China, we 
are pretty proud to use such a title nowadays…. This shows the tolerance the 
Shenzhen ecosystem demonstrates to its members… (Q5.6.8) 
5.7.3 Supportive public and private capital market 
The third condition for replenishment and recycling of resources is the presence of a supportive 
public and private capital market. In both Silicon Valley and Shenzhen, it is found that one of 
the key enabling conditions for the financial resources, either from the public sector, or from 
private investors, is that the ecosystem should have a relatively supportive public and private 
capital market that ensures the financial resources flow in from outside of the ecosystem and 
recycle in the ecosystem following the exit of the funded start-ups.  
In Shenzhen, government financial support from all levels including the central government, 
provincial level and the Shenzhen city government level is prevalent in universities and 
endorsed incubators and/or co-working spaces, as a professor in a Shenzhen research institute 
affiliated to the Chinese Academy of Science described the financial support received from 
governments for entrepreneurial activities in his institution: 
…You can see the recent support from both central government and Shenzhen 
government is very strong. [They] invested a lot in the universities to start 
entrepreneurship courses and workshops…. We also have two government-
endorsed co-working spaces here, which receive support from both central 
government and Shenzhen city government… (Q5.6.9) 
In Silicon Valley, although the private capital investments are much more pervasive, the US 
government or government-related institutional support such as from the National Science 
Foundation ensures that leading universities such as Stanford and Berkeley can continuously 
conduct their cutting-edge research and commercialise the resultant new technologies, as a co-
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founder of a technology and industry news media in Silicon Valley noted,  
 …Stanford and Berkeley have the best research and technologies. Many [of 
the] newest technologies are used in their labs and then diffused and applied 
to other companies and industries. Unlike in the industries, Stanford and 
Berkeley receive a lot of money for research and technology commercialisation 
from the governments and related institutions, and these universities encourage 
entrepreneurship out of the new technologies…. (Q5.6.10) 
However, financial resources from the public sector are rather limited and many such resources 
are required to be used in research rather than directly in commercialisation. Therefore, a 
supportive private capital market ensures the dyadic interaction between investors and 
entrepreneurs – investors could seek appropriate channels to invest in start-ups and start-ups 
could find different types of investors in different stages of their entrepreneurial processes, as 
a senior manager in a corporate venture capital firm described the funding cycle of start-ups 
and division of labour in the capital market in Silicon Valley: 
…So, in the funding cycle of start-ups, you typically see people start by 
borrowing money from friends and family, and you do the very first prototype 
with two or three people in the garage, then you go to angels typically, and you 
get the first institutional fund, which is normally 100,000 to 500,000 dollars, 
to help you create the organisation and make something interesting for the 
market. Then you go to a VC for round A to make the first real product; [after 
that] you get to round B or round C, which is normally for extending your 
market and being able to recruit people to sell your product, and then the 
further rounds are scaling-up the company… but as a corporate VC we don't 
get involved in the first two to three rounds and we are looking for things that 
are proven to be feasible in the market…(Q5.6.11) 
Similarly, in Shenzhen, specialised investors in different stages enable the financial resources 
to flow and, most importantly, to recycle in the ecosystem when successful entrepreneurs 
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reinvest their profits through these channels, as a senior investment manager of a venture 
capital firm in Shenzhen noted: 
…The start-up investment ecosystem is very mature in Shenzhen. We have 
different and specialised funders in different stages of new ventures. For 
example, the angels who invest mainly [at] the very early stage; the venture 
capitalists who focus on the early to middle stage; and also private equities 
who invest in later stages…. The structure is clearly divided and specialised. 
(Q5.6.12) 
5.8 Enabling conditions for resource exit 
The second set of conditions serves for resource exit, as is illustrated in Table 5-7. As can be 
seen in section 5.5, the main resources involved in resource exit are the renewal of key supply-
side resources including the substitution of existing technologies and the exit of obsolete 
industries. Therefore, the conditions for resource exit are mainly concerned with enabling the 
technology substitutions and facilitating the exit of obsolete industries. It is found that highly 
re-combinative industrial architecture and facilitating techno-industrial substitutions are the 
two enabling conditions. 
Table 5–7 Enabling conditions for resource exit and illustrative quotes 
Illustrative Quotes Primary Codes Axial Codes 
Q5.7.2 Focusing on industry with high 






“Silicon Valley is so successful – not because it catches every wave 
of technology, it instead creates every wave of technology…. Think 
about smartphones, electric cars, artificial intelligence…. This is made 
possible by the huge advantages in research not only undertaken in 
Stanford University, Berkeley and national laboratories, but also 
companies like Google and IBM research in Silicon Valley….” A senior 
director in a research institute affiliated to a multinational corporation 
in Silicon Valley 
Diversified technology base with 
deep research base 
Q5.7.3, Q5.7.4 Facilitating the emergence and 





Q5.7.5 Nudging industry upgrading with 
policies and initiatives 
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5.8.1 Highly re-combinative industrial architecture 
As the first enabling condition for resource exit including the substitution of obsolete 
technologies and industries, a highly re-combinative industrial architecture (Jacobides, 
Knudsen, and Augier, 2006; Jacobides, MacDuffie, and Tae, 2016) means more adaptability 
and fluidity for companies in the entrepreneurial ecosystems when new technologies and 
paradigms invert the industry. With this condition, the ecosystem could eject the industries that 
are no longer efficient and recombine the existing and any new resources to establish new 
industries, which consequently enable the ecosystem to achieve longevity and prosperity. In 
both Silicon Valley and Shenzhen, the presence of this condition, and the consequent 
adaptability for the two ecosystems are observed. However, the two ecosystems meet this 
condition in two different ways. 
Silicon Valley acquires the re-combinative industrial architecture by leading the ICT industry 
through its technological superiority, mainly because of its deep research base that includes 
world-leading universities such as Stanford University and the University of California 
Berkeley, as well as first-class research institutes affiliated to multinationals such as IBM 
research, Xerox Silicon Valley research centre and Google’s research department, etc. With its 
deep research base, Silicon Valley could maintain its technological edge and disrupt itself 
before being disrupted by others, just as a co-founder of a venture capital firm in Silicon Valley 
described: 
…. Another difference Silicon Valley has against some other places, for 
example, the Taiwan Hsinchu, is that Silicon Valley keeps reinventing itself. 
Technologies move forward, so if you look at the Silicon Valley that started in 
the 1960s, every 10 years, new companies with new technologies emerge and 
take over…. This is made possible because of the strong research institutes and 
universities here in the Bay Area… (Q5.7.1) 
As a young city in an emerging economy, Shenzhen does not possess such strong research 
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capabilities. However, Shenzhen takes a different approach to obtain a highly re-combinative 
industrial architecture through companies focusing on positions with high embeddedness in the 
global value chains. In other words, Shenzhen successfully has successfully embedded itself 
into the electronics global value chains. Therefore, whenever Silicon Valley leads a 
technological change in the electronics industry, Shenzhen can find itself contributing to the 
manufacturing and key component supply, by re-combining the resources and capabilities 
accumulated in the previous technological paradigm. More importantly, this enables 
generations of start-ups to utilise the flexibility in resource reconfiguration to quickly scale-up 
in the new paradigms. In this way, Shenzhen’s ecosystem successfully sustains itself and 
rapidly adapts to the volatile industrial landscape. A senior official in the Shenzhen 
government’s technology and innovation commission described Shenzhen’s historical 
development and the Shenzhen government’s approach in supporting local industries: 
…. We [Shenzhen government] do focus on specific industries…. Of course you 
always prefer the so-called high-value companies, but we do not disregard 
those who hold important positions in the value chains but are rather small, 
particularly those who are deeply fused into the global value chains. To be 
honest, these companies might well survive longer than others. For example, 
in the transition from feature phone to smartphone, a lot of Shenzhen mobile 
phone companies did not make it but companies who provide key components 
such as batteries and camera components survived and did even better because, 
essentially, smartphones still need these components…. (Q5.7.2) 
5.8.2 Facilitating techno-industrial substitution 
A highly re-combinative industrial architecture only serves as a necessary condition for the 
substitution of obsolete industries and technologies. However, to sufficiently ensure the 
resource exit, the ecosystems need to be able to proactively drive and facilitate the techno-
industrial substitution. In Silicon Valley and Shenzhen, two different mechanisms in facilitating 
techno-industrial substitution are observed.  
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In Silicon Valley, market mechanisms play a major part in driving the substitutions. New 
technologies will be tested in the stiff competition with many other solutions in the market, and 
the winners will prevail, without non-market interventions, as a senior employee in a 
multinational corporation in Silicon Valley described: 
…Silicon Valley is a purely market-driven ecosystem…. There is nearly no 
government intervention, but the market will decide who should survive…. 
People always come up with new technologies every day and, as long as they 
can prove themselves in the market, they will prevail and substitute the existing 
technologies or solutions… (Q5.7.3) 
However, as an entrepreneurial ecosystem in an emerging country, Shenzhen faced a different 
problem – how to upgrade and move up along the global value chains. Recall that Shenzhen 
achieves the first enabling condition by embedding itself into the global value chains to 
increase flexibility and adaptability when faced with disruptions of new technologies; however, 
there are risks of being stuck in the low value-added manufacturing sectors, with the most 
prominent risk being that of increased labour costs, which means the model simply cannot 
sustain in the long term. Secondly, being stuck in the low value-added manufacturing sectors 
means more risk of being replaced by other emerging ecosystems, which could consequently 
cause the focal ecosystem to decline. For example, the 2008 financial crisis hugely affected the 
global economy and Shenzhen’s electronics manufacturing, especially when many companies 
were actually providing electronic manufacturing services to multinationals, as the demand 
decreased significantly, and the labour costs increased due to the increasingly tightened labour 
law in China. Since then, the Shenzhen government and Guangdong provincial government 
have promoted the transformation and upgrading of the local industries by intentionally 
encouraging the development of emerging industries and facilitating the exit of obsolete ones, 
just as a Shenzhen government official commented on Shenzhen’s success: 
…We shift our focus to nurturing strategic emerging technologies and 
industries such as electric vehicles, smartphones and drones, etc., instead of 
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sustaining the old ones. We call this ‘vacating the cage to change bird’…. 
(Q5.7.4) 
A senior director in a robotics incubator in Shenzhen also pointed out that, in contrast to many 
other cities in China that sustained the obsolete industries with financial support from the 
government, Shenzhen’s government proactively encouraged the exit of these resources and 
created spaces for new ones to emerge, with the risk of a significant drop in local economic 
growth during the transition: 
[The] Shenzhen government was under pressure after the financial crisis…. On 
the one hand, they were pressured because they let go the companies who were 
closed down due to the crisis, which slowed down the economic growth data 
significantly…. On the other hand, they were concerned with whether new 
companies could actually come in…. Fortunately, Shenzhen indeed upgraded 
itself from copycats to independent innovation…. Looking back now, I think 
[the] Shenzhen government really took a smart move by intentionally 
facilitating industry upgrading… (Q5.7.5) 
5.9 Enabling conditions for resource diversification 
The third set of enabling conditions is concerned with resource diversification. As can be seen 
in section 5.4, the resource diversification mainly involves the emergence and adoption of new 
technologies, new business models and practices, as well as new organisational forms. When 
tracing back to the data to examine how these new elements emerge and what enables them to 
emerge, it is found that formation of weak social ties, transformation from weak social ties to 
strong social ties, modularised industries and new venture creation process, as well as moderate 
institutional environment and appropriability regimes are the conditions to facilitate resource 
diversification in the entrepreneurial ecosystems, as is illustrated in Table 5-8. The second and 
third sets of enabling conditions respectively for resource exit and diversification together 
precipitate the entrepreneurial ecosystem adaptation. 
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Table 5–8 Enabling conditions for resource diversification and illustrative quotes 
Illustrative Quotes Primary Codes Axial Codes 
Q5.8.1, Q5.8.2 Establishing technology 
entrepreneurship clubs or societies, 
informal activities for start-ups and 
entrepreneurs 
Formation of 
weak social ties 
Q5.8.3, Q5.8.4 Establishing formal business 
networks/activities/relationships for 
start-ups and (potential) entrepreneurs 
Q5.8.5, Q5.8.6 Start-ups and founding teams’ 
formation from informal activities for 
start-ups and entrepreneurs 
Transformation 
from weak ties 
to strong ties 
Q5.8.7, Q5.8.8 Start-ups, business collaborations or 
investments initiated from business 
networks/formal activities/relationships 
Q5.8.9, Q5.8.10 
“...Multinationals do what they need to do…. Small 
companies and start-ups do what they are adept at. This 
means the ecosystem has big trees, flowers and also grass. 
So, there is relatively less nasty competition. This is good for 
innovation when small companies emerge continuously and 
try to invert the big companies…”A co-founder of a 
technology and industry news media in Silicon Valley 
Fragmented industries and specialised 






Q5.8.11, Q5.8.12 Specialised players/organisations in 
each of the new venture creation 
activities 
Q5.8.13, Q5.8.14 Idea/best practice sharing/open to 








“…The government, at first, turned a blind eye to 
Shanzhai companies and even made them legitimate 
although still illegal…. Objectively speaking, although this 
was not good practice for IP protection, the development of 
Shanzhai actually helped Shenzhen get rid of Shanzhai in a 
short amount of time…” An individual investor who was 
among one of the first investors of DJI in Shenzhen 
Reasonably loose institutional 
environment and government policies 
regarding IP 
5.9.1 Formation of weak social ties 
The first condition is the formation of weak social ties. Weak social ties (See also Granovetter, 
1973) among players involved in the (potential) new venture process serve the purposes of 
building further, strong ties. In the entrepreneurial ecosystem setting, weak social ties can be 
formed when multiple parties who are interested in creating new ventures or being involved in 
the new venture creation, such as venture investment, bringing start-ups into incubators, or 
simply searching for potential co-founders, take part in formal or informal activities and 
interact with each other. These activities can be investor days held by investors or incubators, 
technology fairs, as well as entrepreneurship and technology-related societies/clubs activities 
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such as seminars and demonstrations. When these different ecosystem players interact with 
each other and get to know each other, weak social ties form. The formation of weak social ties 
is an enabling condition precisely because it serves as the prerequisite for these ties to transform 
into strong ones, which often yields the emergence of new technologies, new business models 
and new organisational forms. 
From the data, two types of weak tie formation are identified. One is through informal means 
such as informal activities for start-ups and entrepreneurs in technology- and entrepreneurship-
related clubs or societies. For example, in Apple’s entrepreneurial process, both co-founders 
joined the Homebrew Club in Silicon Valley and gained their first order from the club. They 
also hired one of the organisation’s first employees from the club. Similarly, in Google’s 
entrepreneurial processes, the two co-founders knew each other from orientation activities at 
their university and were further connected by their similar interest in search engine algorithms. 
With a vibrant entrepreneurial community, Silicon Valley has numerous societies that aim to 
help members create their ventures, although many of them are not even designed to be 
traditionally perceived entrepreneurship societies. For example, in an interview with a founder 
of a venture capital firm in Silicon Valley, the author was told that the founder’s alma mater 
has an alumni association in the Bay Area which periodically organises events to connect 
alumni who are interested in starting their own companies. This type of informal means 
facilitates the formation of weak social ties when potential collaborators mingle through the 
informal activities. 
 …As a committee member of the TEEC [Tsinghua Entrepreneurship and 
Executives Club] supporting Tsinghua alumni for entrepreneurship since 1995 
in Silicon Valley, we are very active in the Bay Area to host activities for 
entrepreneurships and financing, such as venture contest and investor day, etc. 
Societies like us in the Bay Area are countless and these provide a valuable 
platform for exchanging information and ideas…. (Q5.8.1) 
In Shenzhen, it is also evident that various activities organised by ecosystem actors such as 
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incubators and venture capitalists contribute to the formation of weak social ties among the 
local start-up communities, as a senior manager in a Shenzhen incubator noted: 
 …We have activities regularly for entrepreneurs or people who are generally 
interested in entrepreneurship, such as seminars, successful entrepreneurs’ 
experience sharing, round-table discussions, investor Meet&Greet, etc.…. This 
could foster the communications in the local entrepreneurship community… 
(Q5.8.2) 
Besides the informal approaches, formal means such as attending technology fairs and 
entrepreneurship and/or technology contests, evident from the data, also play an important part 
in the formation of weak social ties. For example, DJI has organised a robotics contest in China 
every year since 2013, hoping to gather the best Chinese robotics talents and create 
opportunities for them to share their ideas and thoughts as well, as a manager of the public 
relations office in DJI told us: 
…Since 2013, we’ve held the RoboMaters China robotics contest every year in 
Shenzhen. We attract many teams from top universities in China to participate 
in the contests…. Except for the contests, we also have summer camps, clubs 
and robotics-related courses for the participants in order to improve their skills 
and increase their interest in robotics…. Actually many teams in the past went 
on to establish a robotics company with our financial support…  (Q5.8.3) 
Interestingly, as can be seen in DJI’s entrepreneurial process, the founding team members knew 
each other from attending a robotics contest in Hong Kong and together they built the flight 
control system which later served as the company’s core technology. In fact, in Shenzhen, the 
government has also played an important role by acting as the medium and creating 
opportunities for the formation of weak social ties in various formal means, such as organising 
technology fairs. In 1999, the first high-tech fair was held in Shenzhen by the Shenzhen 
municipal government and was regarded as a “turning point”, as described by a senior manager 
in a venture capital firm in Shenzhen, as Shenzhen local companies like Tencent agreed the 
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first venture investment with linkages built during the fair: 
 …The high-tech fair can be a turning point for Shenzhen’s entrepreneurship 
and innovation…. In the first high-tech fair, for the first time we brought in 
venture capitalists and mingled them with entrepreneurs in China officially and 
systematically…. Many companies who later became famous attracted their 
first investment [during] this fair, such as Tencent…. (Q5.8.4) 
The weak ties would then serve as a basis for the second enabling condition – transformation 
from weak to strong social ties. 
5.9.2 Transformation from weak ties to strong ties 
The formation of social ties alone does not translate into resource diversification. It is not until 
weak social ties are transformed into strong social ties, indicated by value co-creation activities 
such as co-founding start-ups, venture capital investments and business collaborations, that 
resource diversification can be made possible. From the data, it is found that there are mainly 
two types of strong tie transformation; the first one is the formation of a start-up’s founding 
team from the weak ties formed through informal means. The CEO of an earphone start-up in 
Shenzhen described how he met his co-founder: 
…I knew my co-founder actually from an alumni’s experience-sharing seminar 
held by the local alumni association…. I was surprised to find out that he was 
also interested in the earphones and back in the US he was in an acoustics 
lab…. We almost very quickly reached consensus in creating our own earphone 
brand…. (Q5.8.5) 
The founding team formation through transforming the weak ties built in various activities is 
also evident in Silicon Valley, as the co-founder of a technology and industry news media 
company in Silicon Valley noted: 
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…Because of the atmosphere, you can always find like-minded people who are 
interested in founding a new company together with you in Stanford, when you 
participate in their various activities regarding technologies and 
entrepreneurships… (Q5.8.6) 
Indeed, as is mentioned previously, the weak ties formed by Google’s two co-founders via 
participating in university activities were ultimately transformed to strong ties when they co-
developed the PageRank system and set up Google based on the algorithm. Similarly, DJI was 
founded in Shenzhen by transforming the weak social ties formed at the robotics contest into 
strong ties – co-developing the flight control systems. In both Google and DJI’s cases, new 
technologies were developed, the companies were established, and ecosystem resources were 
diversified along their entrepreneurial processes. 
The second type of strong tie transformation is the start-ups, business collaborations or 
investments initiated from formal activities and business relationships. These formal activities 
can be, for example, the high-tech fairs held in Shenzhen since 1999, which attracted 
entrepreneurs and SMEs to demonstrate their products and solutions, venture capitalists and 
other financial institutions to search for good projects, as well as companies looking for 
partners and complementary technologies. The fair has continuously helped all ecosystem 
actors to establish weak social ties and potentially transform them into strong ties by setting 
down investments and business collaborations afterwards. For instance, the founder of an 
electronics company in Shenzhen described how he got the first venture investment and 
subsequently decided to return to Shenzhen to establish his own company: 
…I attended the first high-tech fair held in Shenzhen, in 1999. At that time, we 
were provided with free demonstration space and mingling opportunities with 
venture capitalists. After we successfully attracted investments, the 
governments also provided loans with no interest. That’s why I moved back 
from the US… (Q5.8.7) 
Formal business relationships in established companies could also serve as a basis for the 
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strong tie transformation to occur. The transformation can be, for example, an internal group 
specialising in a particular technology in an established company spins out as a whole and 
establishes a new company to further utilise the technology they develop. Recall that in 
Fairchild and Intel’s entrepreneurial process in the 1960s, co-founders were colleagues in 
previous companies working on the same technologies – for Fairchild, the co-founders were 
research scientists in Shockley’s company and some of the Fairchild co-founders then jointly 
created Intel based on the technologies they had long been developing at Fairchild. Strong tie 
transformation is prevalent today in Silicon Valley as well, as a co-founder of a media company 
focusing on entrepreneurship and investment news in Silicon Valley described to us: 
…The big companies in Silicon Valley like Google, Facebook and Apple are 
like the military academy of entrepreneurs. Many internal groups [of these 
companies] focusing on specific technologies choose to jump out and set up 
their own companies as it is always more efficient to realise the ideas outside 
of these big corporations. I know some people who got into a strong group in 
Google and, along with the group leader, they started a new company…. 
(Q5.8.8) 
Weak tie formation and strong tie transformation provide necessary conditions for new 
resources to emerge and thrive but are not sufficient for resource diversification in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
5.9.3 Modularised industries and new venture creation process 
In addition to weak tie formation and strong tie transformation, it is also found that the 
modularised nature of the industries and the uniquely disintegrated new venture creation 
process in both Shenzhen and Silicon Valley ecosystems act as enabling conditions for resource 
diversification. 
As Silicon Valley and Shenzhen ecosystems are both centred around the information and 
communications technology industry, the findings show that the nature of this industry, which 
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is highly disintegrated and modularised, indeed serves as a key enabling condition for new 
resources to emerge and thrive within the ecosystems. This is because, when the industry is 
highly disintegrated and modularised, start-ups are more likely to find a niche position to enter. 
Technology and market isolations as disadvantages for start-ups and/or second movers 
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988, 1998) in this sense will be greatly diminished when they 
essentially compete with incumbents in different segments. A director of an Electronic Design 
Automation (EDA) company in Silicon Valley described their successful entry into the market 
and how this relates to the success of Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurial ecosystem: 
We are [a] fairly small company, but we can still make a difference. This is one 
of the reasons why Silicon Valley is so successful: companies focus on 
specialised and niche areas or segments… you can always find your position 
as a newcomer in the industry and the industry environment is friendly for new 
players to emerge…. For example, we are the most influential company in the 
EDA segment within the electronics industry… (Q5.8.9) 
The modularised (see also Baldwin and Clark, 2000) and highly disintegrated nature of the ICT 
industry also provides the opportunity for the ecosystem to have a comprehensive value chain 
for start-ups to successfully prototype their ideas and prevail in the market through rapid trial 
and error. The reason is twofold. On the one hand, a comprehensive value chain agglomerated 
in the same ecosystem enables start-ups with limited resources to access key components more 
conveniently. On the other hand, the comprehensive value chain often includes small and 
medium suppliers other than incumbent ones, which reduces the power asymmetry between 
upstream suppliers and downstream start-ups. For example, a smartphone start-up in Shenzhen 
can access key component suppliers within the ecosystem easily, and, most importantly, a wide 
range of choice from high-end suppliers to low-end suppliers is often available for most 
components in Shenzhen. This is crucial for the start-ups to emerge in the market because, as 
start-ups, their organisational status often does not help them source from internationally top-
tier suppliers due to their unestablished reputation and low order quantities. In this sense, 
accessible and comprehensive local value chains could precipitate the emergence of these start-
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ups, with potential new technologies, new business models and new organisational forms 
and/or routines being created and popularised, as a senior manager of an electronics company 
described the accessibility of Shenzhen’s value chain for electronics: 
…Shenzhen has a comprehensive value chain for hardware production. In 
every step of the production, there are numerous companies…. For example, 
there are many small electronics companies who provide services and 
components that big companies won’t do…. You can easily source components 
from a radius of 15 kilometres… (Q5.8.10) 
Similar to the facilitating effects of a modularised and highly disintegrated industry architecture 
for new companies and new species to emerge, it is found that the modularisation of the new 
venture creation process also acts as a critical enabling condition for start-ups to emerge, with 
the potentiality to create new resources for the ecosystems. In both Silicon Valley and Shenzhen, 
it is found that the whole venture creation process is highly disintegrated, with every activity 
along the process being occupied by numerous intermediary companies, as the founder of a 
robotics start-up in Silicon Valley observed: 
…The entrepreneurial environment and atmosphere is mature here in Silicon 
Valley…Because it is very mature with long historical accumulation of new 
venture creation, so there is sufficient support along the whole process of new 
venture creation. Support like legal services, human resources, financial 
management…. These services could be provided by the ecosystem in Silicon 
Valley and you can find these services easily…. (Q5.8.11) 
The modularised and specialised venture creation process is critical for new species in the 
ecosystem to emerge because start-ups or entrepreneurs do not normally possess sufficient 
resources to commercialise their ideas and technologies and set up organisations without 
accessing ecosystem resources. When the ecosystems offer specialised and disintegrated 
intermediary players such as incubators, accelerators, legal and human resource service 
companies for start-ups, as well as different funding institutions focusing on different stages of 
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new ventures, the barrier to commercialising new technologies, implementing new business 
models and trying out new organisational forms is significantly lowered due to the increased 
accessibility of supporting resources along the new venture creation process other than 
physically delivering products. When the modularised and specialised venture creation process 
is present, start-ups can be created more efficiently, increasing the likelihood of the emergence 
of new resources in the ecosystems. This is akin to a flow line production of commodities, with 
each step standardised and modularised, as the director of a local consulting company in 
Shenzhen noted: 
…This is what you call [an] ecosystem…. There are many specialised and 
professional service providers for new venture creations. For example, 
accounting, finance, legal services and human resource services, etc. This is 
what the ecosystem can offer for the start-up to focus on developing products. 
Also, Shenzhen has comprehensive value chains, with a variety of production-
related service providers, such as moulding, testing, etc.… (Q5.8.12) 
5.9.4 Moderate institutional environment and appropriability regimes 
If the first three conditions are pertinent to the material and social attributes of an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem (Spigel, 2017), there remains a final condition relevant to both 
material and cultural attributes. For the ecosystem resource to diversify, a final condition – 
moderate institutional environment and appropriability regime – is essential. Certainly, a weak 
institutional environment and appropriability regime will hamper value creation and capture of 
new technologies from the firm’s perspective (Teece, 1986). Accordingly, companies in an 
ecosystem with a strong institutional environment and appropriability regime will be more 
likely to capture value from their own innovations, at least in the short run. However, from the 
data, it is found that a moderate institutional environment and appropriability regime could be 
more viable for the ecosystem resources to diversify. 
The moderate institutional environment and appropriability regime in both Shenzhen and 
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Silicon Valley are reflected in two different attributes – cultural and material. Culturally, the 
two regions are used to idea sharing and mutual learning and they put more emphasis on value 
co-creation rather than single-minded value capture for themselves. For example, the Shanzhai 
companies in Shenzhen were willing to share information, including new product designs, new 
market channels, and new component suppliers, etc., even with fellow Shanzhai OEMs who 
essentially would compete with each other in various markets. However, these collaborative 
efforts eventually made Shanzhai OEMs, collectively, very successful in the Chinese rural 
markets, as well as in African markets, because of the aggregated capabilities and resources. 
The legacy left by Shanzhai companies has not faded away in Shenzhen, where many 
companies follow a similar approach to pave their way globally and compete with global 
brands, as a senior manager of a smartphone company in Shenzhen noted: 
Shenzhen companies do not have a tradition of secrecy…. The Shanzhai 
companies were highly collaborative…. When a Shanzhai OEM acquired any 
information regarding the market, they would share [it] with other Shanzhai 
companies, not only upstream suppliers but also other Shanzhai OEMs…. 
Together like this, Shanzhai mobile phones were very successful in African 
markets… (Q5.8.13) 
This idea-sharing and mutual-learning tradition is salient in Silicon Valley, as the co-founder 
of a venture capital firm who was the founder of a PC component provider noted: 
They [companies and individuals] are willing to share…. When they invent 
something, profiting from it does not come to the first place. I remember in 
1985 when I first came here all the PC=related knowledge was free and shared 
across the Bay Area. You can use other people’s knowledge…. This tends to 
encourage people to do more. (Q5.8.14) 
The other key aspect is the material attribute of the ecosystems. Both Shenzhen and Silicon 
Valley have reasonably loose institutional environments and government policies related to 
intellectual properties. As a professor at Tsinghua University Shenzhen Campus pointed out, 
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Shenzhen’s government believes in a trial and error approach towards innovations that may be 
violating existing governing policies or guidelines but could otherwise bring social benefits: 
Our government is relatively tolerant towards innovations that could 
potentially bring some problems but are beneficial for the society… taking the 
example of the sharing bikes in China…. In Shenzhen you can see them 
everywhere…. They [the government officials] always hold an experimental 
mind-set and relaxed the policies towards these new things…. I believe this is 
an important reason for having a vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystem with new 
things coming up continuously here in Shenzhen... (Q5.8.15) 
In Silicon Valley, the legal system is also favourable for start-ups. The non-compete clause in 
contract law enables employees in Silicon Valley to flow to other companies with fewer 
constraints. In this way, knowledge embedded with them spills over to other companies in the 
ecosystem more effectively and efficiently, thus increasing the possibility of the emergence of 
new resources in the ecosystem, as the co-founder of a technology and industry news media in 
Silicon Valley told us: 
…Another factor is the legal aspect. The legal system in California is 
reasonably relaxed towards companies and start-ups. For example, there is no 
non-compete clause in the contract law, which means the law does not forbid 
one from hopping to another company that is doing the same business. This has 
made the fluidity of talents in the Valley very high and increased the knowledge 
flow within the ecosystem which often comes with the people…. (Q5.8.16) 
5.10 Summary 
Answering to the first sub research question ‘what are the dimensions for entrepreneurial 
ecosystem health’, Chapter 5 identifies six dimensions: ecosystem resources, entrepreneurial 
process, ecosystem performance, ecosystem robustness, ecosystem adaptation, and enabling 
conditions for resource dynamisms. 
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6. Resource Dynamisms in Entrepreneurial 
Ecosystems 
[T]he predominant large-scale econometric studies have been essential to 
understanding the determinants and variations of entrepreneurship in certain 
regions. However, such studies have limitations, especially in uncovering 
reciprocity…. Since the entrepreneurial process in regions is dynamic, it occurs 
over time, involves various agents and various dimensions of the local, meso 
and macro environment, it is imperative to focus on the interplay, the 
potentially reinforcing links and relations. Müller (2016, p.16) 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 shed light on the key dimensions of entrepreneurial ecosystem health. In particular, 
four resource dynamisms within entrepreneurial ecosystems were identified. Although the 
resource dynamisms are at the ecosystem level, they are nevertheless aggregated outcomes of 
resource-accessing behaviours in the individual entrepreneurial activities. Hence, this chapter 
aims at answering the second sub research question ‘How do individual entrepreneurial 
activities contribute to collective entrepreneurial ecosystem health’, by showing how 
individual resource-accessing behaviours contribute to ecosystem-level resource dynamisms. 
Table 6-1 lists all the case companies’ resource-accessing behaviours – resource acquisition, 
resource exploitation and resource feedback – for different ecosystem resources along their 
entrepreneurial processes. In particular, the specific behaviours that contribute to different 
resource dynamisms at the ecosystem level are marked with different numbers of stars. It is 
found that different resource-accessing behaviours at the individual level actually contribute to 
different types of resource dynamisms in the ecosystems. Furthermore, as the entrepreneurial 
ecosystems evolve from the emerging phase through the growing phase to the mature phase, 
the extent of certain resource dynamisms changes as well. 
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Table 6–1 Individual entrepreneurial processes in relation to their use of entrepreneurial ecosystem resources  
Implications to EE resources: * resource replenishment in EE; ** resource recycling in EE; *** resource exit in EE; **** resource diversification in EE 
EE Case companies 
Resource dynamics in individual entrepreneurial processes 
Types of resource Resource acquisition Resource exploitation Resource feedback 
Silicon 
Valley 
Fairchild Technologies embedded in the Traitors 
Eight during their work in Shockley ** 
Invented planar process to 
manufacture silicon components **** 
The first generation of silicon production 
was replaced by the planar process in most 




The Traitors Eight were hired by Shockley 
from the East Coast * 
N/A Traitors Eight as well as the other early 
employees left Fairchild and entered 
different areas for new venture creations 
Human resources 
Linkages to East Coast bankers by 
Kleiner’s family 
N/A Fairchild as the WestPoint of the 
semiconductors industry ** 
Social capital 
N/A The first venture capital fund ever in 
the Bay area; it paved a new approach 
of investment – technology could win 
shares for the co-founders. **** 
First spin-off, Rheem, from Fairchild ** 
Amelco was founded by three of the Traitors 
Eight ** 




routines, and practices) 
Kleiner’s letter to his family’s fund 
manager was seen by Rock 
In a meeting arranged with Rock, the 
Traitors Eight persuaded him to 
invest, in exchange for shares. First 
venture capital investment **** 
N/A Financial capital 
N/A N/A N/A Intermediaries 
N/A First contract accessing parent 
company in the east as a shareholder 
of IBM 
N/A Market resources 
    
 Intel Direction of chip R&D set by Intel 
founders in Fairchild ** 




 Gathered co-founders in Fairchild – 
Groove, Moore and Noyce ** 
Employees from Stanford University 
including Hoff who later designed CPU * 
N/A N/A Human resources 
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 Linkages with Rock in Fairchild and 
Traitors Eight 
N/A N/A Social capital 
 N/A N/A Distributing shares to employees, imitated 
by other SV companies **** 
KPCB founded by Kleiner **** 





routines, and practices) 
 Investment from other Traitors Eight * 
Conducted several rounds of financing 
with Rock’s help* 
N/A N/A Financial capital 
 N/A N/A N/A Intermediaries 
 N/A N/A N/A Market resources 
     
 Apple Jobs attended computer science courses at 
Stanford University 
Jobs got DRAM from Intel after 
writing a letter 
Former Atari employee helped design 
the main board 
Body of Apple II designed by a 
Homebrew Club member 
Idea of GUI conceived after visiting 
Xerox SV **** 
First mouse was designed by a local 
company recruited by Apple **** 
The GUI and mouse style replaced IBM’s 
traditional PC with command lines, etc. *** 
Technologies and 
Production resources 
Wozniak’s family moved to SV as father 
worked as an engineer at Lockheed 
Martin* 
Founder team built up attracted former 
Atari employees ** 
Wozniak knew Jobs and other early 
employees in high school 
Utilised linkages in Atari and 
Homebrew Club to hire new 
employees 
Don introduced Markkula, who was a 
director of Intel, to join Apple as CEO 
Markkula later invited former 
Fairchild employee Mike Scott to be 
CEO 
N/A Human resources 
N/A Connection to Xerox research centre 
established by Raskin, a former Atari 
employee, for Jobs to visit and be 
further inspired by Xerox’s ideas 
**** 
N/A Social capital 
Jobs became familiar with product design N/A Jobs established NEXT with some of the key Organisations 
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working at Atari ** Apple employees ** (including 
organisational forms, 
routines and practices) 
Atari CEO Bushnell suggested Jobs 
approach Don Valentine for investment * 
Markkula persuaded Rock to invest in 
Apple * 
Xerox involved in second-round financing 
* 
N/A N/A Financial capital 
N/A Homebrew Club was established and 
Jobs and Wozniak were early 
members to gather feedback and ideas 
on products **** 
N/A Intermediaries 
N/A Demonstration in Homebrew Club 
attracts local computer shop who 
made the first order 
N/A Market resources 
    
 Google Brin and Page borrowed from several 
departments at Stanford to run their 
project 
Page conceived the idea of working 
out the links between webpages **** 
PageRank beat the traditional Yahoo! etc.’s 
simple linkages between webpages as the 
industry standard *** 
Auction-based advertising invented by 
Google and became standard for future 
search engines *** 
Technologies and 
Production resources 
Brin joined Stanford University for 
computer science and knew Page, who 
also joined the same department * 
Recruiting from fresh Stanford graduates 
as a tradition * 
N/A Several early members of the team left for 
further new venture creations** 
Human resources 
N/A Connected with a Stanford alumni, 
who developed the then popular 
search engine **** 
Connected with AOL with the help of 
KPCB for collaboration and 
investment **** 
N/A Social capital 
N/A N/A Brian Lent, one of the early members, 







routines and practices) 
Larry’s superior Garcia-Molina got money 
from a project for Brin and Page * 
Earliest investors introduced by Stanford 
professor * 
Getting privileged low share 
exchanges for huge investment from 
KPCB and Sequoia, creating a new 
way of bargaining with leading 
technologies**** 
An unconventional way of IPO, open to all 
investors, employing a local investment 
bank, against the traditional Wall Street 
approach ****  
Financial capital 
N/A N/A N/A Intermediaries 
N/A N/A N/A Market resources 
    
 Tesla Tarpenning and Eberhardt had experience 
with lithium batteries ** 
Battery factory in Thailand, sourcing 
components from major European car 
makers 
X.com established by Musk created 
the first online banking in 
collaboration with Barclays and FDIC 
**** 
Developed battery management 
system, the core of Tesla **** 
Model S served as the model for pure 
electric cars and competed with hybrid and 
traditional vehicles *** 
Technologies and 
Production resources 
Staubel attended Stanford University * 
Musk moved to SV for an internship in a 
games company * 
Musk’s brother was persuaded to move to 
SV * 
N/A A few key employees such as Eberhardt and 
Tarpenning left the company as the Roadster 
project was not going well ** 
Human resources 
In a talk given by Musk in Stanford, 
Eberhard and Tarpenning felt Musk would 
be a potential co-founder in Tesla 
Musk helped built connections with 
major VCs such as Draper, 
VantagePoint and Larry Page as 
individual investors **** 
N/A Social capital 
N/A N/A N/A Organisations 
(including 
organisational forms, 
routines, and practices) 
Musk profited from selling Zip 2 * 
Musk invested in and joined Tesla * 
Straubel joined Tesla and attracted more 
Stanford graduates as an alumnus ** 
Daimler acquired a 10% share in Tesla  
N/A N/A Financial capital 
N/A Demonstration in the Pebble Beach N/A Intermediaries 
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Concours d’Elegance car 
demonstration 
N/A Daimler started to purchase battery 
systems from Tesla 
N/A Market resources 
    
Shenzhen Huawei During Ren’s work at a state-owned 
electronics company he learnt about the 
switching technologies in telephones ** 
Successfully released H08**** 
Launch of CDMA 1X marked that 
Huawei had obtained equal capability 
as international brands in 
telecommunications equipment **** 
N/A Technologies and 
Production resources 
Following an open-door policy and 
economic reform, Shenzhen attracted a lot 
of talents from the mainland * 
Ren joined a state-owned company in 
Shenzhen * 
Massive hiring from HZUST and 
Tsinghua in the early Huawei * 
N/A Ex-Huawei employees joining other start-
ups and helping their success, such as 
Tencent ** 
Human resources 
N/A Connected to China Merchants after 
Premier’s visits following success of 
H08 **** 
Ex-Huawei employees set up Huawei club to 
connect all previous Huawei employees 
**** 
Social capital 
N/A Following the reform of share-holding 
companies in China, Huawei started 
to distribute shares to its employees 
**** 
Huawei began to encourage senior 





routines, and practices) 
Raised first investment in the agent 
businesses * 
N/A Huawei’s early employees served as the first 
individual investors in Shenzhen ** 
Financial capital 
N/A N/A Ren suggested to the Chinese government 
that it should protect local 
telecommunication companies **** 
Intermediaries 
Ren was introduced by a local agent to sell 
Hong Kong’s switching systems 
Open up rural market for telephone 
switching systems 
Won contract from Shenzhen China 
Unicom and Shenzhen Post Office  
N/A Market resources 
      
 Tencent Ma and his co-founders took computer-
related courses in Shenzhen University 
Purchased components from Huaqiangbei 
Ma developed a unique sense of 
product design during his work in 
RunXun and management of FidoNet 
QQ instant messaging severely affected the 
short message service on the mobile phones 





to assemble more computers for software 
development 
QICQ was developed, first 
customised instant messaging 
software in China **** 
them to cooperate with companies like 
Tencent *** 
Ma arrived in Shenzhen with his family * 
Gathered co-founders in Shenzhen who 
were as interested in the Internet as he was 
* 
Attracted many FidoNet users as first 
software developers from all around China 
* 
Tencent attracted employees previously at 
Huawei ** 
N/A Tencent employees further started a few 
famous start-ups** 
Human resources 
Ma joined RunXun and learnt the paging 
centre business in the company 
Ma started to manage FidoNet and got to 
know many later renowned Internet giants 
N/A N/A Social capital 
N/A N/A VC industry rose in China thanks to some of 





routines, and practices) 
IDG and Li Zekai from Hong Kong 
invested in Tencent * 
N/A N/A Financial capital 
N/A Attended the high-tech fair held in 
Shenzhen and attracted attention from 
the newly rising VCs in China **** 
Tencent supported further new venture 
creation both by its own employees and 
outside innovations ** 
Intermediaries 
N/A Won first order from Shenzhen 
telecommunications through one of 
the co-founders’ personal linkages 
Started collaboration with China 
Unicom Shenzhen 
N/A Market resources 
    
 DJI Utilising the experiences of Prof Li’s first 
company, Googol, and also the course 
project Wang had done at HKUST ** 
DJI’s core technology flight control 
system was developed **** 
Utilised smartphone apps to provide 
better experiences 
Shanzhai-era component suppliers and 
manufacturing service providers declined 




Prof Li’s lab established in HKUST 
attracted talents from mainland China to 
N/A Some of the early founders left and joined 




study automation and robotics * 
Tao Wang and his family moved to 
Shenzhen * 
N/A N/A N/A Social capital 
N/A N/A Three co-founders left and established their 
own companies in different areas of flight 




routines, and practices) 
Prof Li and HKUST provided first funding 
* 
Individual investor Qun Zhang provided 
funding * 
N/A N/A Financial capital 
N/A Nanshan government provided 
support 
Sponsored Robotics contest every year to 
attract robotics talents **** 
Established Songshanhu Robotics Industrial 
Park as an incubator to nurture more 
robotics start-ups **** 
Intermediaries 
N/A N/A N/A Market resources 
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6.2 Resource acquisition and implications for ecosystem resources 
This section zooms into the resource acquisition activities illustrated in Table 6-1 and highlights 
their implications for ecosystem resources, as well as the main activity enablers as evidenced 
in the cases, which are compiled in Table 6-2. 
Table 6–2 Resource acquisitions and implications for ecosystem resources 
Companies Resource acquisition activities Implications for 
ecosystem resources 










Technologies embedded in the Traitors Eight 
during their work in Shockley brought to 
Fairchild 
Resource recycling Rebellious and free spirits; 
entrepreneurial culture 
The Traitors Eight were hired by Shockley 
from the East Coast 
Resource replenishment N/A 
Linkages to East Coast bankers by Kleiner’s 
family 
N/A N/A 
Kleiner’s letter to his family’s fund manager 
was seen by Rock 
N/A N/A 
Direction of chip R&D set by Intel founders 
in Fairchild 
Resource recycling N/A 
Gathered co-founders in Fairchild – Groove, 
Moore and Noyce 
Employees from Stanford University 
including Hoff who later designed CPU 
Resource replenishment 
and recycling 
Divergence with East Coast parent 
company’s culture; rebellious and free 
spirits; entrepreneurial culture 
Linkages with Rock in Fairchild and Traitors 
Eight 
N/A N/A 
Investment from other Traitors Eight  




Entrepreneurial culture; supportive 
private capital market 
Apple Jobs attended computer science courses in 
Stanford University 
N/A N/A 
Wozniak’s family moved to SV as father 
worked as an engineer at Lockheed Martin 
Founder team built up attracted former Atari 
employees 
Wozniak knew Jobs and other early 
employees in high school 
Resource replenishment 
and recycling 
Infrastructure; entrepreneurial culture 
Jobs became familiar with product design 
working at Atari 
Resource recycling N/A 
Atari CEO Bushnell suggested Jobs approach 
Don Valentine for investment 
Markkula persuaded Rock to invest in Apple 
Xerox involved in second-round financing 
Resource replenishment Supportive private capital market; 
entrepreneurial culture 
Google Brin and Page borrowed from several 
departments at Stanford to run their project 
N/A N/A 
Brin joined Stanford University for computer 
science and knew Page, who also joined the 
same department 
Recruiting from fresh Stanford graduates as a 
tradition 
Resource replenishment Attracted by Stanford education; 
infrastructure 
Page’ superior Garcia-Molina got money Resource replenishment Able to source funding from outside of 
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from a project for Brin and Page 
Earliest investors introduced by Stanford 
professor 
universities; supportive private capital 
market 
Tesla Tarpenning and Eberhardt had experience 
with Lithium batteries 
Resource recycling Tarpenning and Eberhardt stayed in 
Silicon Valley for funding and talents; 
supportive private capital market and 
entrepreneurial culture 
Straubel attended Stanford University 
Musk moved to SV for an internship in a 
games company 
Musk’s brother was persuaded to move to SV 
Resource replenishment Infrastructure, university and education 
system; entrepreneurial culture and 
mind-sets 
After attending a talk given by Musk in 
Stanford, Eberhard and Tarpenning felt Musk 
would be a potential co-founder in Tesla 
N/A N/A 
Musk profited from selling Zip 2 
Musk invested in and joined Tesla 
Straubel joined Tesla and attracted more 
Stanford graduates as an alumnus 
Daimler acquired a 10% share of Tesla 
Resource replenishment 
and recycling 
Supportive private capital market and 
entrepreneurial culture in re-investing 
in local start-ups. 
Huawei During Ren’s work in a state-owned 
electronics company he learnt about the 
switching technologies in telephones and 
started the agent business 
Resource recycling Entrepreneurial culture and risk-taking 
mind-sets 
Following the open-door policy and 
economic reform, Shenzhen attracted a lot of 
talents from the mainland 
Ren joined a state-owned company in 
Shenzhen 
Massive hiring from HZUST and Tsinghua in 




Raised first investment in the agent 
businesses 
Resource replenishment Supportive private capital market 
Ren was introduced by a local agent to sell 
Hong Kong’s switching systems 
N/A N/A 
Tencent Ma and his co-founders took computer-
related courses at Shenzhen University 
Purchased components from Huaqiangbei to 
assemble more computers for software 
developing 
N/A N/A 
Ma arrived in Shenzhen with his family 
Gathered co-founders in Shenzhen who were 
interested in the Internet just as he was 
Attracted many FidoNet users as first 
software developers from all around China 




Entrepreneurial culture to attract 
programmers to join the company 
Ma joined RunXun and learnt the paging 
centre business in the company 
Ma started to manage FidoNet and got to 
know many later renowned Internet giants 
N/A N/A 
IDG and Li Zekai from Hong Kong invested 
in Tencent 
Resource replenishment Developing venture capitalists in 
Shenzhen, supportive private capital 
market 
DJI Utilising the experiences of Prof Li’s first 
company, Googol, and also the course 
project Wang had done at HKUST 
N/A N/A 
Prof Li’s lab established in HKUST attracted Resource replenishment University education, attractive 
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talents from mainland China to study 
automation and robotics 
Wang and his family moved to Shenzhen  
infrastructure 
Prof Li and HKUST provided first funding  
Individual investor Qun Zhang provided 
funding  
Resource replenishment Supportive private (investors like Qun) 
and public (grant from university) 
capital market. 
From Table 6-2, it can be seen that resource acquisition behaviours in the individual level will 
contribute to the resource replenishment and recycling in the ecosystem level. These mainly 
involve financial resources and human resources as well as the social capital and technology 
resources embedded with them. For example, when Tencent managed to settle its first venture 
capital investments from Hong Kong and other international investors, financial resources were 
replenished in the Shenzhen entrepreneurial ecosystem; when the ‘Traitors Eight’ decided to 
establish Fairchild to pursue their ambitions in the semiconductor industry and the subsequent 
spin-off of Intel by two of their number, “which attracted investments by the other members as 
well as their friends in the semiconductor industry, both financial resources and human 
resources as well as the social capital embedded were recycled in the Silicon Valley ecosystem. 
In this sense, the following proposition can be derived: 
P1a. The extent of resource acquisition behaviours in individual entrepreneurial 
processes will increase the extent of resource replenishment and resource recycling in 
entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
Although, collectively, resource acquisition behaviours can increase the level of resource 
replenishment and recycling in entrepreneurial ecosystems, there are conditions facilitating 
such linkages. It is found that the conditions for resource replenishment and recycling that have 
been shown in Chapter 6 serve as moderators for the relationships between resource acquisition 
in the individual level and the resource dynamisms in the ecosystem level. Despite the fact that 
resource acquisition can take place anytime when entrepreneurs try to gather resources from 
the ecosystems, as can be seen in Table 6-2, not all of them lead to resource replenishment or 
recycling for ecosystem resources. In other words, the key moderators have precipitated the 
ecosystem-level resource replenishment and recycling resulting from resource acquisition in 
individual entrepreneurial processes.  
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For example, when Tencent first decided to accept venture capital investments, the developing 
venture capitalist industry guided by the Shenzhen government enabled Tencent to obtain 
financial investments from an investor in Hong Kong. These investments replenished the 
Shenzhen entrepreneurial ecosystem with financial resources. In the meantime, the growing 
awareness of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial mind-sets in Shenzhen also helped Tencent 
in its early days as a start-up to hire top programmers who had previously worked in Huawei, 
which resulted in human resource recycling at the ecosystem level. Due to the liberated private 
capital market, many former Huawei employees who left Huawei with a fortune started to 
invest in Shenzhen’s local start-ups, being the first individual investors, which indicates the 
moderating effect of supportive private capital market on the relationship between ecosystem-
level resource recycling and individual-level resource acquisition. Attractive infrastructure like 
university education also acts as a key moderator for strengthening the ecosystem-level 
resource replenishment resulting from resource acquisition activities in the entrepreneurial 
process as university graduates establish their own companies – like Google in Silicon Valley 
and DJI in Shenzhen. Also, for these university graduates, joining a local start-up became a 
prevalent choice because of the open-minded and entrepreneurial culture, as in the case of 
Google hiring Stanford graduates and DJI being composed of HKUST students. This indicates 
the moderating effect of entrepreneurial culture on the relationship between resource 
acquisition and resource recycling in the ecosystem. Hence, the following proposition can be 
derived: 
P1b. Attractive living conditions and infrastructure, open-minded and eclectic culture, 
and supportive public/private capital market will strengthen the relationship between 
resource acquisition behaviours in individual entrepreneurial processes and resource 
replenishment and recycling in entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
6.3 Resource exploitation and implications for ecosystem 
resources 
This section zooms into the resource exploitation activities illustrated in Table 6-1 and 
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highlights their implications for ecosystem resources, as well as the main activity enablers as 
evidenced in the cases, which are compiled in Table 6-3. 
Table 6–3 Resource exploitation and implications for ecosystem resources 




Activity enablers (evidence from 
cases) 





The first venture capital fund ever in the Bay 
Area and paved a new approach of investment 




Network with Rock and social capitals of the 
Traitors Eight: weak tie formation and strong tie 
transformation  
In a meeting arranged with Rock, the Traitors 
Eight persuaded him to invest, in exchange for 
shares. First venture capital investment 
Resource 
diversification 
Network with Rock and social capitals of the 
Traitors Eight: weak tie formation and strong tie 
transformation  
First contract accessing parent company in the 
east as a shareholder of IBM 
N/A N/A 
Intel First CPU developed by Intel Resource 
diversification 
Intel co-founders were able to bring the 
technologies as well as the roadmap to the new 
company, Intel: moderate institutional 
environment and appropriability regimes.  
Apple Jobs got DRAM from Intel after writing a letter 
Former Atari employee helped design the main 
board 
Body of Apple II designed by a Homebrew 
Club member 
Idea of GUI conceived after visiting Xerox SV 
First mouse was designed by a local company 
recruited by Apple 
Resource 
diversification 
Strong tie transformation of co-founders in 
sourcing components and technologies; 
Technology clubs where weak time can be 
formed and transformed into strong ties 
subsequently; Idea sharing and open to mutual 
learning: moderate institutional environments 
and appropriability regimes. 
Utilised linkages in Atari and Homebrew Club 
to hire new employees 
Don introduced Markkula, who was a director 
of Intel, to join Apple as CEO 
Markkula later invited former Fairchild 
employee Mike Scott to be CEO 
N/A N/A 
Connection to Xerox research centre for Jobs to 
visit and to be inspired by Xerox’s ideas 
established by Raskin, a former Atari employee 
Resource 
diversification 
Strong tie transformation of co-founders in 
acquiring talents 
Homebrew Club was established and Jobs and 
Wozniak were early members to gather 
feedback and ideas on products 
Resource 
diversification 
Technology clubs where weak ties can be 
formed and transformed into strong ties 
subsequently; 
Demonstration in Homebrew Club attracts 
local computer shop who made the first order 
N/A N/A 
Google Page conceived the idea of working out the 




Connected with a Stanford Alumni, who 
developed the then popular search engine 
Connected with AOL with the help of KPCB 
for collaboration and investment 
Resource 
diversification 
Weak tie formation through universities and 
venture capitalists; subsequent strong tie 
transformation while collaborating and 
investing. 
Getting privileged low share exchanges for 
huge investment from KPCB and Sequoia, 
creating a new way of bargaining with leading 
Resource 
diversification 
Modularised venture creation processes to 




Tesla Battery factory in Thailand, sourcing 
components from major European car makers 
X.com established by Musk created the first 
online banking in collaboration with Barclays 
and FDIC 
Developed battery management system, the 
core of Tesla 
Resource 
diversification 
Modularised industries to leverage division of 
labour and specialise. 
Musk helped built connections with major VCs 
such as Draper, VantagePoint and Larry Page 
as individual investors 
Resource 
diversification 
Weak tie formation in previous start-up 
experiences and strong tie formation in 
subsequent new venture creation activity 
Demonstration in the Pebble Beach Concours 
d’Elegance car demonstration 
N/A N/A 
Daimler started to purchase battery systems 
from Tesla 
N/A N/A 
Huawei Successfully released H08 
Launch of CDMA 1X marked that Huawei had 
gained equal capability as international brands 
in telecommunications equipment 
Resource 
diversification 
Modularised industry to leverage manufacturing 
capabilities 
Connected to China Merchants after Premier’s 
visits following success of H08 
Resource 
diversification 
Indirect support from central government as 
Premier’s political impacts on state-owned 
banks: moderate institutional environment 
Following the reform of share-holding 
companies in China, Huawei started to 
distribute shares to its employees 
Resource 
diversification 
Moderate institutional environment and 
appropriability regimes – reformation of share-
holding-related laws in China opening new ways 
of distributing shares to employees. 
Open up rural market for telephone switching 
systems 
Won contract from Shenzhen China Unicom 
and Shenzhen Post Office  
N/A N/A 
Tencent Ma developed a unique sense of product design 
during his work in RunXun and management of 
FidoNet 
QICQ was developed, first customised instant 




Attending the high-tech fair held in Shenzhen 
and attracted attention from the newly rising 
VCs in China 
Resource 
diversification 
Weak tie formation in technology fairs, strong 
tie transformation from weak ties 
Won first order from Shenzhen 
telecommunications through one of the co-
founders’ personal linkages 
Started collaboration with China Unicom 
Shenzhen 
N/A N/A 
DJI DJI’s core technology flight control system was 
developed 




Modularised industries to leverage specialised 
components providers and manufacturing 
capabilities while specialising in software 
Nanshan government provided support N/A N/A 
From Table 6-3, it can be seen that resource exploitation behaviours in the individual 
entrepreneurial process could contribute to the resource diversification in entrepreneurial 
ecosystems. These involve resources such as technologies, new business models and practices, 
as well as new organisational forms and intermediaries. For example, when Fairchild’s co-
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founders were seeking investments for their processor technologies, a new investment model 
for start-ups was born; that is, entrepreneurs could exchange their technologies for shares in 
the companies they set up, with external investment from individuals and institutions. 
Subsequently, financial institutions that focused exclusively on venture investment, which are 
known as venture capitalists, emerged in Silicon Valley and spread to the rest of the world. In 
Shenzhen, following the reform of shareholder laws and financial regulations, Huawei started 
to distribute shares to its employees and also encourage them to purchase the company’s 
internal stock rights. This practice not only enhanced the morale of Huawei’s employees, but 
also collected sufficient funding for Huawei to further invest in R&D in order to capture the 
telecommunications equipment market. Although it is not new for Silicon Valley companies, 
this practice was imitated by many subsequent start-ups in Shenzhen, which has helped local 
start-ups to attract the best talents. As is shown in Chapter 5, these resources are not only novel 
for the entrepreneurial ecosystems; they also serve as disruptive resources that alter the method 
of new venture creation and often resolve bottlenecks in the new venture creation process. In 
this sense, the following proposition can be derived: 
P2a: The extent of resource exploitation behaviours in individual entrepreneurial 
processes will increase the extent of resource diversification in entrepreneurial 
ecosystems. 
Although, collectively, resource exploitation behaviours can increase the level of resource 
diversification in entrepreneurial ecosystems, there are conditions to facilitate such linkages. It 
is found that the conditions for resource diversification, which are formation of weak social 
ties, transformation from weak ties to strong ties, modularised industries and new venture 
creation process, as well as moderate institutional environment and appropriability regimes, as 
we have shown in Chapter 5, serve as moderators for the relationships between resource 
exploitation behaviours in the individual level and the resource diversification in the ecosystem 
level. Despite the fact that resource exploitation behaviours can take place anytime when 
entrepreneurs utilise the resources they have acquired from the ecosystem, as is seen in Table 
6-3, not all of them lead to the creation of novel resources. In other words, these key moderators 
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have precipitated the ecosystem-level resource diversification resulting from resource 
exploitation in individual entrepreneurial processes.  
For example, before Apple released its first personal computer, Jobs and Wozniak had joined 
the Homebrew Club, a local electronics technology club. In this club, Apple’s two co-founders 
for the first time demonstrated their prototypes and received considerable attention. During 
their social and technology demonstration activities, weak social ties were formed. In fact, not 
long after their first demonstration, a local computer seller approached them and ordered the 
first batch of Apple’s computers. Additionally, when Apple was designing its second-
generation personal computer, Apple II, many of the then engineers and designers were 
recruited from the club, as a result of the transformation from weak ties to strong ties. These 
two conditions enabled Apple to deliver its earliest technologies in personal computers. As 
another example, when Tencent demonstrated its software for the first time in the high-tech fair 
organised in Shenzhen by the government, they got the opportunity to pitch their products and 
visions to many investors at the fair, which ultimately led to the first venture capital investment 
in the company. This investment enabled QICQ to be upgraded into the completely localised 
QQ, which dominated the Chinese market soon afterwards.  
Modularised industries and new venture creation process can also catalyse the linkage between 
resource exploitation and resource diversification. For example, by leveraging Shenzhen’s 
specialised players in manufacturing, electronic components and prototyping, DJI’s founding 
team was able to focus exclusively in its early days on developing its drone flight control 
system, which has become the core technology held by the company. A modularised venture 
creation process may also facilitate resource diversification in the ecosystems through resource 
exploitation by start-ups. For example, Google successfully leveraged the dynamics between 
multiple investors in different stages of its entrepreneurial process and secured favourable deals 
in venture investments in the early stage, as well as in the later stage up until its initial public 
offering. 
Moderate institutional environment and appropriability regimes could also positively influence 
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the linkage between resource exploitation by start-ups and resource diversification in the 
ecosystems. For example, Apple was able to conceive the idea of a graphical user interface and 
finally integrate it into Apple computers because of Xerox’s generous opening of their labs to 
Apple employees. The shared mind-sets and resultant moderate appropriability regimes helped 
the resource exploitation behaviours (leveraging social network of their investors) of Apple 
turn into the creation of novel technological resources. Another example is Huawei’s 
aforementioned novel practices of distributing its shares to key employees. This was enabled 
by the reform of shareholder regulations in China, as characterised by the moderate institutional 
environment, which is reasonably relaxed for companies to adopt flexible and often 
revolutionary practices.  
Hence, the following proposition can be derived: 
P2b: Formation of weak social ties, transformation from weak ties to strong ties, 
modularised industries and new venture creation processes, as well as moderate 
institutional environment and appropriability regimes, will strengthen the relationship 
between resource exploitation behaviours in individual entrepreneurial process and 
resource diversification in entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
6.4 Resource feedback and implications for ecosystem resources 
This section zooms into the resource feedback activities illustrated in Table 6-1 and highlights 
their implications for ecosystem resources, as well as the main activity enablers as evidenced 
in the cases, which are compiled in Table 6-4. 
Table 6–4 Resource feedback and implications for ecosystem resources 




Activity enablers (evidence from 
cases) 
Fairchild The first generation of silicon production was 
replaced by planar process by most 
semiconductors companies in the industry 
Resource exit Market selection: facilitating technology 
substitution 
Traitors Eight as well as the other early 
employees left Fairchild and entered different 
Resource 
recycling 




areas for new venture creations 




Open-minded and entrepreneurial culture; 
industrial infrastructure building up 
First spin-off, Rheem, from Fairchild 
Amelco was founded by three of the Traitors 
Eight 





open-minded and entrepreneurial culture; 
formation of weak social ties in companies, 
transformation to strong ties when new 
opportunities/technologies emerged in the 
semiconductor industry; leveraging 
modularised industries to specialise in 
different sub-sectors. 
Intel 1103 DRAM adopted by most PC companies Resource exit Market selection: facilitating technology 
substitution 
Distributing shares to employees, imitated by 
other SV companies 
KPCB founded by Kleiner 





N/A; supportive private capital market; 
entrepreneurial culture 
Apple The GUI and mouse style replaced IBM’s 
traditional PC with command lines, etc. 
Resource exit Market selection: facilitating technology 
substitution 




Supportive private capital market; 
entrepreneurial culture 
Google PageRank beat the traditional Yahoo! etc.’s 
simple linkages between webpages as the 
industry standard 
Auction-based advertising invented by Google 
and became standard for future search engines  
Resource exit Market selection: facilitating technology 
substitution 
Several early members of the team left for further 
new venture creations 
Resource 
recycling 
Entrepreneurial mind-sets; supportive private 
capital market 
Brian Lent, one of the early members, established 
Medio Systems after leaving the project 
Resource 
recycling 
Supportive private capital market; 
entrepreneurial culture 
An unconventional way of IPO, open to all 
investors, employing a local investment bank, 
against the traditional Wall Street approach 
Resource 
diversification 
Modularised venture creation process; 
leveraging dynamics and competitions 
between investment banks 
Tesla Model S served as the model for pure electric 
cars and competed with hybrid and traditional 
vehicles 
Resource exit Market selection: facilitating techno-industrial 
substitution 
A few key employees such as Eberhardt and 
Tarpenning left the company as the Roadster 




Huawei Ex-Huawei employees joining other start-ups and 
helping their success, such as Tencent 
Resource 
recycling 
Supportive public/private capital market; 
entrepreneurial culture 
Ex-Huawei employees set up Huawei club to 
connect all previous Huawei employees 
Resource 
diversification 
Creation of new intermediary organisations, 
facilitated by moderate institutional 
environment in Shenzhen and formation of 
weak social ties in Huawei 
Huawei began to encourage senior employees to 
start their own companies to commercialise 
technologies developed in the company both 
upstream and downstream of Huawei’s 
businesses to complement its core products 
Resource 
diversification 
Moderate appropriability regimes, Huawei 
willing to trade off for technologies in order to 
control value chains; modularised industries to 
create opportunities for specialisation 
Huawei’s early employees served as the first 
individual investors in Shenzhen 
Resource 
recycling 
Entrepreneurial culture and mind-sets; 
supportive private capital market 
Ren suggested to the Chinese government that it 




New policy initiatives proposed by 
entrepreneurs; moderate institutional 
environment 
Tencent QQ instant messaging severely affected the short 
message service on the mobile phones from state-
owned mobile operators, forcing them to 




cooperate with companies like Tencent 




Entrepreneurial mind-sets; supportive private 
capital market 
VC industry rose in China thanks to some of the 
initial success funded by VCs such as Tencent 
Resource 
diversification 
Moderate institutional environment: reform of 
shareholder regulations and allowing private 
capital to invest in new ventures 
Tencent supported further new venture creation 




Entrepreneurial mind-sets; supportive private 
capital market 
Shanzhai-era component suppliers and 
manufacturing service providers declined but 




Highly re-combinative industry architecture; 
Industrial infrastructure retaining upstream 
suppliers and downstream OEMs 
DJI Some of the early founders left and joined other 




The other three co-founders left and established 
their own companies in different areas of flight 
control and drones 
Resource 
recycling 
Entrepreneurial mind-sets; supportive private 
capital market 
Sponsored Robotics contest every year to attract 
robotics talents 
Established Songshanhu Robotics Industrial Park 
as an incubator to nurture more robotics start-ups 
Resource 
diversification 
New intermediary organisations and activities 
for weak tie formation and strong tie 
transformation, leading to diversification of 
resources 
From Table 6-4, it can be seen that resource feedback behaviours in the individual 
entrepreneurial process could contribute to the resource recycling, exit and diversification in 
entrepreneurial ecosystems. These mainly involve production and technological resources, 
organisational resources such as new business practices, and intermediary resources. For 
example, Intel’s spin-off from Fairchild is a resource feedback activity which leads to resource 
recycling in the ecosystem, as many former Fairchild engineers and developers joined Intel, 
including two of the Fairchild co-founders. Huawei’s resource feedback activities towards the 
end of its entrepreneurial process include setting up a Huawei ex-employee club in support of 
their new venture creations. The birth of this club created a new species in the ecosystem and 
therefore diversified the ecosystem resources. Resource exit brought about by resource 
feedback activities is also salient in the cases. Fairchild’s planar manufacturing process 
substituted the traditional production method of silicon-based processors. Similarly, Apple’s 
graphical user interface also proved its superiority in the market. The legacies left by these 
companies at the end of their entrepreneurial processes contributed to the exit of obsolete 
resources in the ecosystems. In this sense, the following proposition can be derived: 
P3a: The extent of resource feedback behaviours in individual entrepreneurial 




Although, collectively, resource feedback behaviours can increase the level of resource 
recycling, exit and diversification in entrepreneurial ecosystems, there are conditions to 
facilitate such linkages. It is found that the conditions for resource recycling, exit and 
diversification, as is shown in Chapter 5, serve as moderators for the relationships between 
resource feedback behaviours in the individual level and the resource dynamisms in the 
ecosystem level. Despite the fact that resource feedback behaviours can take place anytime 
when start-ups release the resources they have acquired from the ecosystems due to their exit 
from the market for various reasons, as can be seen in Table 6-4, not all of them lead to resource 
dynamisms in the ecosystems. In other words, these moderators have precipitated the 
ecosystem-level resource dynamisms resulting from the resource feedback in individual 
entrepreneurial processes. 
Similar to P2b, the four conditions also serve as moderators for the relationship between 
resource feedback activities in individual entrepreneurial processes and resource 
diversification in the ecosystems. For example, spin-offs of Fairchild resulted from identifying 
new opportunities in the semiconductor industries. This was enabled by the weak tie formation 
in Fairchild as most of the co-founders of these spin-offs were previous employed by Fairchild. 
By transforming the weak ties into strong ties, new ventures were created such as Rheem, AMD 
and Amelco. The modularised semiconductor industry also provided an opportunity for start-
ups to identify niche positions and specialise. As another example, moderate institutional 
environment and appropriability regimes also enabled the resource diversification through 
Huawei’s feedback to ecosystem resources such as new policy initiatives to promote local 
telecommunications companies and the ex-Huawei employee club in support of their start-ups. 
Hence, the following proposition can be derived: 
P3b: Formation of weak social ties, transformation from weak ties to strong ties, 
modularised industries and new venture creation process, as well as moderate 
institutional environment and appropriability regimes, will strengthen the relationship 
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between resource feedback behaviours in individual entrepreneurial processes and 
resource diversification in entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
It is also found that the two conditions – facilitating techno-industrial substitution and highly 
re-combinative industrial architecture – also serve as moderators in the linkage between 
resource feedback and resource exit in ecosystems. For example, due to Shenzhen’s highly re-
combinative industry architecture, indicated by its high embeddedness in the local and global 
value chains, the exit of some of the Shanzhai manufacturers from Shenzhen’s ecosystem 
created spaces for the resilient ones to upgrade and serve incoming start-ups including DJI, 
who leveraged some of the Shanzhai suppliers extensively in the early days of product 
development. In terms of facilitating techno-industrial substitution, although Silicon Valley 
companies successfully developed technologies that prevailed in the market and facilitated the 
exit of obsolete technologies, the Shenzhen government proactively supported start-ups like 
DJI to help the upgrade and exit of obsolete and inefficient companies and industries, 
facilitating the techno-industrial substitutions. From the cases, it can be seen that the two 
conditions amplified the feedback impacts from the individual entrepreneurial process to the 
ecosystem resource exit. Hence, the following proposition can be derived: 
P3c. Facilitating techno-industrial substitution and highly re-combinative industrial 
architecture will strengthen the relationship between resource exploitation behaviours 
in individual entrepreneurial processes and resource exit in entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
Similar to P1b, the three conditions of resource recycling moderate the relationships between 
resource feedback in individual entrepreneurial processes and resource recycling in ecosystems. 
For example, the recycling of co-founders and employees from previous companies like 
Fairchild and Huawei helped later start-ups to grow their businesses, driven by entrepreneurial 
mind-sets aspiring to join or create start-ups rather than established companies, as well as 
supportive public or private capital markets that ensured the finances of these start-ups. 
Attractive living conditions and infrastructure are also critical in ensuring that, when start-ups 
perform resource feedback, the talents as well as the knowledge and financial resources 
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embedded with them do not flow to other ecosystems, and instead choose to recycle in the 
ecosystems. Hence, the following proposition can be derived: 
P3d. Attractive living conditions and infrastructure, open-minded and eclectic culture, 
and supportive public/private capital market will strengthen the relationship between 
resource feedback behaviours in individual entrepreneurial processes and resource 
recycling in entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
With the first three sets of propositions, the resource dynamisms are illustrated in Figure 6-1 
to summarise the findings in terms of individual-level resource dynamisms and ecosystem-
level resource dynamisms. 
 
Figure 6–1 Resource dynamisms in entrepreneurial ecosystems 
6.5 Resource dynamisms and ecosystem maturity 





Intermediary organisations (government, 
incubators, venture capitalists, service 
providers, universities etc.)
Start-ups
New resources (new 
technologies, new business 
models and practices, new 
organisational forms)
Focal EE Other EE
Resource feedback by start-ups
Resource exit in ecosystems
Resource flow
Resource feedback by start-ups
Resource recycling in ecosystems
Resource acquisition by start-ups
Resource replenishment in ecosystems Resource feedback by start-ups
Resource diversification in ecosystems
Resource acquisition by start-ups
Resource recycling in ecosystems
Resource exploitation by start-ups
Resource diversification in ecosystems
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as the ecosystems grow from early stage to mature stage. As can be seen from tables 6-1, 6-3 
and 6-4, a general pattern for resource diversification and exit emerges; that is, as the 
ecosystems become mature, the extent of resource diversification and resource exit becomes 
less intensive. The fading effect is not surprising because, as the ecosystems become more 
mature, the resource pools tend to become consolidated and standardised, leaving less room 
for the diversification of resources and the resource exit coupled with it. The extent of creation 
of new technologies and substitution of obsolete technologies may not be affected by the 
growing ecosystem, but it is especially true for organisational resources such as novel 
organisational forms and business practices related to new venture creations, because the 
process of new venture creation gets more and more sharpened and comprehensive as the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem grows. Hence, the following proposition can be derived: 
P4a. For a healthy entrepreneurial ecosystem, the extent of resource diversification and 
resource exit will be lower when the ecosystem becomes more mature. 
As is seen from the tables, however, there exists a reverse pattern for resource replenishment 
and recycling in ecosystems. That is, when an ecosystem becomes more mature, the extent of 
resource replenishment and recycling in that ecosystem becomes more intensive. This 
conforms with one’s intuition and the reasons are twofold. On the one hand, at the mature stage, 
as the types of resources are becoming consolidated and standardised, the ecosystem therefore 
becomes more stable and slightly slows down its pace in terms of the diversification and exit 
of resources. On the other hand, as the ecosystem becomes more mature, the increased number 
of start-ups and new venture creation activities inevitably boost the intensity of resource-
leveraging behaviours of start-ups within the ecosystem, in particular resource acquisition and 
feedback activities of individual start-ups, which will collectively lead to a higher level of 
resource replenishment from outside of the ecosystem and resource recycling within ecosystem. 
Hence, the following proposition can be derived: 
P4b. For a healthy entrepreneurial ecosystem, the extent of resource replenishment and 




This chapter serves to answer the second sub research question ‘How do individual 
entrepreneurial activities contribute to collective entrepreneurial ecosystem health’, by 
identifying the underlying relationships between individual level resource accessing 
behaviours and the ecosystem level resource dynamisms. All four sets of propositions are 
summarised in Figure 6-2.  
With these propositions, this dissertation not only establishes linkages between individual 
entrepreneurial behaviours of resource accessing and the aggregated resource dynamisms of 
the whole ecosystems, but also reveals how resource dynamisms change over time with the 
evolution of entrepreneurial ecosystems. These propositions also provide future research 
opportunities in theory testing.  
 
Figure 6–2 Summary of propositions for resource dynamisms 
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7. An Integrative Process Model: How a Healthy 
Entrepreneurial Ecosystem Facilitates New 
Venture Creation 
[T]alk about ecosystem processes – the mechanisms through which start-ups 
and scale-ups gain a competitive edge from their regional environments – as 
well as ecosystems as processes: the ways in which ecosystems are reproduced 
and transformed over time. Spigel and Harrison (2018, p.158) 
7.1 Introduction 
To this end, the key dimensions for entrepreneurial ecosystem health, and the relationships 
between resource-accessing behaviours in individual entrepreneurial processes and ecosystem 
resource dynamisms have been revealed. Based on previous findings, this chapter offers an 
integrative model describing how a healthy entrepreneurial ecosystem durably facilitates new 
venture creation, as is illustrated in Figure 7-1, in attempt to answering the third sub research 
question ‘How does a healthy entrepreneurial ecosystem facilitate new venture creation’. 
This model is comprised of two components - transformation processes and feedback impacts. 
In the transformation processes, the ecosystem resources are utilised by start-ups through 
resource acquisition, resource exploitation and resource feedback in their entrepreneurial 
processes. Upon completion of new venture creations, the transformation processes will have 
feedback impacts on regional resources. Such feedback impacts are realised through ecosystem 
robustness and adaptation that are strengthened in the transformation processes, as ecosystem 
resources are replenished, recycled, exited and diversified due to the aggregated outcomes of 
resource-accessing behaviours in individual entrepreneurial processes. These resource 
dynamisms are enabled by conditions illustrated in Figure 7-1 and demonstrated in chapters 5 
and 6. The feedback impacts on the ecosystem resources will prepare the ecosystem for the 
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next round of new venture creation. In this sense, the transformation processes and feedback 
impacts together form a closed loop, revealing how a healthy entrepreneurial ecosystem can 
sustain new venture creation even upon external disruption. With this model, a formal 
definition of entrepreneurial ecosystem health from an entrepreneurial process (dynamic) 
perspective is provided to end this chapter.  
7.2 Transformation processes: new venture creation with 
ecosystem resources 
The first part of the model involves the transformation processes of regional entrepreneurial 
ecosystem resources into new ventures, through the individual entrepreneurial processes. In 
the transformation processes, ecosystem resources are exploited by entrepreneurs to create new 
ventures. Collectively, this contributes to the ecosystem performance of new venture creation. 
Specifically, as is shown in Chapter 5, supply-side resources including human capital and 
financial resources are acquired in the opportunity and organisational creation stages. The 
resource acquisition is often coupled with resource exploitation of ex ante or ex post 
intermediary resources such as social capitals, especially in searching for co-founders and 
sourcing financial support from friends and family. Resource exploitation is also evident in the 
organisational creation and technology set-up stages when entrepreneurs utilise the supply-side 
and intermediary resources to develop other core assets, such as key technologies and business 
models, settling legal and accounting issues. Similarly, resource exploitation is coupled with 
resource acquisition. For example, as the start-up grows, intermediary resources such as social 
networks can grow and potentially bring the company more opportunities in investment and 
talent acquisition. In the market exchange stage, start-ups could tap into local markets and 
demand-side resources, while continuing to exploit supply-side resources such as production, 
financial, and intermediary resources. Certainly, many start-ups nowadays are born global, 
serving the international market upon creation. In this case, they may still exploit the ecosystem 
resources as other local organisations may possess the knowledge and capabilities required for 
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When market entry is successful, the start-up could either fail or succeed in the subsequent 
market competition. Regardless of the outcomes of the new venture creation – be it failure, or 
acquisition by multinationals, or fortunately reaching the IPO – the start-up will release the 
resources acquired and also generated by itself through exploiting ecosystem resources, upon 
completion of the new venture creation processes. For example, employees or co-founders 
could again start new companies or join other companies, bringing their technologies, tacit 
knowledge, or organisational forms and routines into other companies in the ecosystem.  
Collectively, the transformation processes create new ventures in the entrepreneurial 
ecosystems by tapping into various ecosystem resources. As is shown in Chapter 6, the 
individual entrepreneurial behaviours of resource acquisition, resource exploitation and 
resource feedback will have feedback impacts for ecosystem resources. In other words, the 
transformation processes will collectively yield feedback impacts on ecosystem resources, 
which ultimately forms a closed loop and facilitates the next round of new venture creation 
processes in the ecosystem. 
7.3 Feedback impacts on ecosystem resources from regional 
entrepreneurship 
The feedback impacts on ecosystem resources from the transformation processes result from 
four underlying resource dynamisms, namely resource replenishment, resource recycling, 
resource diversification and resource exit, as is shown in chapters 5 and 6.  
Resource replenishment enables the key supply-side resources such as human resources and 
financial resources to be continuously attracted from outside of an ecosystem. These resources 
can be from other competing entrepreneurial ecosystems in the same country, or even from 
outside of the home country. As is shown in chapters 5 and 6, resource replenishment often has 
network effects: the more talents and financial capital agglomerate, the more intensified the 
entrepreneurial activities will be in the ecosystem, and vice versa. From the evidence on the 
entrepreneurial processes of key companies in different stages in both Shenzhen and Silicon 
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Valley, resource replenishment in the macro entrepreneurial ecosystem level results from 
resource acquisition in the micro individual entrepreneurial process level. This is because, as 
entrepreneurs acquire resources, they do not only acquire them from within the ecosystem. 
Rather, they often bring talents and investments from outside of the ecosystem. Once these 
resources enter the focal ecosystem, resource replenishment is fulfilled. 
However, resources being attracted to the focal entrepreneurial ecosystem can theoretically 
flow to other ecosystems if the focal ecosystem cannot retain them or when other competing 
ecosystems are more attractive. Resource recycling, in this sense, serves as the second resource 
dynamism to ensure that the financial and human resources can recycle in the focal ecosystem 
to continuously create new ventures (see also Spigel and Harrison, 2017). As is pointed out in 
Chapter 5, this does not mean locking in these resources in the ecosystem. Rather, well-
functioning resource dynamisms could ensure that the net resource flow is positive towards the 
focal ecosystem. Again, from our evidence in Shenzhen and Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurial 
processes of key companies in different stages, resource recycling in the macro entrepreneurial 
ecosystem level results from resource acquisition and resource feedback in the micro individual 
entrepreneurial process level. This is because, when entrepreneurs acquire resources during 
their opportunity and organisational creation stages, they may well utilise the ex-ante 
ecosystem resources such as serial entrepreneurs and individual investors who were once 
successful entrepreneurs themselves. Similarly, when the new venture creation is near 
completion, the resources acquired and created by the new venture will be released into the 
ecosystem and provide further opportunities for other new ventures to utilise and exploit again. 
The extent of resource replenishment and recycling is contingent on three enabling conditions 
– attractive living conditions and infrastructure, open-minded and eclectic culture, and 
supportive private and public capital markets, as is explained in chapters 5 and 6. Together, 
resource replenishment and recycling increase the ecosystem robustness. This is because these 
two mechanisms attract and retain key supply-side resources to keep the ecosystem functioning. 
They do not create anything new but provide sufficient elements for the ecosystem to sustain 
its current status and performance in new venture creation, without drifting away to potential 
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failure. However, this is true only in the absence of external disruptions, which could be major 
technological change resulting in paradigm shifts or financial crisis that reduced market 
demand significantly for particular segments. 
When the ecosystem faces external disruptions, there are not enough new resources in its 
existing resource pool13 to adapt to the new environment. For example, adoption of new 
technologies is needed when the existing industries are being disrupted; new organisational 
forms such as venture capitalists and incubators are essential to scale-up start-ups when they 
are vulnerable in the turbulent market. In these circumstances, resource diversification could 
create new resources for the ecosystem. These new resources can be supply-side resources such 
as new technologies and intermediary resources such as emergence of new organisational 
forms, new business models and practices. From the evidence on the entrepreneurial processes 
of Shenzhen and Silicon Valley’s key companies in different stages, resource diversification in 
the macro entrepreneurial ecosystem level results from resource exploitation and feedback in 
the micro individual entrepreneurial process level. This is because new resources could be 
created when entrepreneurs exploit existing resources, for example, developing new 
technologies with the co-founders and employees. New resources could also be created at the 
end of the new venture creation process, when entrepreneurs and start-ups release their 
resources back into the ecosystem and these are further diffused into other organisations in the 
ecosystem, including commercialising new technologies as a spin-off and establishing 
organisations with new business models after their successful venture creation. The extent of 
resource diversification is contingent on four enabling conditions, formation of weak social 
ties, transformation from weak ties to strong ties, modularised industries and new venture 
creation processes, as well as moderate institutional environment and appropriability regimes.  
However, resource diversification only ensures the creation of new resources, but cannot 
guarantee the embeddedness of the new resources in the ecosystem – there needs to be enough 
                                               
13 One could also relate the ‘resource pool’ concept in this dissertation to ‘untraded interdependency’ (Storper, 1995) 
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space for the new resources to come into existence. In other words, it is essential for obsolete 
resources to exit the ecosystem in order to make way for resource diversification. Therefore, 
resource exit serves as the final resource dynamism to facilitate the withdrawal of obsolete or 
inefficient resources. Similar to resource diversification, resource exit could include 
substitution of existing technologies and decline of obsolete industries. From our evidence on 
the entrepreneurial processes of Shenzhen and Silicon Valley’s key companies in different 
stages, resource exit in the macro entrepreneurial ecosystem level results from resource 
feedback in the micro individual entrepreneurial process level, as resource exit is often coupled 
with the results of successful new venture creations such as the commercialisation of new 
technologies and new business models. In other words, resource exit can be considered as one 
of the outcomes brought by the resource feedback at the end of the individual entrepreneurial 
process. The extent of resource exit is contingent on two enabling conditions – highly re-
combinative industry architecture facilitating techno-industrial substitutions. 
Together, resource diversification and exit could increase the ecosystem adaptation, because 
they create and make space correspondingly for new resources that are required for the 
ecosystem to cope with the turbulence and disruptions often brought by new technologies and 
macro-economic incidents. With the new resources, the ecosystem will be able to adapt to the 
next possible status that reconciles with the disruptive events. In the meantime, it is also critical 
for obsolete supply-side and intermediary resources to exit the ecosystem in a timely manner, 
in order to create more space for the aforementioned new resources to emerge. 
7.4 Defining entrepreneurial ecosystem health: a dynamic view 
The process model offers new insights into the evolution of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, in 
particular how the ecosystem continuously creates new ventures with the evolving resource 
pool. It is argued that such a changing resource pool is the outcome of the new venture creation 
activities in the ecosystem. With the dimensions of entrepreneurial ecosystem health and their 
internal linkages reflected by the process model, entrepreneurial ecosystem health can now be 
formally defined as follows: 
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Definition of Entrepreneurial Ecosystem Health: Entrepreneurial ecosystem health 
consists of six dimensions, namely ecosystem resources, entrepreneurial process, 
ecosystem performance, ecosystem robustness and ecosystem adaptation, as well as 
enabling conditions for resource dynamisms. It divulges the currentperformance of 
new venture creation in the entrepreneurial ecosystem and the expectation of sustaining 
or growing its ability to continuously create new ventures. 
The definition reflects both the static and dynamic parts of research findings on entrepreneurial 
ecosystem health. The static part – ecosystem resources and ecosystem performance – 
represents the traditional linear dimensions in assessing regional entrepreneurship. The 
dynamic part – entrepreneurial process, ecosystem robustness and adaptation as well as the 
enabling conditions for resource dynamisms – takes the evolving nature of entrepreneurial 
ecosystems and individual entrepreneurial processes into consideration and demonstrates how 
these dynamics affect the new venture creation activities. In this sense, the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem health framework seeks to capture the dynamics along the full cycle of new venture 
creation process in the entrepreneurial ecosystems. This is akin to observing the motion status 
of a moving object in Newtonian mechanics, where both velocity and acceleration need to be 
considered, as velocity represents the current status of motion in terms of magnitude and 
direction (as a vector), and acceleration represents the expected status of motion in terms of 
magnitude and direction in the future. It is argued that, the definition of entrepreneurial 
ecosystem health proposed in this research indicates not only how ecosystems perform now in 
terms of new venture creation, but also how well they could be in the future. 
7.5 Summary 
This chapter explicates a process model to answer the third sub research question ‘How does a 
healthy entrepreneurial ecosystem facilitate new venture creation’. The process model presents 
a closed loop that details how a healthy entrepreneurial ecosystem could durably facilitate new 
venture creation even upon external disruption. A formal definition of entrepreneurial 





Based on the research findings presented in previous chapters, Chapter 8 attempts to discuss 
the contributions to theory and practice. Research limitations and future opportunities are also 
outlined. 
8.2 Theoretical contributions 
This dissertation contributes to entrepreneurial ecosystem literature with the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem health framework, and regional entrepreneurship literature by shedding light on the 
reciprocity between new venture creation activities and ecosystem resources. The author also 
aspires to bridge the micro entrepreneurial resource acquisition behaviours with the emerging 
ecosystem literature. Finally, a resource-based account of entrepreneurial ecosystems is offered, 
highlighting the significance of supply-side resources, as a complement to the extant demand-
side view of ecosystems. 
8.2.1 Understanding entrepreneurial ecosystem health 
The framework of entrepreneurial ecosystem health proposed in this dissertation differs from 
previous concepts and thus contributes to entrepreneurial ecosystem literature in three ways. 
First, by identifying the dimensions of entrepreneurial ecosystem health, this research advances 
understanding of entrepreneurial ecosystems. As a relatively new domain, although extant 
literature has identified the configurations and key players/components of an entrepreneurial 
ecosystem (Cohen, 2006; Isenberg, 2011; Shi and Shi, 2016; Spigel, 2017; Spilling, 1996), 
research has significantly lagged behind in terms of the competitiveness and performance of 
an entrepreneurial ecosystem. The health of an ecosystem is critical in that it affects the fate of 
all ecosystem actors (Iansiti and Levien, 2004a). The conceptualisation of entrepreneurial 
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ecosystem health is the first attempt and offers opportunities to further advance understanding 
of entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
Second, by offering an entrepreneurial process perspective of understanding ecosystem health, 
this dissertation offers a dynamic framework of ecosystem health, and echoes the call for an 
evolutionary perspective in entrepreneurial ecosystem research (Mack and Mayer, 2015; Spigel, 
2017). Extant literature treats health as a rather static concept, making it confusingly similar to 
related concepts such as determinants of regional entrepreneurship and regional innovation 
systems (Armington and Acs, 2002; Fritsch and Slavtchev, 2011; Tamásy, 2006). However, the 
research findings show that to evaluate an entrepreneurial ecosystem’s health is much more 
than evaluating merely its performance. Due to the dynamic, evolutionary nature of ecosystems 
(Liu and Rong, 2015), the health of entrepreneurial ecosystems goes beyond transient measures 
(snapshots) of performance. It instead includes the future expectation of the ecosystem’s 
development. In other words, the prosperity of a region at a certain point does not necessarily 
indicate that it can still be healthy after some time. On the contrary, it may well decline in the 
future if the ecosystem resilience is not as satisfactory as before. To understand this better, one 
can relate it to evaluating an object’s state of motion in Newtonian mechanics, where both 
transient velocity and acceleration are needed in order to fully capture its motion at this time 
and in the future. Therefore, with an entrepreneurial process perspective, it is argued that the 
health of an entrepreneurial ecosystem is subject to an examination of the whole new venture 
creation process in the ecosystem. 
Thirdly and also relating to the second aspect, traditional literature on performance of clusters, 
regional innovation systems or determinants of regional entrepreneurship tends to address the 
comprehensiveness of regional structures and resources (Eisingerich, Bell, and Tracey, 2010; 
Fritsch and Slavtchev, 2011; Tamásy, 2006). However, it is argued that the health of 
entrepreneurial ecosystems is far beyond the comprehensiveness of resources and structures, 
but is also dependent on the resource dynamisms. In other words, it is not enough to just possess 
the necessary resources and elements to innovate and create new ventures – what is equally 
important is to facilitate the flow of and interactions between these resources, be they new 
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resources or existing resources or obsolete resources. In this sense, the dynamisms are the key 
for the ecosystem to flourish and continuously create new ventures, which also echoes Spigel 
and Harrison (2018) that the resource flow is critical for a well-functioning ecosystem. 
8.2.2 Regional entrepreneurship’s feedback impacts for regional 
structures/context 
This dissertation also contributes to the regional entrepreneurship literature by elaborating on 
the feedback impacts of regional entrepreneurship to regional structures and identifying the 
mechanisms of how regional entrepreneurship could reinforce regional resources/structures. 
In regional entrepreneurship, there is extensive literature discussing how regional resources 
and regional context are positively associated with new venture creation in a region (e.g. 
Audretsch & Fritsch 1994; Georgellis & Wall 2000; Armington & Acs 2002). Extant literature 
also unveils the pivotal role of regional entrepreneurship in regional development (e.g. 
Audretsch & Fritsch 2002; Pike et al. 2007). However, less light is shed on the reciprocity in 
these relationships, in particular, whether regional entrepreneurship impacts on regional 
contexts (Müller, 2016). Examining this interplay is urgent in the sense that these factors co-
evolve over time and traditional unidirectional considerations cannot fully understand the 
dynamics and variations in the entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
The conceptualisation of entrepreneurial ecosystem health has revealed how regional 
entrepreneurship feeds back into regional resources and context. It is argued that new venture 
creation activities will in turn have feedback impacts on regional resource/structure, via 
individual resource acquisition activities in the entrepreneurial processes. The four resource 
dynamisms, being resource replenishment and recycling for existing resources, as well as 
resource diversification for new resources and resource exit for obsolete resources, incurred by 
resource acquisition in new venture creation activities in the ecosystem will contribute to the 
expansion and transformation of ecosystem resources. The resource dynamisms also chime 
with Spigel and Harrison’s (2018) conceptualisation of how resources can flow in the 
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entrepreneurial ecosystems but differ from them in that this research specifically sheds light on 
the antecedents and outcomes of these mechanisms. These mechanisms also entail some of the 
arguments in economic geography such as Myrdal’s circular causation theory (Myrdal, 1957) 
and Arthur’s positive feedback theory (Arthur, 1989). 
8.2.3 Linking (micro) entrepreneurial process with (macro) 
entrepreneurial ecosystems 
The research findings also contribute to bridging the traditional entrepreneurial acquisition 
(Starr and Macmillan, 1990) literature with the burgeoning entrepreneurial ecosystem literature. 
Extant ecosystem literature largely focuses on what the entrepreneurial ecosystem contains and 
how such an ecosystem promotes regional entrepreneurship (Isenberg, 2011; Mason and Brown, 
2014; Spigel, 2017). However, very few studies consider the ecosystem benefits from the 
entrepreneur’s perspective, thus losing a significant part of what an entrepreneurial ecosystem 
is supposed to serve.  
Prior studies in resource acquisition of start-ups highlight the need to facilitate new ventures’ 
resource acquisition behaviours, as – unlike for established firms – these are more important 
than deploying resources (Lichtenstein and Brush, 2001), and new ventures inevitably suffer 
from multiple issues in identifying, attracting and combining resources to create their resource 
platform to yield corresponding capabilities (Brush, Greene, and Hart, 2001) due to liability of 
newness. Further research has identified different approaches in acquiring resources for new 
ventures, such as through storytelling (Martens et al., 2007) and indirect ties (Zhang, Soh, and 
Wong, 2010). Yet, little is known regarding how entrepreneurs access and acquire resources 
from entrepreneurial ecosystems, although extant literature frequently argues that ecosystems 
provide resources to entrepreneurs. 
The research findings offer insights into how entrepreneurs access resources from the 
ecosystems and, more importantly, reveal how their resource acquisition behaviours in turn 
change the resource pool of the entrepreneurial ecosystems. As the first attempt to bridge the 
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two streams of literature, the author also aspires to add to the meaningfulness of entrepreneurial 
ecosystems. 
8.2.4 Towards a resource-based view of entrepreneurial ecosystems 
Extant literature on ecosystems, be it business ecosystems (Moore 1993, 1996; Iansiti & Levien 
2004a, 2004b; Rong & Shi 2014; Liu & Rong 2015; Rong et al. 2015) or innovation ecosystems 
(Adner 2006, 2012; Adner & Kapoor 2010; Adner 2017; Jacobides et al. 2018), has largely 
focused on the demand-side of the ecosystems. It is argued that ecosystems are designed and 
nurtured by focal firms in order to meet customer demand, and follow the inherent structure 
brought by interdependence of technologies. This demand-driven view highlights the necessity 
of identifying, managing and orchestrating complementors in an ecosystem to co-create value 
in an attempt to meet the ever-changing demand of end customers (Jacobides et al., 2018). 
Although entrepreneurial ecosystem literature is starting to appreciate the vitality of location 
as well as the resources embedded within it, extant literature still limits its discussion to the 
intermediary roles – incubators, universities, governments and science parks. Certainly, these 
players are crucial for the development of entrepreneurial ecosystems and new venture creation 
within these ecosystems. However, fundamentally, what drives the development of the local 
entrepreneurial ecosystem is the resource – the supply side that truly facilitates the new venture 
creation with the resource dynamisms of the entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
This is not to say that the demand side is not important. Rather, it is to say that the supply side 
is equally as important as the demand side, if not more so. This is akin to the debate in supply-
side or demand-side economics on which side is more effective when it comes to stimulating 
the economy. The orchestrators of entrepreneurial ecosystems should consider the enabling 
conditions that alter and mobilise ecosystem resources in order to facilitate new venture 
creation in the ecosystem, rather than pursuing the completeness or comprehensiveness of 
resources, or intermediaries. Just building up incubators or purely pouring in money is simply 
not a sustainable model for an entrepreneurial ecosystem to flourish. 
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In this sense, it is argued that entrepreneurial ecosystems are bundles of regional resources. 
Differing from the resource-based view of firms in pursuit of the value, rareness, imitability 
and substitutability of the resource bundling (Barney 1991, 2001), the resource-based view of 
ecosystems, address the importance of resource dynamisms, i.e. replenishment, recycling, 
diversification and exit, within and outside of the ecosystems. In other words, although 
resources are heterogeneously distributed across different regional entrepreneurial ecosystems, 
as in the case of firm resources, the nature of the resources across different ecosystems is 
homogenous and highly mobilised, as these resources are not necessarily geographically 
bounded in the sense that they can flow from one ecosystem to another ecosystem with few 
constraints, unlike firm resources. For example, human and financial resources could flow 
freely to maximise their utilities; organisations could relocate or expand to other geographical 
areas where, for example, costs are lower, or technologies are more accessible. In the traditional 
firm-level resource-based view, resource dynamisms are implicit and to some extent self-
evident, because firms constantly mobilise the resources they possess regardless of the 
effectiveness, and resources and capabilities are not easily transferable from organisation to 
organisation because they are ‘firm-specific’ in nature. This means, unlike the case of firm 
resources, ecosystems that are solely nurturing and/or possessing valuable, rare, non-imitable 
and non-substitutable resources do not automatically obtain competitive advantages over other 
ecosystems; rather, ecosystems that possess well-functioning resource dynamisms will stand 
out. This is because, in the case of entrepreneurial ecosystems, resources are free flowing from 
one ecosystem to another. 
The antecedents of ecosystem resources, however, stem from ecosystem actors’ activities. As 
is shown in chapters 5 and 6, ecosystem resources are created, altered and accumulated during 
individual entrepreneurial processes. From an individual entrepreneur’s perspective, resources 
and capabilities tend to accumulate over time as the entrepreneur engages in the new venture 
creation process (Ucbasaran, Westhead, and Wright, 2001). Therefore, when taking an 
ecosystem perspective, collective accumulation of entrepreneurial resources and capabilities in 
the individual entrepreneurial processes over time gradually constructs a resource pool, which 
contains various resources that can be mobilised and valorised by other new ventures in the 
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region. In this sense, this research also offers insights into the emergence of an entrepreneurial 
ecosystem, which echoes with Thompson et al.’s (2018) work on how Seattle’s entrepreneurial 
ecosystem takes form via the accumulative activities of various actors. 
The outcomes of ecosystem resource-based accounts are also different from those of a firm’s. 
The traditional resource-based view of firms contends that deploying the bundles of resources 
will yield capabilities that could be used by the firms to obtain competitive advantages 
(Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991, 2016). However, unlike the traditional resource-based view of 
firms addressing the need to possess the unique resource bundling in pursuit of competitive 
advantages, the resource-based view of ecosystems addresses the necessity of facilitating 
sufficient resource dynamisms within and outside of the ecosystems in pursuit of ecosystem 
health. To this end, a resource-based account of entrepreneurial ecosystems is provided, with 
its antecedents and outcomes explained, as is illustrated in Figure 8-1. 
 
Figure 8–1 A resource-based account of entrepreneurial ecosystems 
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8.3 Practical implications 
This dissertation has implications for both policy makers and entrepreneurs. 
8.3.1 Policy Implications 
This research has significant policy implications, in terms of ecosystem health assessment and 
the roles governments should play in managing their regions. 
First, regional policymakers could be informed with more insights into how well the 
ecosystems perform in terms of new venture creation. By assessing each dimension of the 
health of entrepreneurial ecosystems, policymakers will be able to issue relevant policies to 
support the regions’ overall prosperity. In this way, the government bodies can promote 
coordination and cooperation among all stakeholders within the ecosystems in order to 
maximise the economic return and societal utilities.  
Second, policymakers would also be able to pursue specific dimensions and targets as per the 
developmental stages of their regions, based on the result of health assessment. For example, 
for resource-scarce regions, policy makers could put more emphasis on attracting resources 
(financial and human capital) from outside of the ecosystems; for resource-munificent regions, 
the focus could be on how to retain and recycle current resources within the ecosystems, and 
in particular, how to create new resources with the current resource bases. In general, regional 
governments should take into account the endowment of their regions – it is much more 
important for an entrepreneurial ecosystem to have one or some particularly strong dimensions 
than one with average ratings on all dimensions because strong dimensions could serve as a 
good starting point to lead the ecosystem into a virtuous cycle. 
Third, with the enabling conditions for facilitating resource dynamisms within the ecosystems, 
a highlight of this dissertation for policymakers is about resource (re-)configurations in the 
ecosystems. Questions that still remain among policymakers such as “do I get a Silicon Valley 
by putting the same resources in my city?” show that considerable misunderstanding persists 
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on the de facto determinants of ecosystem health. As a rule of thumb, simply pouring resources 
into the ecosystems do not necessarily work, which ties back to the concerns over some of the 
initiatives regarding entrepreneurship in China in particular – government bodies tend to put 
efforts into creating an ecosystem with all kinds of resources. Instead, according to the research 
findings, facilitating the resource dynamisms within and outside of the ecosystems is the utmost 
important factor in determining the prosperity of the ecosystems. In this sense, government 
bodies should steer their policy directions to the enabling conditions demonstrated in the 
research findings, such as facilitating weak tie formation and strong tie transformation. In this 
way, they act as facilitators, rather than orchestrators. 
8.3.2 Implications for entrepreneurs 
First, for entrepreneurs who are considering where to locate their start-up, this research 
provides a framework for them to assess the health of the entrepreneurial ecosystems in which 
they are considering starting their business.  
Second, this research sheds light on how individual entrepreneurs access resources from the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems as well as the impacts of such resource-accessing behaviours, thus 
informing entrepreneurs about what resources they can expect from the local entrepreneurial 
ecosystems at different stages of their venture creation processes and how to access these 
resources.  
Third, this dissertation brings individual entrepreneurs the ‘ecosystem’ perspective to consider 
their personal success and failure in the wider context and inform them that short-term failure 
could result in resource feedback to the ecosystem in which they are embedded, which could 
potentially help them launch successful businesses in their future endeavours. This provides a 
rational explanation for serial entrepreneurs. 
8.4 Research limitations 
Besides the contributions, this research has the following limitations.  
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First, although the nature of case studies offers opportunities to reveal insights for 
entrepreneurial ecosystem health and resource dynamisms, generalisability problems exist. 
While the author is intended to make every effort to claim a generalisable framework, as the 
data focuses primarily on ICT industry in Shenzhen and Silicon Valley, limitations in 
generalisability may exist because industrial, regional, and country-level heterogeneities could 
influence the current results.  
Second, the author is aware that the cases are successful entrepreneurial ecosystems. Although 
this research is focused on revealing the successful factors and dimensions of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems, lack of failed cases limits the explanatory power of the current 
framework. 
Finally, employing a qualitative approach only yields key dimensions of the framework but it 
is still far from operationalisation. The author is aware that large scale quantitative method 
could be a complementary approach to enrich and operationalise the framework, which could 
be used when developing the tool for assessing entrepreneurial ecosystem health. 
8.5 Future research 
Based on previous discussions and research limitations, future research could focus on the 
following aspects: 
 A comparison study could be made on the basis of current findings for Shenzhen and 
Silicon Valley. Such a comparison study may yield more insights in the way 
entrepreneurial ecosystems are organised and governed, under different cultural norms, 
industrial architectures and political regimes.  
 Conducting complementary case studies to enhance the robustness of the current 
framework and potentially generate new insights pertaining to the heterogeneities between 
regions and industries. This could be through either studying different industries such as 
biotech in the same regions, or different regions in other economies such as in Europe. 
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 Exploring ‘failed’ entrepreneurial ecosystems. Further research could look into failed 
ecosystems in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding by particularly 
examining what dimensions are absent in these failing ecosystems. This could provide 
opportunities for cross checking and enriching the health framework. 
 Tool development for assessing entrepreneurial ecosystem health. Future research could 
also focus on developing a health assessment tool for regional entrepreneurial ecosystems, 
which can be readily used by regional policymakers to review their regional development 
and entrepreneurs to decide where to locate their start-ups. 
8.6 Summary 
This chapter highlights the theoretical contributions to entrepreneurial ecosystem, regional 
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial behaviour literature. It also discusses practical 
implications for both policy makers and individual entrepreneurs. Research limitations and 




Although discussions around entrepreneurship and regional development have burgeoned 
among academics, policymakers and industry practitioners, a fundamental question still 
challenges policy makers and industry practitioners: what makes an entrepreneurial region 
stand out among the crowds? On the one hand, regional entrepreneurship literature highlights 
the impacts of regional context and structures on regional entrepreneurship, but fails to reveal 
the reciprocity between them, i.e., how regional entrepreneurship could in turn benefit regional 
context in order to sustain the new venture creation activities over time. On the other hand, 
although entrepreneurial ecosystem literature provides a new perspective to understand 
regional entrepreneurship in context by shedding light on the structures and building blocks of 
an entrepreneurial ecosystem, relatively less is known about what dimensions and factors 
contribute to the performance and competitiveness that signify the ecosystem’s ability to 
continuously create new ventures in the region. Hence, this research asks: how do we unpack 
the health of an entrepreneurial ecosystem? 
Following an inductive approach, a qualitative study on two exemplary entrepreneurial 
ecosystems – Silicon Valley, US, and Shenzhen, China – was conducted. For each ecosystem, 
its evolution over time was revealed first, highlighting critical events and start-ups in different 
lifecycle stages of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Then the entrepreneurial processes of key 
start-ups – Fairchild-Intel, Apple, Google and Tesla in Silicon Valley and Huawei, Tencent and 
DJI in Shenzhen – as well as their interactions with the ecosystems were analysed. The primary 
data is mainly from semi-structured interviews with informants pertinent to different players 
in the ecosystems, as well as employees who are familiar with the entrepreneurial processes of 
the key companies identified. Primary data was complemented and triangulated with secondary 
data mainly from academic papers, archives, online articles from reliable sources, books and 
monographs, as well as biographies of key companies and their founders, etc. 
Findings in relation to research sub-question 1: What are the dimensions for 
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entrepreneurial ecosystem health? 
The research finding shows that entrepreneurial ecosystem health consists of six dimensions: 
 Ecosystem resources (supply-side, intermediary and demand-side resources) 
 Entrepreneurial process (resource acquisition in opportunity and organisational creation 
stages, resource exploitation in organisational creation and technology set-up stages, 
resource feedback in market exchange and exit stages) 
 Ecosystem performance (regional economic impact and regional entrepreneurship 
performance) 
 Ecosystem robustness (resource replenishment and recycling) 
 Ecosystem adaptation (resource diversification and exit) 
 Enabling conditions for resource dynamisms (conditions for resource replenishment and 
recycling, for resource diversification, as well as for resource exit) 
Findings in relation to research sub-question 2: How do individual entrepreneurial 
activities contribute to collective entrepreneurial ecosystem health? 
This dissertation also sheds light on how resource acquisition, exploitation and feedback in 
individual entrepreneurial processes contribute to the resource dynamisms in entrepreneurial 
ecosystems, and how these relationships are enabled by the three sets of conditions detailed in 
chapter 5 and 6. A summary of these propositions is provided in Figure 6-2. 
Findings in relation to research sub-question 3: How does a healthy entrepreneurial 
ecosystem facilitate new venture creation? 
With the dimensions of ecosystem health and resource dynamisms, an integrated process model 
revealing how a healthy entrepreneurial ecosystem continuously creates new ventures is 
provided, illustrated in Figure 7-1. It is argued that, with an entrepreneurial process perspective, 
the health of an entrepreneurial ecosystem divulges its performance in relation to new venture 




This dissertation seeks to contribute to entrepreneurial ecosystem literature with the 
conceptualisation of entrepreneurial ecosystem health. The resource dynamisms bridge the gap 
between individual entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial ecosystems and shed light on how 
resource-accessing behaviours in individual entrepreneurial processes contribute to the 
ecosystem-level resource dynamisms. The integrative process model contributes to the regional 
entrepreneurship literature by elaborating on the feedback impacts of regional entrepreneurship 
on regional resources. Finally, a resource-based view of entrepreneurial ecosystems is provided, 
which addresses the necessity of facilitating sufficient resource dynamisms within and outside 
of the ecosystems in pursuit of ecosystem health.  
This dissertation has implications for governments to guide their policy initiatives by informing 
them the health of regional entrepreneurial ecosystems and potential directions for resource 
(re-)configurations in the ecosystems in order to maximise the economic return and societal 
utilities. It also has implications for individual entrepreneurs in terms of their location choices 
and how to leverage resources of the ecosystem in which they reside. 
As in any other qualitative work, generalisability problems exist. Future work could focus on 
drawing comparisons between Shenzhen and Silicon Valley to yield new insights. More case 
studies on different regions, particularly those ‘failed regions’, should be explored to enrich 
the current framework. The author also realises that this framework is far from 
operationalisation. It is therefore imperative to focus on operationalising the health of 
entrepreneurial ecosystems in order to provide a readily available tool for policymakers to 
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